Opinion
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
CHARLES F. EICK, Magistrate Judge.
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Stephen V. Wilson, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 636 and General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
PROCEEDINGS
On November 1, 2010, Petitioner filed a "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Person in Federal Custody, " arguing that the Bureau of Prisons violated the "Second Chance Act of 2007, " Pub. L. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2007) ("Second Chance Act") by refusing to place Petitioner in a Residential Reentry Center ("RRC") for the last twelve months of his sentence. On December 3, 2010, Petitioner filed a "Supplemental Brief" in support of the Petition. On February 8, 2011, Respondent filed a "Response" to the Petition. On May 2, 2011, Petitioner filed a "Response to Rebuttal of Respondent's Answer to § 2241" (the "Reply").
On April 13, 2011, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the instant Petition voluntarily. On the same date, the Court entered Judgment dismissing the Petition without prejudice. On June 27, 2011, Petitioner filed a "Motion for Relief from Judgment and Order to Reopen Case, etc., " which the Court granted on September 7, 2011.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is serving a 36-month sentence for having violated the terms of his supervised release (Petition at 2). Assuming Petitioner earns all available good conduct credit, he will be eligible for release on November 6, 2011 (Declaration of Jeffrey Horton filed with Response ("Horton Decl.") at ¶ 5 & Ex. A thereto).
On February 22, 2010, Petitioner submitted a "Request for Administrative Remedy Informal Resolution" form to his counselor, requesting that the Bureau of Prisons (the "Bureau") consider Petitioner for placement in an RRC facility for the last full year of his sentence (Petition Ex. A). On February 24, 2010, Petitioner's counselor denied the request, stating "your Unit Team has considered your request for a one year placement in an RRC, but has determined that a [six] month placement will meet your needs [and] protect society" (Id.). Petitioner's acting unit manager concurred with the denial on or about the same date (Id.).
On February 26, 2010, Petitioner submitted a "Request for Administrative Remedy" form, asking for reconsideration of his RRC placement and for a statement of the criteria used in determining Petitioner's placement (Petition Ex. B-1). On or about March 10, 2010, Petitioner's warden denied Petitioner's request, asserting that the six-month RRC placement is adequate to meet Petitioner's needs, given the "resources of the facility being considered, the nature of the circumstances of the inmate's offense, history and characteristics of the inmate, availability of resources, and foremost, public and inmate safety" (Petition Ex. C-2).
On March 17, 2010, Petitioner submitted a "Regional Administrative Remedy Appeal" form requesting reconsideration of his RRC placement, arguing that Petitioner required one full year of RRC placement to meet his specific reentry needs (Petition Ex. B-2). On April 9, 2010, Petitioner's Regional Director denied the request, stating:
A review of your case reveals that you are serving a 36-month sentence and have a projected release date of August 16, 2011. The Unit Team has made an individualized determination regarding your RRC placement to address your transitional needs. You are commended for your consistent participation in a significant number of educational courses during your period of incarceration. You are also encouraged to dedicate some time to the Release Preparation Program (RPP). Your participation in the RPP, is an effective way to begin the transition from incarceration to successfully living in the community. A review of your trust fund account reveals that you receive funds on a regular basis which would suggest you have support in the community. Based upon all of these factors, we agree that 180 days in an RRC is of sufficient duration to provide the greatest likelihood of successful reintegration into the community. Institution staff have utilized Program Statement 7310.04, Community Corrections Center (CCC) Utilization and Transfer Procedure, and the criteria set forth in the Second Chance Act of 2007 in making this decision.
Program Statement 7310.04 is the Bureau's Program Statement concerning RRC placement procedures. See Bureau of Prisons, Community Corrections Center (CCC) Utilization and Transfer Procedure (Dec. 16, 1998), available at http:// www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/7310_004.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2011). The Statement remains in effect "with minor adjustments" to comply with the Second Chance Act. See Horton Decl., Ex. B at 2-4 (April 14, 2008 Bureau memorandum explaining the changes to the law and applicable Bureau policies following the Second Chance Act).
(Petition Ex. C-3).
On or about May 3, 2010, Petitioner submitted a "Central Office Administrative Remedy Appeal" form requesting reconsideration of his RRC placement, alleging that the prior administrative responses were inadequate for supposedly failing to consider all of Petitioner's reentry needs (Petition Exs. B-3, D). On October 8, 2010, the Administrator of National Inmate Appeals denied the request, explaining:
Our review revealed that you were evaluated for pre-release RRC placement pursuant to the Second Chance Act. Upon review of your individual case, along with consideration of the [Program Statement 7310.04] factors and the criteria in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), staff determined an RRC placement of 180 days was appropriate. At your next program review, your unit team noted you had not maintained clear conduct since that last team meeting. Specifically, you received incident reports for Possession of a Dangerous Weapon (Code 104), Accepting Money or Anything of Value from Another without Staff Authorization (Code 328), and Use of the Telephone for Abuses Other than Criminal Activity (Code 397). As a result of these incident reports, your RRC placement recommendation was reduced to 90 days. Staff refer inmates for pre-release placement to the appropriate Community Corrections Manager (CCM), but the final decision as to the community program or placement length is within the discretion of the CCM. You will be notified of the final decision. We concur with the actions of staff and find them appropriate.
This incident report concerned a five-inch-long piece of metal sharpened to a point and concealed within the sole of a boot (Exhibit F to Petitioner's "Supplemental Brief, etc., " filed December 3, 2010).
(Horton Decl., Ex. J (last page); see also Horton Decl. ¶¶ 11-12 & Exs. E-F (detailing five chronological disciplinary records and related incident reports Petitioner received from February through October 2010)).
Following Petitioner's administrative appeal, it appears that Bureau officials twice have reconsidered Petitioner's RRC placement and reduced the placement recommendation. Petitioner alleges that in October, 2010, his Case Management Coordinator approved Petitioner for RRC placement for only the last sixty (60) days of his sentence due, in part, to the incident reports that Petitioner received during his current incarceration (Supplemental Brief at 2-3). Most recently, on January 11, 2011, Petitioner's Unit Team reviewed Petitioner's progress in recommended programs and determined that RRC placement for only the last thirty (30) days of Petitioner's sentence was appropriate, given Petitioner's "numerous disciplinary incidents during the last year of his incarceration" and considering the criteria in 18 U.S.C. section 3621(b). See Horton Decl. ¶¶ 13-15 (explaining evaluation in detail).
PETITIONER'S CONTENTIONS
Petitioner originally contended that the Bureau of Prisons violated the Second Chance Act by refusing to place Petitioner in an RRC for the last twelve months of his sentence. Specifically, Petitioner contended that the Bureau did not consider his participation in skills development programming, as purportedly required under 42 U.S.C. section 17541, when the Bureau assessed Petitioner for placement in an RRC (Affidavit attached to Petition at 1-2). Petitioner argues that the Bureau has not created any incentive programs for inmates, as purportedly required under 42 U.S.C. section 17541 (Id.). Petitioner now asks the Court to grant him a six-month RRC placement rather than the thirty-day placement the Bureau presently intends (Reply at 3).
GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARDS
As amended by the Second Chance Act in 2008, 18 U.S.C. section 3624 governs the designation of prisoners to RRCs for the final months of their sentences. See Sacora v. Thomas , 628 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2010), pet. for cert. filed, (May 16, 2011) (discussing same). Section 3624(c) provides that the Bureau:
shall, to the extent practicable, ensure that a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment spends a portion of the final months of that term (not to exceed 12 months), under conditions that will afford that prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for reentry of that prisoner into the community. Such conditions may include a community correctional facility. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1). Section 3624(c)(6) delegates to the Bureau the responsibility to issue regulations to ensure that placement in a community correctional facility is conducted in a manner consistent with 18 U.S.C. section 3621(b), determined on an individual basis, and "of sufficient duration to provide the greatest likelihood of successful reintegration into the community." See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(6). The Bureau accordingly has adopted policies for designating RRC placement, which the Ninth Circuit has approved. See Sass v. Thomas, 405 Fed.App'x 202, 203 (9th Cir. Dec. 8, 2010) (citing Sacora v. Thomas , 628 F.3d at 1061, as approving the Bureau's Second Chance Act-related policies); Sacora v. Thomas , 628 F.3d at 1061-67 (discussing applicable policies at length); see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 570.20-.22 (applicable regulations which track language in 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(6)); Horton Decl. Exs. B-C (April 14, 2008 and November 14, 2008 Bureau memoranda outlining modified procedures for determining RRC placements based on the Second Chance Act).
Community Correctional facilities are also known as Residential Reentry Centers. See Sacora v. Thomas , 628 F.3d at 1061; see also Bureau of Prisons, Statement of Work, Residential Reentry Center, Attachment F (Revision Feb. 2010) (defining "Residential Reentry Center"), available at www.bop.gov/ locations/cc/res_rentry_ctr_sow_2010.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2011).
Section 3621 provides in pertinent part:
Although not discussed in Sacora, the Bureau issued a third memorandum regarding RRC placement on June 24, 2010, providing that "inmates with recent, serious, or chronic misconduct... may be inappropriate" for RRC placement. See Horton Decl., Ex. D at 3.
The Bureau is solely responsible for designating the place of a federal prisoner's confinement. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). Where a petitioner complains of the Bureau's RRC placement decision, the only relief a habeas court may grant is an order for individualized consideration of RRC placement in accordance with applicable laws. See Rodriguez v. Smith , 541 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming grant of writ of habeas corpus and ordering the Bureau to consider petitioner for transfer to an RRC in accordance with 18 U.S.C. section 3621(b), rather than ordering immediate transfer); see also United States v. Dragna , 746 F.2d 457, 458 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985) (district court does not have jurisdiction to decide the location of a defendant's incarceration; that decision rests solely with the executive branch); United States v. Charry Cubillos , 91 F.3d 1342, 1343 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); Brown v. Atkinson, 2010 WL 3659634, at *5 (S.D. Fla. June 11, 2010), adopted, 2010 WL 3659587 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2010) ("decisions regarding the prisoner's placement, including whether, when, and for how long he [or she] might appropriately be placed [] in a pre-release setting..., are for the [Bureau] to make, and are matters over which this Court does not have authority"); Arred v. Phillips, 2008 WL 4219074, at *3 n.2 (N.D. W.Va. Sept. 15, 2008) (noting that the court lacks authority to order the Bureau to afford a longer period of community corrections placement once a decision is made). Where a court finds that the Bureau's policies are unlawful, the resulting relief is not an order for transfer, only an order for the individualized consideration of transfer. See Rodriguez v. Smith , 541 F.3d at 1189.
DISCUSSION
For the reasons discussed below, the Petition should be denied and dismissed without prejudice.
The Court has considered and rejected all of Petitioner's arguments. The Court discusses Petitioner's principal arguments herein.
I. Petitioner's Challenge to the Bureau's Alleged Failure to Give Petitioner an Incentive Award Does Not Merit Habeas Relief.
Petitioner contends that he has not received an "incentive award, " and the Bureau has not created any incentive programs for inmates, as assertedly required by the Second Chance Act (Affidavit attached to Petition at 1-2). Petitioner claims he is entitled to an incentive award of designation for the maximum allowable time in an RRC for having participated in skills development programming while incarcerated (Id. (citing 42 U.S.C § 17541 and Krueger v. Martinez , 665 F.Supp.2d 477 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 2009)).
Section 17541, which was created by the Second Chance Act, provides in relevant part:
The Attorney General, in coordination with the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, shall, subject to the availability of appropriations, conduct the following activities to establish a Federal prisoner reentry initiative: The establishment of a Federal prisoner reentry strategy to help prepare prisoners for release and successful reintegration into the community, including, at a minimum, that the Bureau of Prisons... provide incentives for prisoner participation in skills development programs.
42 U.S.C. § 17541(a)(1)(G). Such incentives "may, at the discretion of the Director, include [] the maximum allowable period in a community confinement facility; and [] such other incentives as the Director considers appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 17541(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
Contrary to Petitioner's contentions, the Second Chance Act does not mandate that the Bureau designate those prisoners who participate in skills development programs for the full twelve months of RRC placement as an incentive for such participation. Rather, the Act expressly leaves to the discretion of the Bureau the nature of the incentives. See 42 U.S.C. § 17541(a)(2)(A); see also Richardson v. Dir. for Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2011 WL 2559423, at *1 (3d Cir. June 29, 2011) (rejecting claim that Second Chance Act requires that Bureau give any particular incentives to prisoners under section 17541); Greene v. Longley, 2011 WL 3924984, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2011) (same); Graves v. Babcock, 2011 WL 818447, at *5 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2011), adopted, 2011 WL 809493 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2011) (finding that language of statute does not create entitlement to twelve months of RRC placement); Rosario v. Scism, 2011 WL 398200, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2011), adopted, 2011 WL 444145 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2011) (same); Bell v. Zych, 2010 WL 5114504, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 16, 2010), adopted, 2010 WL 5100994 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2010) (same); Arthur v. Roal, 2010 WL 3025019, at *7 (D. Minn. July 6, 2010), adopted, 2010 WL 3024848 (D. Minn. Aug. 2, 2010) (same); Rodriguez v. Bledsoe, 2010 WL 2471740, at *9 (M.D. Pa. May 7, 2010), adopted, 2010 WL 2471697 (M.D. Pa. June 15, 2010) (same); Delacruz v. Bledsoe, 2010 WL 1791241, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2010), adopted, 2010 WL 1791234 (M.D. Pa. May 4, 2010) (same).
In Petitioner's case, it appears that the Bureau provided some incentive for participation in skills development programs. In accordance with Program Statement 5325.07, prisoners who do not participate in the Release Preparation Program are deemed to lack the responsibility necessary for community program participation and "ordinarily" will not be allowed to participate in community-based programs. See Horton Decl., ¶ 15; see also Bureau of Prisons, Release Preparation Program (Dec. 31, 2007), available at http://www.bop.gov/ policy/progstat/5325_007.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2011). The Bureau accounted for Petitioner's participation in skills development programs in reviewing Petitioner's case for RRC placement under 18 U.S.C. section 3624(c), when reviewers considered Petitioner's "consistent participation in a significant number of educational courses during [his] period of incarceration" in initially deciding that Petitioner's reintegration needs would best be met by six months in an RRC (Petition Ex. C-3), and also when reviewers considered Petitioner's participation in education and self-improvement courses and in the Release Preparation and Financial Responsibility Programs in determining that Petitioner would best be served by thirty days in an RRC (Horton Decl., ¶¶ 13(c), 15 & Ex. H). Such consideration is sufficient to comply with the Second Chance Act. See, e.g., Bell v. Zych, 2010 WL 5114504 at *4 (finding no need for further review where it was clear from record that Bureau considered petitioner's participation in programs and other rehabilitation efforts in setting RRC placement); Greene v. Longley, 2011 WL 3924984, at *7-*8 (noting that participation in prison programming is one of many factors included in the history and characteristics of the inmate considered under 18 U.S.C. section 3621(b)(3)).
Petitioner's citation to Krueger v. Martinez , 665 F.Supp.2d 477 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 2009), does not alter the Court's conclusion. In Krueger, the district court interpreted Section 17541 as requiring that the Bureau conduct a second, separate individualized consideration (in addition to consideration under 18 U.S.C. section 3624(c)), for a full twelve months of RRC placement as an incentive for those prisoners who participate in skills development programs. Id. at 485-86. Because the Krueger court could not discern from the record whether the Bureau had separately considered Krueger for a full RRC placement as an incentive for his programming, the court ordered the Bureau to consider separately a twelve-month placement. Id. at 486.
No district court outside the Middle District of Pennsylvania has agreed with Krueger's novel interpretation of section 17541. Many district court decisions subsequent to Krueger have rejected the suggestion that section 17541 requires the consideration of any particular incentives for participation in skills development programming, or requires an RRC consideration separate from the consideration normally given under 18 U.S.C. section 3624(c). See, e.g., Crim v. Benov, 2011 WL 1636867, at *7-*11 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2011) (rejecting Krueger and collecting district court cases reaching same conclusion); Greene v. Longley, 2011 WL 3924984, at *7-*8 (same; adopting reasoning in Crim); but see Hill v. Scism, 2011 WL 705354, at *2-*3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2011) (following Krueger); McDowell v. Scism 2011 WL 184013, *5 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2011) (same); Polishan v. Hubbard, 2011 WL 43457, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2011) (same).
This Court declines to adopt Krueger's interpretation of section 17541. The plain language of section 17541 provides that the Bureau "may" (not must) employ a twelve-month RRC placement incentive for prisoner participation in skills development programs. Nothing in the plain language of the statute requires a separate consideration of programming for a twelve-month RRC placement where, as here, the Bureau otherwise has accounted for such programming in making its individualized RRC determination under 18 U.S.C. section 3624(c). The Court must enforce statutes according to their terms. See Caminetti v. United States , 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("the meaning of the statute must, in the first instance be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain... the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms"); Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co. , 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992) ("when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue[, ] judicial inquiry... is finished"). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has made it clear that courts ordinarily must defer to the Bureau's implementation of policy with respect to the Second Chance Act. See Sacora v. Thomas , 628 F.3d at 1061-67; Sass v. Thomas, 405 Fed.App'x at 203. Deference is appropriate in the present case.
Even the Krueger court "agree[d] that the language of § 17541 vests discretion with the BOP concerning the type of incentives to award." Krueger , 665 F.Supp.2d at 485.
II. Any Challenge to the Bureau's Refusal to Designate Petitioner for Twelve Months' RRC Placement or for Six Months' RRC Placement is Moot.
To the extent Petitioner challenges the Bureau's failure to designate Petitioner for RRC placement for twelve months or six months as allegedly inconsistent with the Second Chance Act, Petitioner's claim must fail. First, contrary to Petitioner's contentions (Affidavit attached to Petition at 1), the Second Chance Act does not require the Bureau to make any particular RRC placement. Rather, as quoted above, the plain language of the statute affords the Bureau the option of placing prisoners in an RRC for up to twelve months. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c); Sacora v. Thomas , 628 F.3d at 1070 (noting same).
Second, to the extent any of the Bureau's allegedly unexplained RRC decisions for Petitioner may have been inconsistent with the Second Chance Act, the record shows that Petitioner now has received all the consideration to which he is entitled. On January 11, 2011, Petitioner's Unit Team considered Petitioner for placement in accordance with 18 U.S.C. sections 3621(b) and 3624(c) and determined that Petitioner's reentry needs will best be met by a thirty-day stay in an RRC. See Horton Decl., ¶¶ 13-15. Thus, although Petitioner has not received as much time in an RRC as he desires, Petitioner has already received the only relief this Court properly could order, i.e., individualized consideration for RRC placement in accordance with sections 3621(b) and 3624(c). Rodriguez v. Smith , 541 F.3d at 1189; United States v. Dragna , 746 F.2d at 458. Accordingly, the Petition is moot. See, e.g., Bell v. Sanders, 2010 WL 5631740, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2010), adopted, 2011 WL 202046 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2011) (claim that Bureau did not articulate reasons for denying RRC placement mooted where record showed that Unit Team considered section 3621(b) factors in making determination); Smith v. Sanders, 2009 WL 2900317, at *5-*6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2009) (Unit Team's consideration of appropriate factors in determining petitioner merited a 150-180-day RRC placement mooted petitioner's challenge to Bureau's refusal to provide petitioner with more than 180 days' RRC placement); Katz v. Sanders, 2010 WL 4449368, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2010), adopted, 2010 WL 4449364 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2010) (challenge to duration of 180-day RRC placement moot where petitioner received individualized consideration of his request for an extended RRC placement); Washington v. Copenhaver, 2009 WL 1814460, at *3-*4 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2009), reconsideration denied, 2009 WL 2488016 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2009) (same); Tanner v. Deboo, 2009 WL 1026027, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2009), adopted, 2009 WL 1459040 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2009) (same); Berry v. Sanders , 2009 WL 789890, at *6-*7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20 2009) (same); Delpit v. Sanders, 2008 WL 5263825, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec.15, 2008) (same); Sparks v. Smith, 2008 WL 2509435 *4-*5 (E.D. Cal. June 23, 2008), adopted, 2008 WL 4177736 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2008) (challenge to Bureau's prior placement decision moot where the Bureau already had conducted a second assessment in accordance with the Second Chance Act, providing all the relief the Court could provide).
Petitioner's allegations that he was denied due process by the weight his Case Management Coordinator gave to the various factors reviewed in making an earlier RRC determination (Supplemental Brief at 2-3), do not merit relief. A prisoner has no liberty interest in being housed in a particular prison. See Witherow v. Crawford, 339 Fed.App'x 785 (9th Cir. July 31, 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 2107 (2010) (citing Meachum v. Fano , 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) ("The Constitution... does not guarantee that a convicted prisoner will be placed in any particular prison.")); U.S.Ct. App. 9th Cir. Rule 36-3(b); Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) (court may cite unpublished Ninth Circuit opinions issued on or after January 1, 2007). As discussed herein, Congress has vested in the Bureau "full discretion to control conditions of confinement, " including prisoner classification and eligibility for rehabilitative programs. Moody v. Daggett , 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3621.
Because the Bureau's individualized consideration of Petitioner's request for placement in an RRC has given Petitioner all the relief to which he conceivably could be entitled at this time, the Petition should be dismissed as moot.
This dismissal should be without prejudice to any rights or remedies Petitioner may have under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Federal Tort Claims Act, or any other federal law potentially authorizing the recovery of damages.
Finally, in light of the proximity of Petitioner's reported release date, the passage of time also appears to have mooted Petitioner's request for twelve months or six months of RRC placement. See Caswell v. Calderon , 363 F.3d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 2004) (habeas claim becomes moot when the court no longer can provide effective relief). Even if such relief were appropriate (which it is not), the Court could not provide such relief at this time.
RECOMMENDATION
For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) accepting and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) directing that Judgment be entered denying and dismissing the Petition without prejudice.
NOTICE
Reports and Recommendations are not appealable to the Court of Appeals, but may be subject to the right of any party to file objections as provided in the Local Rules Governing the Duties of Magistrate Judges and review by the District Judge whose initials appear in the docket number. No notice of appeal pursuant to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should be filed until entry of the judgment of the District Court.
(b) Place of imprisonment. The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of the prisoner's imprisonment. The Bureau may designate any available penal or correctional facility that meets minimum standards of health and habitability established by the Bureau, whether maintained by the Federal Government or otherwise and whether within or without the judicial district in which the person was convicted, that the Bureau determines to be appropriate and suitable, considering
(1) the resources of the facility contemplated;
(2) the nature and circumstances of the offense;
(3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner;
(4) any statement by the court that imposed the sentence
(A) concerning the purposes for which the sentence to imprisonment was determined to be warranted; or
(B) recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as appropriate;[] and
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 28.
... The Bureau may at any time, having regard for the same matters, direct the transfer of a prisoner from one penal or correctional facility to another.
18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (emphasis added).
Petitioner has no due process right to be placed in an RRC on any particular date, provided at least that the Bureau has given Petitioner the individualized consideration contemplated by the Second Chance Act and that some evidence supports the Bureau's decision. See Smith v. Sanders, 2009 WL 2900317, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2009) (declining to reweigh the statutory factors the Bureau considered in making placement decision; "The [Bureau] considered the requisite factors, and some evidence supports the [Bureau's] placement decision. The law requires nothing more."). Petitioner received all of the consideration to which he was due and some evidence supported the Bureau's RRC determination. See Horton Decl., ¶¶ 13-16 & accompanying exhibits; compare Superintendent v. Hill , 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985) (even when a prison official's decision concerns a prisoner's constitutionally protected liberty interest, due process requires only that the decision be supported by "some evidence"; evidence that is "meager" or indirect may constitute "some evidence").