Opinion
No. 05-10-00011-CR
Opinion Filed June 30, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F05-60131-T.
Before Justices O'NEILL, FRANCIS, and MURPHY.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
James Antwan Royal appeals from the adjudication of guilt for possession of cocaine. In two points of error, appellant contends the order of deferred adjudication and the trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt should be modified. We affirm the judgment adjudicating guilt as modified. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled. Appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine in an amount of one gram or more, but less than four grams. See Tex. Health Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(a), (c) (Vernon 2003). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court deferred adjudicating guilt, placed appellant on four years' community supervision, and assessed a $1500 fine. The State later moved to adjudicate guilt, alleging appellant violated seven conditions of his community supervision. Appellant pleaded not true to the allegations in a hearing on the motion. The trial court found two of the allegations true, adjudicated appellant guilty, and assessed punishment at three years' imprisonment. In his first point of error, appellant contends the order of deferred adjudication should be modified to reflect the correct name of the State's attorney. In his second point of error, appellant contends the judgment adjudicating guilt should also be modified to recite the correct the name of the State's attorney. The State agrees that the judgment adjudicating guilt should be modified as proposed by appellant. As to the order of deferred adjudication, we dismiss appellant's complaint. Once the trial court adjudicated appellant's guilt, the deferred adjudication order was no longer in effect. See Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); McCoy v. State, 81 S.W.3d 917, 919 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, pet. ref'd). A trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt expressly sets aside the underlying deferred adjudication order and declares it to be "of no further force and effect." See McCoy, 81 S.W.3d at 919. Therefore, there is no longer an order in effect requiring modification. We overrule appellant's first point of error. The record shows the State was represented by Patrice Williams at the hearing on the motion to adjudicate. The written judgment adjudicating guilt recites that "John Grau" appeared as the attorney for the State. Thus, the written judgment is incorrect. We sustain appellant's second point of error. We modify the trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt to show Patrice Williams was the attorney for the State. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529-30 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd). As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt.