Id. at 510, 23 A. at 755. Accord, Roxbury v. Bridgewater, 85 Conn. 196, 202, 82 A. 193, 194 (1912), cited in Perlstein, supra, 152 Conn. at 158, 204 A.2d at 911; cf. Hames v. Hames, 163 Conn. 588, 599, 316 A.2d 379, 385 (1972) ("policy of the law is strongly opposed to regarding an attempted marriage . . . entered into in good faith, believed by one or both of the parties to be legal, and followed by cohabitation, to be void"). In Erwin v. English, the standard of proof that no divorce decree had issued dissolving a prior marriage was described to be as stringent as the standard of proof in a criminal prosecution for bigamy. 61 Conn. at 509, 23 A. at 755.

No mere claim of bigamy, whether made in a pleading or elsewhere, would establish that a marriage was bigamous. See cases such as Roxbury v. Bridgewater, 85 Conn. 196, 202, 82 A. 193. Seldom, if ever, would a party to a bigamous marriage, in the face of the presumption of its validity, feel free to treat the marriage as a nullity without a decree of annulment. Nor do we believe any attorney would advise such a course of conduct.

We discussed the concept of domicil at length in McDonald v. Hartford Trust Co., 104 Conn. 169, 132 A. 902, where we noted that a domicil once acquired continues until another is established and that "[t]he law does not permit one to abandon, nor recognize an abandonment of, a domicil until another has been established." We also there quoted with approval (p. 179) from Roxbury v. Bridgewater, 85 Conn. 196, 201, 82 A. 193, that "[a] change of domicil is a question of `act' and `intention,'" and from Story, Conflict of Laws (5th Ed.) 44 as follows: "Two things, then, must concur to constitute domicil; first, residence; and secondly, the intention of making it the home of the party. . . . It is the fact, coupled with the intention of remaining there."

No mere claim of bigamy, whether made in a pleading or elsewhere, would establish that a marriage was bigamous. See cases such as Roxbury v. Bridgewater, 85 Conn. 196, 202, 82 A. 193. Seldom, if ever, would a party to a bigamous marriage, in the face of the presumption of its validity, feel free to treat the marriage as a nullity without a decree of annulment. Nor do we believe any attorney would advise such a course of conduct.

Whatever assistance she may have had from friends at other times apparently was not available to her to help her defray the expense of her hospitalization. She qualified as a public charge for whom the city was required to provide hospitalization because she was in fact destitute, without means, credit, or prospect of paying for the care within a reasonable period, and she had no legally obligated relatives of sufficient means upon whom liability could be imposed. Bridgewater v. Roxbury, 54 Conn. 213, 222, 6 A. 415; Hartford Hospital v. Berlin, 114 Conn. 233, 236, 158 A. 236; State v. Bristol, 139 Conn. 469, 474, 95 A.2d 78. Mrs. Bromley's insistence that the bill for her hospitalization was an obligation of her own and not one for the municipality is a refreshing commentary upon her character and sense of responsibility.

The statute does not demand that information be given as to the extent or quality of the support which the necessities of the pauper require, but information that his condition is that of one who is in receipt of public aid, as being poor and unable to support himself." Roxbury v. Bridgewater, 85 Conn. 196, 202, 82 A. 193. The notice in question was in the form of a letter. It gave the names of all members of the Reynolds family, with the date and place of birth; it stated that they have been "accepted for aid" in the plaintiff town; that "we understand" Reynolds is unable to contribute to the support of the family, there is no income in the group and Mrs. Reynolds is unable to work; it detailed the various places and dates where the family had lived since leaving the defendant town and stated that the family had not acquired a settlement in any other town; it closed with the request: "May we have your acceptance of this case?

The intent is the controlling factor in determining the question of domicil. Roxbury v. Bridgewater, 85 Conn. 196, 201, 82 A. 193; Newtown v. Southbury, supra, p. 253. The trial court has not found an intention on her part to establish a domicil in the town of Washington. Strictly speaking the question is not one of domicil but of continuous residence within the terms of the statute.

The intent is the controlling factor. Newtown v. Southbury, 100 Conn. 251, 253, 123 A. 278; Roxbury v. Bridgewater, 85 Conn. 196, 201, 82 A. 193. The conclusion of the trial court that this man had a settlement in Plainville at the time he became dependent, was warranted by the facts.

The circumstantial trustworthiness of the report is supported by the fact that the examination, and the entry thereof, were made in the regular course of the business he had undertaken to perform and for the accuracy and truthfulness of which he assumed responsibility, there being an absence of evidence of any controlling motive to misrepresent. 3 Wig., Ev., ss. 1522, 1527; Welsh v. Barrett, 15 Mass. 380, 386; Nicholls v. Webb, 8 Wheat. 326; Bridgewater v. Roxbury, 54 Conn. 213, 217; Abel v. Fitch, 20 Conn. 90, 96. The claim that the report was a mere casual and isolated statement, like a letter, disregards the evidence that Dr. Stillings was the regular surgeon of the railroad and that his examination and report were made pursuant to the customary practice of the railroad to have such examinations and reports in all cases of accidental injuries. It was a record required by, and kept, in accordance with an established practice.

The entries were identified, sufficiently for purposes of admissibility, as having been made by the deceased chief. Wilcox v. Downing, 88 Conn. 368, 91 A. 262; Norman Printers Supply Co. v. Ford, 77 Conn. 461, 59 A. 499; Bridgewater v. Roxbury, 54 Conn. 213, 216, 6 A. 416; Mathes v. Robinson, 49 Mass. 269; Butchers Slaughtering Melting Asso. v. Boston, 214 Mass. 254, 101 N.E. 426; Hitchner Wall Paper Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 158 F. 1011, 1013; Edwards v. Cedar Rapids, 138 Iowa 421, 116 N.W. 323; 3 Wigmore on Evidence (2d Ed.), § 1639; Stephen's Digest of Evidence, Art. 27; 22 Corpus Juris, pp. 861, 868. The check-mark opposite defendant's name on September 29th was claimed to be a trifle shorter and darker than other check-marks on the same page, but this feature, if it existed, was not of itself sufficient to render the book inadmissible ( Wilcox v. Downing, supra, p. 371, and cases cited), and the claims of the plaintiff questioning the genuineness of this particular entry were fully and fairly submitted to the jury for determination by them.