Opinion
No. 17,861.
Filed June 30, 1949.
1. APPEAL — Presentation in Lower Court of Grounds for Review — Motion for New Trial — Specification To Test Sufficiency of Evidence — Negative Judgment — No Question Presented — Question Can Be Raised by Specification that Decision Is Contrary to Law. — Where appellant assigned as error upon appeal the overruling of her motion for new trial after judgment for defendants on counterclaim to quiet title to farm based on grounds that (1) the decision was not sustained by sufficient evidence and (2) was contrary to law, appellant's first specification presented no question since a negative decision may not be attacked for lack of evidence; however, she may properly assert, under the second specification, that by the decision of the trial court she was denied the relief to which the evidence entitled her. p. 344.
2. HUSBAND AND WIFE — Marriage Settlements — Antenuptial Settlements — Construction and Operation — Entire Contract Considered — Intention of Parties. — Rule by which the Appellate Court must be controlled in the interpretation of antenuptial contract is that which is applicable to any other contract; and it must be considered not in fragments, but as an entirety, and the intention of the parties ascertained through the words they have used; and to ascertain their intention, regard should be had to the character of the instrument, the condition of the parties, and the object they had in view. p. 345.
3. HUSBAND AND WIFE — Marriage Settlements — Requisites and Validity — Antenuptial Settlements — Intended Husband and Wife Have Power and Right to Create Own Rule of Inheritance by Contract. — The right of an adult intended husband and wife in contemplation of marriage to intercept a statutory line of descent or the rights conferred by law and substitute by contract or agreement a rule of inheritance of their own creation by which their respective rights of the property of each other may be measured is a well settled principle. p. 346.
4. HUSBAND AND WIFE — Marriage Settlements — Requisites and Validity — Antenuptial Settlements — Favored by Law. — Antenuptial contracts are favored by law, and they adjust property questions and promote domestic happiness. p. 346.
5. HUSBAND AND WIFE — Marriage Settlements — Requisites and Validity — Antenuptial Settlements — Formality of Contracts Not Required — Liberally Construed — Effect Given Intention of Parties. — In antenuptial contracts no formality is required, and a liberal construction will be given them in every case, giving effect, if possible, to the intention of the parties. p. 346.
6. HUSBAND AND WIFE — Marriage Settlements — Requisites and Validity — Antenuptial Settlements — Wife May Release Rights in Husband's Estate — Enforced by Courts in Absence of Fraud or Imposition. — An adult woman, before her marriage, may bar her legal rights in her husband's estate by her agreement to accept any other provisions in lieu thereof, and such an agreement will be upheld and enforced by the courts in the absence of fraud or imposition upon her, and where it may be said, under the particular circumstances, that it is not unconscionable. p. 346.
7. HUSBAND AND WIFE — Marriage Settlements — Requisites and Validity — Antenuptial Settlements — Consideration for Wife's Release of Rights in Husband's Estate — When Sufficient. — The consideration fixed by the parties to an antenuptial contract will be deemed sufficient, even though the provisions for the contemplated wife be much less than the statutory right of widows, or even give her no property interest. p. 347.
8. HUSBAND AND WIFE — Marriage Settlements — Antenuptial Settlements — Construction and Operation — Disposition of Husband's Property and Interests. — Appellate Court would construe provision in antenuptial contract as giving intended wife possession for one year of all realty of which prospective husband should be seized at time of death, together with one-fourth interest in rents and profits therefrom during such year, but not as including any freehold interest therein for life or in fee, in view of fact that parties at time of her marriage each had children by former marriages and each was owner of property. p. 347.
From the Saint Joseph Superior Court No. 1, J. Fred Bingham, Judge.
Action by Ellen Roush against Alta Hullinger and Henry E. Hullinger for partition of realty and an accounting, wherein the defendants filed a counterclaim to quiet title to such realty. From a judgment for defendants on counterclaim, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed. By the court in banc.
Warren E. McGill; and Seebirt, Oare Deahl, all of South Bend, for appellant.
Roy Sheneam, of Plymouth, for appellees.
This is an appeal from a judgment on appellees' counterclaim to quiet title to 40 acres of farm land in St. Joseph County, Indiana. The issues were based upon a paragraph of the complaint for partition and a paragraph of the complaint for accounting, together with answers filed thereto and two paragraphs of counterclaim to quiet title filed by the appellees and the answers of the appellant thereto, and the court found against the appellant on those issues. Appellant assigns error in the overruling of her motion for new trial which specifies that (1) the decision of the court is not sustained by sufficient evidence, (2) the decision of the court is contrary to law.
Although the first specification in appellant's motion for a new trial presents no question since a negative decision may not be attacked upon the ground that there is a lack of 1. evidence to sustain it, the appellant may properly assert under the second specification that by the decision of the trial court she was denied the relief to which the evidence entitled her. Wadler v. Mogul Rubber Corporation (1945), 116 Ind. App. 152, 61 N.E.2d 472; Wilson, Admx. v. Rollings (1938), 214 Ind. 155, 14 N.E.2d 905; McKee v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. (1943), 222 Ind. 10, 51 N.E.2d 474; Dept. of Insurance v. Indiana Trav. Assur. Co. (1945), 115 Ind. App. 285, 58 N.E.2d 761.
This case was tried by the court without the intervention of a jury. This suit involved the construction of an agreement purporting to restate the contents of a prior lost antenuptial contract which contained the following provisions; "The said Ellen Bickel shall have possession of all the real estate of which I may die seized for the period of one year after my death, together with one-fourth of the proceeds therefrom."
The contention of counsel for appellant is that in accord with the proper construction of this provision the appellant should have possession of all real estate of which her husband died seized for a period of one year after his death including the incidents thereof, such as the exclusive right to occupy and control the same and to receive the profits therefrom and that in addition to such possession and the incidents thereof, the appellant was to receive a one-fourth title interest in all real estate of which Isaiah Roush died seized.
The rule by which we must be controlled in the interpretation of this contract is that which is applicable to any other contract: First, it must be considered not in fragments, 2. but as an entirety, and the intention of the parties ascertained through the words they have used. To ascertain their intention, regard should be had to the character of the instrument, the condition of the parties, and the object which they had in view. Kennedy v. Kennedy, et al. (1898), 150 Ind. 636, 50 N.E. 756.
The circumstances or conditions of the parties to this contract, at the time of its execution, appearing from the averments of the second paragraph of counterclaim are that the decedent, Isaiah Roush, intermarried with appellant in the year of 1914, at which time each had children by former marriages, and at said time each was the owner of property; said decedent was survived at his death by the appellant, a second childless wife and 7 children by former marriage.
The right of an adult intended husband and wife in contemplation of marriage, to intercept a statutory line of descent, or the rights conferred by law, and substitute by 3. contract, or agreement, a rule of inheritance of their own creation, by which their respective rights in the property of each other may be measured or determined, is a well settled principle. Bishop on Married Women, § 427; McNutt v. McNutt (1889), 116 Ind. 545, 19 N.E. 115.
Antenuptial contracts are favored by the law. They adjust property questions and promote domestic happiness. In such contracts no formality is required and a liberal 4, 5. construction will be given them in every case, giving effect, if possible, to the intention of the parties. Moore, Adm. v. Harrison, Adm. (1900), 26 Ind. App. 408, 59 N.E. 1077 and cases there cited.
The law is clear at the present time that an adult woman, before her marriage, may bar her legal rights in her husband's estate by her agreement to accept any other provisions in 6. lieu thereof, and such an agreement will be upheld and enforced by the courts in the absence of fraud or imposition upon her, and where it may be said, under the particular circumstances, that it is not unconscionable. Kennedy v. Kennedy, et al., supra.
In the case of McNutt v. McNutt, supra, the court said:
"The truth is, it is exceedingly difficult to imagine why, in any case where there is no fraud, courts should displace the judgment of contracting parties and substitute their own. No person in the world can so well and so justly judge as the contracting parties themselves, and it is only in the strongest and clearest cases that courts should disregard their judgment, and never where there is neither positive wrong nor a fraud."
Our courts have uniformly upheld antenuptial contracts where fairly entered into, even though the effect be to leave the surviving wife very little, based upon the motives of 7. marriage not being mercenary, but of the consideration in itself, and holding under such contracts, that the considerations fixed by the parties will be deemed sufficient, even though the provisions for the contemplated wife be much less than the statutory right of widows, or even give her no property interest. Mallow v. Eastes (1912), 179 Ind. 267, 100 N.E. 836, and cases there cited. In the case of Webb v. Rhodes (1902), 28 Ind. App. 393, 61 N.E. 735, the court held "possession" is a synonym for "occupancy."
Tested by these well settled principles we are of the opinion that appellant and her prospective husband at the time they executed the contract in controversy, intended that her rights in his estate, at his death, should be measured solely by the provisions therein made for her.
This court construes said antenuptial contract to the effect that appellant should have possession for one year of all real estate of which her prospective husband should be seized, 8. at the time of his death, together with one-fourth interest in the rents and profits therefrom during such year, but not including any freehold interest therein for life or in fee.
The counsel for the appellant cites and relies upon the following cases as authority for giving the appellant one-fourth interest in the real estate. Hunt, Guardian, et al. v. Williams (1890), 126 Ind. 493, 26 N.E. 177; Bowen v. Swander, et al. (1889), 121 Ind. 164, 22 N.E. 725; Thompson v. Schenck (1861), 16 Ind. 194; Skinner v. Spann (1911), 175 Ind. 672, 93 N.E. 1061. These cases all involved the construction and interpretation of wills and the facts in those cases are distinguished from the facts in this case.
Counsel for appellant also cites Williams, et al. v. Owen, et al. (1888), 116 Ind. 70, 18 N.E. 389. That case construes a deed, and the facts are distinguished from the case at bar.
The decision of the court is not contrary to law and the court did not err in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial.
Judgment affirmed.
Royse, J., not participating.
NOTE. — Reported in 86 N.E.2d 714.