24 Am.Jur. 867 (Sec. 49); Ex parte Montgomery, 244 Ala. 91, 12 So.2d 314. The oath of secrecy given to grand jurors refers primarily to deliberations. Ex parte Montgomery, 244 Ala. 91, 12 So.2d 314; Rowell v. State, 39 Ala. App. 613, 105 So.2d 877. After indictment and arrest, the testimony before a grand jury is not a matter of secrecy. Ex parte Montgomery, 244 Ala. 91, 12 So.2d 314; Rowell v. State, 39 Ala. App. 613, 105 So.2d 877. Even in absence of a statute or rule, the mere presence of a stenographer before a grand jury merely for the purpose of taking the testimony of witnesses does not warrant the dismissal of the indictment.

United States v. American Radiator Standard Sanitary Corporation, 45 F.R.D. 477 (D.C.W.D.Pa., 1968). It has further been held that the same considerations do not necessarily apply regarding witness secrecy once an indictment has been issued, and that at that time witness secrecy is no longer required, State ex rel. Clagett v. James, 327 S.W.2d 278 (Mo.Sup.Ct., 1959); Rowell v. State, 39 Ala. App. 613, 615, 105 So.2d 877 (1958). The court in Rowell v. State, supra, construing a statutory provision similar to that of Ohio imposing an obligation of secrecy as to "the counsel of the state, your own, and your fellows" held that such restriction related only to the debates, deliberations, matters no billed and voting of the grand jury.

Evidence gained as the result of illegal search and seizure may not be introduced. Boggs v. State, 268 Ala. 358, 106 So.2d 263; Tell v. State, 285 Ala. 234, 231 So.2d 107; Duncan v. Alabama, 278 Ala. 145, 176 So.2d 840; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854. Denial of information to defendant relative to his innocence is denial of due process of law. Constitution of the United States, Art. V; Rowell v. State, 39 Ala. App. 613, 105 So.2d 877; Ala. Code Title 30, Sec. 87. William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., Montgomery, and Quentin O. Brown, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Birmingham, for the State.

The testimony subject to be disclosed by a grand juror is limited and specified by statute to issues involving consistency or truth. Farlow v. State, 7 Ala. App. 137, 61 So. 474; Williams v. State, 32 Ala. App. 597, 28 So.2d 731; Rowell v. State, 39 Ala. App. 613, 105 So.2d 877; Code, Tit. 30, § 87. In a prosecution for assault with intent to murder, the jury may infer intent from the character of the assault, the nature of the instrument used, the extent of the wounds inflicted and the presence or absence of excusing or palliating facts or circumstances.