Summary
dismissing claim where complaint did not "describ[e] a failure by policymakers to provide adequate training or supervision to subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate indifference"
Summary of this case from Harding v. CanfieldOpinion
6:19-CV-06933 EAW
2021-09-03
Ronald E. ROWLES, Plaintiff, v. Nurse Jane DOE, Physician Assistant Dave Parsons, and Niagara County, Defendants.
Ronald E. Rowles, Buffalo, NY, Pro Se. Paul A. Sanders, Barclay Damon, LLP, Rochester, NY, for Defendant PA Dave Parsons. Brian P. Crosby, Melissa M. Morton, Gibson, McAskill & Crosby, LLP, Buffalo, NY, for Defendant Niagara County.
Ronald E. Rowles, Buffalo, NY, Pro Se.
Paul A. Sanders, Barclay Damon, LLP, Rochester, NY, for Defendant PA Dave Parsons.
Brian P. Crosby, Melissa M. Morton, Gibson, McAskill & Crosby, LLP, Buffalo, NY, for Defendant Niagara County.
DECISION AND ORDER
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, Chief Judge INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Ronald E. Rowles ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants Nurse Jane Doe, Physician Assistant Dave Parsons, and Niagara County (collectively "Defendants"), violated his constitutional rights when they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. (Dkt. 4). Presently before the Court is a motion filed by defendant Niagara County ("the County") to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for municipal liability against it, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. 10). For the reasons explained below, the County's motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's amended complaint. (Dkt. 4). As required on a motion to dismiss, the Court treats Plaintiff's factual allegations as true.
Plaintiff alleges that, when he was being processed at Niagara County Correctional Facility on June 28, 2019, he verbally informed the nurse that he recently underwent an MRI after being involved in a car accident on February 16, 2019. (Id. at 5, 12). Plaintiff had sustained injuries to his back and neck, which included "herniations and bulges" at "T1, T2, T9, T10, C5-6, C6-7, L5 [and] S1." (Id. ). "No further action was taken" by the medical staff and, on July 26, 2019, Plaintiff "filed a sick call for [his] pain [but] was never seen." (Id. at 5).
Plaintiff filed additional sick call requests in August through December 2019. (Id. at 12-13). On October 2, 2019, Plaintiff was informed that the "jail doesn't provide medical care for federal inmates." (Id. at 12). Plaintiff started receiving some pain medication on October 14, 2019, but it was insufficient to relieve his "major" pain. (Id. at 12, 14). On December 4, 2019, Plaintiff was seen by defendant Parsons, who advised Plaintiff that he "shouldn't have come to jail" and called him a "complainer." (Id. at 12). Plaintiff filed several grievances in December 2019, and was erroneously removed from the doctor's list on or about December 25, 2019. (Id. at 12-13). Plaintiff was seen by the doctor on December 27, 2019, and approved for physical therapy, which consisted of only two sessions conducted in January and February 2020. (Id. at 13). As of September 1, 2020, Plaintiff was still waiting for his physical therapy to resume, and he continues to suffer from severe neck and back pain. (Id. at 13-14). He alleges that his injuries "are far more serious than what the medical staff has medicated [him] for," and that he has "never had this much of a hassle receiving ‘proper care’ " for his medical problems than he has at the jail. (Id. at 14).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed his complaint and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on December 30, 2019. (Dkt. 1; Dkt. 2). The Court screened the complaint and directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. (Dkt. 3). Plaintiff filed his amended complaint on September 8, 2020, and named the "Niagara County Correctional Facility Medical" as a defendant. (Dkt. 4 at 1). On January 5, 2021, the Court issued a Decision and Order, which permitted Plaintiff's claim based on inadequate medical care to proceed to service. (Dkt. 5 at 5). The Court further found that although Plaintiff named "Niagara County Correctional Facility Medical" as a defendant, the real party in interest was Niagara County, and therefore the County was substituted as a defendant. (Id. at 6). The Court clarified that "[f]or purposes of initial review only" it would "generously construe[ ] the pleadings to assert the existence of a policy or practice to deny medical care to federal prisoners confined at the Jail." (Id. at 7).
Plaintiff states in a grievance attached to his amended complaint that he was "a federal detainee inmate." (Dkt. 4 at 10). Assuming that Plaintiff was not a sentenced prisoner during the period alleged in the amended complaint, his deliberate indifference claim would be evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Darnell v. Pineiro , 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017).
On February 19, 2021, the County filed its motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 10). The Court set a scheduling order, requiring that Plaintiff file response papers no later than March 15, 2021 (Dkt. 13), and the docket reflects that a copy of the scheduling order was mailed to Plaintiff. To date, Plaintiff has not filed a response to the County's motion to dismiss.
Defendant Parsons filed an answer to the amended complaint on February 24, 2021. (Dkt. 15). To date, Plaintiff has failed to identify the individual presently named as Nurse Jane Doe. (See Dkt. 8; Dkt. 18; Dkt. 19).
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
"In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may consider the facts alleged in the [pleading], documents attached to the [pleading] as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the [pleading]." DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C. , 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010). A court should consider the motion by "accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the [claimant]." Trs. of Upstate N.Y. Eng'rs Pension Fund v. Ivy Asset Mgmt. , 843 F.3d 561, 566 (2d Cir. 2016). To withstand dismissal, a claimant must set forth "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the [claimant] pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Turkmen v. Ashcroft , 589 F.3d 542, 546 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ).
"While a [pleading] attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a [claimant]’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotations and citations omitted). "To state a plausible claim, the [pleading]’s ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’ " Nielsen v. AECOM Tech. Corp. , 762 F.3d 214, 218 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). While the Court is "obliged to construe [pro se ] pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations," McEachin v. McGuinnis , 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004), even pleadings submitted pro se must satisfy the plausibility standard set forth in Iqbal and Twombly , see Harris v. Mills , 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) ("Even after Twombly , though, we remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.").
II. Plaintiff has Failed to Plead a Claim for Municipal Liability Against the County
The County moves for dismissal on the basis that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for municipal liability against it for deliberate indifference to medical care, because he has failed to allege: (1) the existence of a formal policy endorsed by the County; (2) a practice so persistent and widespread such that it constitutes a custom or usage of which supervisory authorities must have been aware; or (3) a municipal custom, policy, or usage which can be inferred from evidence of deliberate indifference of supervisory officials to such abuses. (Dkt. 10-1 at 4; Dkt. 10-4 at 9-16). The County contends that medical treatment at the jail is provided not by county employees, but rather by employees of an independent contractor, PrimeCare Medical of New York, Inc.—the employees of which do not hold supervisory roles in the county and are not involved in making policy decisions—and therefore municipal liability cannot exist as to the County, since the conduct complained of by Plaintiff was not performed by county employees. (Dkt. 10-4 at 10-11). Further, the County argues that even if the conduct complained of by Plaintiff was undertaken by a county employee, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a claim for municipal liability. (Id. at 11-17).
In support of its claim that medical care at the jail was performed not by county employees but by an independent contractor, the County submits the declaration of Darren W. Engert, an Administrative Captain with the Corrections Division of the Niagara County Sheriff's Office. (Dkt. 10-2 at ¶ 1). Mr. Engert states, in relevant part, that "any and all medical care and treatment received by inmates at the Niagara County Jail is exclusively provided by an independent contractor, PrimeCare Medical of New York, Inc. ... and its employees and/or subcontractors." (Id. at ¶ 12). Mr. Engert's statement that PrimeCare, and not county employees, provide medical care to inmates at the jail is supported by Plaintiff's amended complaint, which includes as an attachment a PrimeCare "Patient Follow-Up Sheet." (See Dkt. 4 at 9). The document is dated "8-22," and indicates that Plaintiff underwent an MRI of his cervical spine on June 14, 2019, the results of which were considered within normal ranges, with no further visits required. (Id. ). "Herniations [at] C5-6 [and] C6-7 without stenosis" were noted. (Id. ).
Given that the motion before the Court is a motion to dismiss—where the Court is required to accept all allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff—the Court will not consider the declaration submitted by Mr. Engert in resolving the County's motion. Further, the Court notes that "[c]ontracting out prison medical care does not relieve the State of its constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment to those in its custody, and it does not deprive the State's prisoners of the means to vindicate their [constitutional] rights." Carter v. Broome Cnty. , 394 F. Supp. 3d 228, 241-42 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting West v. Atkins , 487 U.S. 42, 56, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) ).
"[T]o establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that ‘action pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused the alleged constitutional injury." Cash v. Cnty. of Erie , 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Connick v. Thompson , 563 U.S. 51, 60, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011) ). "[T]o hold a [municipality] liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of its employees, a plaintiff is required to plead and prove three elements: (1) an official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right." Batista v. Rodriguez , 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1983). Official municipal policy includes "the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law." Connick , 563 U.S. at 61, 131 S.Ct. 1350. To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff "cannot merely allege the existence of a municipal policy or custom, but must allege facts tending to support, at least circumstantially, an inference that such a municipal policy or custom exists." Triano v. Town of Harrison, N.Y. , 895 F. Supp. 2d 526, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff may satisfy the "policy or custom" requirement by alleging one of the following:
(1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions taken by government officials responsible for establishing the municipal policies that caused the particular deprivation in question; (3) a practice so consistent and widespread that, although not expressly authorized, constitutes a custom or usage of which a supervising policy-maker must have been aware; or (4) a failure by policymakers to provide adequate training or supervision to subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of those who come into contact with the municipal employees.
Brandon v. City of New York , 705 F. Supp. 2d 261, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff's allegations are not sufficient to survive the County's motion to dismiss. The focus of Plaintiff's amended complaint is the treatment of his neck and back injuries at the jail, including that he was denied medical treatment and that when he did receive treatment, including both in the form of medications and physical therapy, it was not effective. Plaintiff's factual allegations focus on treatment he received from a physician assistant and a nurse, rather than on a widespread policy to deny inmates medical treatment.
Even construing Plaintiff's allegation that on October 2, 2019, he was informed that the "jail doesn't provide medical care for federal inmates" (see Dkt. 4 at 12) as identifying a policy or practice by the County, the amended complaint does not include supporting factual allegations regarding this alleged policy sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. "While Monell claims are not subject to a ‘heightened’ pleading standard beyond that defined in Rule 8(a)(2), such claims nevertheless must meet the plausibility requirements of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly ... and Ashcroft v. Iqbal ." King v. City of Beacon Police Dep't , No. 20 CV 5815 (VB), 2021 WL 1550073, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2021) (citation omitted); see also Missel v. Cnty. of Monroe , 351 F. App'x 543, 545 (2d Cir. 2009) (where plaintiff complained that deputy acted pursuant to county policy of permitting deputies to publish false statements and to target perceived pedophiles for harassment, explaining that plaintiff "made no allegation that any official policymaker or policymaking body took any action to establish either of the policies he alleges," and "allegations that [the deputy] acted pursuant to a ‘policy,’ without any facts suggesting the policy's existence, are plainly insufficient.").
Here, Plaintiff does not specify who informed him of the alleged policy or the circumstances of his learning of the policy, nor does he identify other federal inmates denied medical care or any rule indicating that it is the official policy of the County to deny medical care to federal inmates. Plaintiff's allegations, which reveal that he did receive at least some medical treatment at the jail, also do not provide factual support for the existence of such a policy. In other words, even generously construing Plaintiff's amended complaint as alleging a policy of denying medical care to federal inmates, that allegation is still too conclusory to plausibly allege a claim for municipal liability against the County. Vassallo v. City of New York , No. 15 Civ. 7125 (KPF), 2016 WL 6902478, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2016) (dismissing plaintiff's inadequate medical care claim against municipal defendants, and explaining that "[t]o state there is a policy does not make it so," and "while a plaintiff need not assert the allegations in the initial complaint with a level of specificity only made possible through discovery ... additional facts for Plaintiff's ‘official policy’ Monell allegations are required" (internal citation omitted)); see also Fleming v. City of New York , No. 18 Civ. 4866 (GBD), 2019 WL 4392522, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2019) ("Plaintiff's conclusory allegations are ... insufficient to allege that the Monell Defendants have a longstanding custom, pattern, or practice of ... being deliberately indifferent to inmates’ medical needs or physical safety."); Isaac v. City of New York , No. 17 Civ. 1021 (PGG), 2018 WL 1322196, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2018) ("Plaintiff's conclusory allegations regarding the alleged deprivation of adequate medical care that he suffered are ... not sufficient to establish a municipal custom or policy."). In other words, "mere allegations of a municipal custom, a practice of tolerating official misconduct, or inadequate training and/or supervision are insufficient to demonstrate the existence of such a custom unless supported by factual details. " Tieman v. City of Newburgh , No. 13-CV-4178 (KMK), 2015 WL 1379652, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015) (emphasis added); see also Simms v. City of New York , No. 10-CV-3420 (NGG)(RML), 2011 WL 4543051, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2011) (dismissing plaintiff's claim against city, which made "a scant three factual assertions, which, when read together, d[id] not amount to a plausible claim that any City policy, practice, or custom contributed to [plaintiff's] injury"), aff'd , 480 F. App'x 627 (2d Cir. 2012).
Further, Plaintiff has not identified any actions taken by policymaking individuals resulting in the denial of medical care to federal inmates. Rather, Plaintiff's claims are based on medical treatment he received or did not receive from a nurse and physician assistant, neither of whom from the allegations contained in the amended complaint appear to be policymaking individuals. Nor has Plaintiff alleged that the failure to treat federal inmates was a practice so consistent or widespread at the jail that it constitutes a custom, such as by identifying other federal inmates who were denied medical care or other prison officials who denied federal inmates medical care. See Walker v. City of New York , No. 14-CV-808 (ER), 2015 WL 4254026, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2015) ("While Plaintiff provides general allegations that the City has adopted a widespread custom, the facts pled are insufficient to meet this prong's requirements."). Finally, the amended complaint does not contain allegations describing a failure by policymakers to provide adequate training or supervision to subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate indifference. Rather, Plaintiff's amended complaint details his requests for medical care, his visits with medical staff at the jail, and grievances he filed relating to his care. Without further development by Plaintiff, allegations of this nature are not sufficient to impose liability on the County.
Plaintiff has not responded to the County's motion to dismiss, and therefore he has failed to identify how any of the allegations contained in his amended complaint support imposing municipal liability on the County. Because Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege municipal liability on the part of the County, his claims against it must be dismissed. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the County's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's municipal liability claim is granted. Plaintiff's amended complaint is dismissed as to defendant Niagara County only, and the Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Niagara County as a defendant to this action.
SO ORDERED.