Rowlett v. Great South Bay Associates

13 Citing cases

  1. Rhodes-Evans v. 111 Chelsea

    44 A.D.3d 430 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)   Cited 60 times
    In Rhodes, the court dismissed the Labor Law claims of a field technician who was assigned the isolated task of splicing a fiber optic cable located in a parking garage in order to provide telephone service to a single tenant located in the building.

    omposition of the building or structure" ( Panek v County of Albany, 99 NY2d 452, 457-458, quoting Joblon v Solow, 91 NY2d 457, 465). Nothing in this record suggests that in splicing a fiber optic cable located in a box plaintiff was making a significant physical change to the garage or building. Splicing a fiber into preexisting fiber optic cable for one tenant in a building does not effect a "significant physical change to the configuration or composition of the building or structure" and does not amount to an alteration under Labor Law § 240 (1) (see Joblon v Solow, 91 NY2d at 465; see also Lioce v Theatre Row Studios, 7 AD3d 493 [plaintiff who fell from ladder while installing lights for a theatrical production not engaged in activity covered by Labor Law § 240 (1)]; DiBenedetto v Port Auth. of N.Y. N.J., 293 AD2d 399, lv denied 98 NY2d 610 [plaintiffs work involving the removal of two bolts and the replacement of a part of a crane did not involve a significant physical change]; Rowlett v Great S. Bay Assoc, 237 AD2d 183, lv denied 90 NY2d 809 [changing electrical switch on rooftop air conditioner so that unit can be turned off for season not protected activity under section 240 (1)]). Nor can it be concluded that the cable was a structure within the meaning of Labor Law § 240 (1). Campbell v City of New York ( 32 AD3d at 704-705) and Sarigul v New York Tel. Co. ( 4 AD3d at 169-170), where plaintiffs, respectively, were splicing an amplifier box into a cable television line and stripping the insulation from a preexisting cable wire, do not require a contrary conclusion.

  2. Esposito v. N.Y.C. Indus. Dev. Agency

    305 A.D.2d 108 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)   Cited 26 times

    The Labor Law § 240(1) claim was properly dismissed; defendants showed that the work plaintiff was preparing to perform, though termed a repair of an air conditioning unit that was not functioning properly, involved only adjustments and replacements of small components, thus falling within the rule enunciated in Jehle v. Adams Hotel Assocs. ( 264 A.D.2d 354; see also Rowlett v. Great South Bay Assocs., 237 A.D.2d 183, 184, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 809). As to plaintiff's claim under Labor Law § 241(6), it must fail as plaintiff was not involved in construction, excavation or demolition as contemplated in that statute.

  3. Gleason v. Gottlieb

    35 A.D.3d 355 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)   Cited 28 times

    an employee of a subcontractor, the third-party defendant Comfort Air Conditioning and Heating, Inc., which was hired by a general contractor, the defendant Taocon, Inc. (hereinafter Taocon), fell from a ladder as he attempted to replace a "water coil" in an air-conditioning unit at the defendant LuLu's LLC, doing business as Lotus Restaurant, owned by the defendant William Gottlieb (hereinafter collectively referred to as Lotus). The work performed by the plaintiff at the time of the accident involved the replacement of worn out parts in a nonconstruction and nonrenovation context, and did not constitute "erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building" within the meaning of Labor Law § 240 (1) so as to bring him within the protective ambit of that statute ( see Smith v Shell Oil Co., 85 NY2d 1000, 1002; Anderson v Olympia York Tower B Co., 14 AD3d 520, 521; Jani v City of New York, 284 AD2d 304; Jehle v Adams Hotel Assoc., 264 AD2d 354, 355; Rowlett v Great S. Bay Assoc., 237 AD2d 183, 184).

  4. Anderson v. Olympia York Tower B Company

    14 A.D.3d 520 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)   Cited 22 times

    The plaintiff, an air-conditioning technician, was injured when he hit his hip against an air-handling unit as he attempted to climb on top of it in order to replace worn-out bearings. The work performed by the plaintiff at the time of the accident involved the replacement of worn-out parts in a nonconstruction and nonrenovation context, and did not constitute "erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building" within the meaning of Labor Law § 240 (1) so as to bring him within the protective ambit of the statute ( see Smith v. Shell Oil Co., 85 NY2d 1000, 1002; Jani v. City of New York, 284 AD2d 304; Rowlett v. Great S. Bay Assoc., 237 AD2d 183, 184). The Supreme Court also properly dismissed the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action since the accident did not occur in connection with construction, demolition, or excavation work ( see Nagel v. D R Realty Corp., 99 NY2d 98, 103).

  5. Caraciolo v. 800 Second Avenue Condominium

    294 A.D.2d 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)   Cited 26 times

    (Melo v. Consolidated Edison, 92 N.Y.2d 909; Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 513; Beckford v. City of New York, 261 A.D.2d 158.) Defendant contends that Caraciolo was not engaged in repair or any of the other activities specified in Section 240(1) when he fell from the water tank ladder and suffered his injuries, but only in the performance of routine maintenance, and that, therefore, Section 240(1) does not apply (see, Smith v. Shell Oil Co., 85 N.Y.2d 1000, 1002; Rowlett v. Great South Bay Associates, 237 A.D.2d 183, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 809). Defendant's contention is rejected.

  6. Jani v. City of New York

    284 A.D.2d 304 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)   Cited 31 times

    The injured plaintiff (hereinafter the plaintiff), an electrician, was injured when he fell from a ladder while attempting to replace an electrical contactor located in an air-handling unit. The work performed by the plaintiff at the time of the accident involved the mere replacement of a worn-out component part in a nonconstruction, nonrenovation context, and did not constitute "erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building" within the meaning of Labor Law — 240(1) so as to bring the plaintiff within the protective ambit of the statute (see, Smith v. Shell Oil Co., 85 N.Y.2d 1000; Greenwood v. Gold Shearson, Lehman Hutton, 238 A.D.2d 311; Rowlett v. Great S. Bay Assocs., 237 A.D.2d 183; see also, Edwards v. Twenty-Four Twenty-Six Main St. Assoc., 195 A.D.2d 592). Similarly, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the plaintiffs' claim pursuant to Labor Law — 241(6), as the injured plaintiff's activity did not constitute repair work (see, Ross v. Curtis-Palmer, 81 N.Y.2d 494).

  7. Franco v. Jemal

    280 A.D.2d 409 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)   Cited 24 times
    Fixing inoperative rooftop central air conditioning unit

    Plaintiff, a journeyman electrician, was injured when he fell from a ladder while attempting to repair a rooftop central air conditioning unit. The IAS court granted defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment on the authority of Rowlett v. Great South Bay ( 237 A.D.2d 183, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 809), holding that plaintiff's replacing of a switch on the rooftop air conditioner was not the type of work to which the protections of the scaffold law apply. While the plaintiff in Rowlett was performing routine maintenance, Franco was assigned to perform the repair in this case because the rooftop air conditioner was inoperable.

  8. Zevallos v. Treeco Plainview Limited

    267 A.D.2d 305 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 5 times

    The injured plaintiff then fell to the ground, sustaining injuries as a result of both the electric shock and the fall. We agree with the Supreme Court that the activity in which the injured plaintiff was engaged at the time he was injured, whether examining a junction box in preparation for changing some wires which had been sparking or investigating the cause of the sparking to determine if future maintenance was necessary, was routine maintenance and does not fall within the ambit of Labor Law § 240 Lab.(1) (see, Joblon v. Solow, 91 N.Y.2d 457; Houchang Haghighi v. Bailer, 240 A.D.2d 368; Rowlett v. Great S. Bay Assocs., 237 A.D.2d 183;Howe v. 1660 Grand Is. Blvd., 209 A.D.2d 934; Bermel v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 231 A.D.2d 663). Thus, the Supreme Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant dismissing the complaint.

  9. Lawrence Jehle v. Adams Hotel Associates [1st Dept 1999

    695 N.Y.S.2d 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)

    Accordingly, if the injured party's underlying complaint fails to state a cause of action, there is no basis for a contribution claim. Labor Law § 240(1) does not apply to routine maintenance that is not done in the context of construction or renovation work (Koch v. E.C.H. Holding Corp., 248 A.D.2d 510, 511, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 811). Case law indicates that replacement of parts that wear out routinely should be considered maintenance, outside the purview of Labor Law § 240(1) (Rowlett v. Great S. Bay Assocs., 237 A.D.2d 183, 184, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 809 [statute does not cover replacing broken electrical switch on air conditioning unit]), as opposed to replacement of non-functioning components of a building or structure (Holka v. Mt. Mercy Academy, 221 A.D.2d 949, appeal dismissed 87 N.Y.2d 1055 [statute covers removal of broken motor from ventilation system on building roof]). As in Rowlett, Jehle's tasks on the day of the accident merely involved replacing or repairing relatively small components that suffered from normal wear and tear, not major structural work.

  10. Jehle v. Adams Hotel Associates

    264 A.D.2d 354 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 70 times
    Replacing small air conditioning components that suffered from wear and tear

    Accordingly, if the injured party's underlying complaint fails to state a cause of action, there is no basis for a contribution claim. Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1) does not apply to routine maintenance that is not done in the context of construction or renovation work ( Koch v. E.C.H. Holding Corp., 248 A.D.2d 510, 511, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 811). Case law indicates that replacement of parts that wear out routinely should be considered maintenance; outside the purview of Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1) ( Rowlett v. Great S. Bay Assocs., 237 A.D.2d 183, 184, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 809 (statute does not cover replacing broken electrical switch on air conditioning unit]), as opposed to replacement of non-functioning components of a building or structure ( Holka v. Mt. Mercy Academy, 221 A.D.2d 949, lv dismissed 87 N.Y.2d 1055 (statute covers removal of broken motor from ventilation system on building roof]). As in Rowlett, Jehle's tasks on the day of the accident merely involved replacing or repairing relatively small components that suffered from normal wear and tear, not major structural work.