"The matters adjudicated by the decrees of distribution are not again properly before the court for consideration." In re Roukos' Estate, 141 Me. 83, 39 A.2d 663 (1944) our court held that the probate court had authority to revoke an action which it had taken which was in fact unauthorized by law. There the probate court had licensed the sale of real estate, the property had been sold and no appeal had been taken.
The objection raised is that there was no hearing on the appeal in the Supreme Court of Probate. Counsel for the Trustee cites us to decisions which support the principles that probate decrees entered outside the field of statutory probate jurisdiction are wholly void and may be attacked collaterally, Fowle v. Coe, 63 Me. 245; Coolidge v. Allen, 82 Me. 23, 19 A. 89; Snow v. Russell et al., 93 Me. 362, 45 A. 305, 74 Am. St. Rep., 350; and that decrees entered within that apparent field may be attacked directly and avoided on proof that statutory procedure was not followed. See the cases cited on the first point and also Thompson v. Hall, 77 Me. 160; Taber et al. v. Douglass et al., 101 Me. 363, 64 A. 653; Thompson, Appellant, supra ( 116 Me. 473, 102 A. 303); Waitt, Appellant, 140 Me. 109, 34 A.2d 476; Roukos, Appellant, 140 Me. 183, 35 A.2d 861, and 141 Me. 83, 39 A.2d 663. Reference is made also to Peters v. Peters, 8 Cush., 529, and Pierce v. Prescott, 128 Mass. 140, but these add nothing to our own cases. It is undoubted that a preliminary inquisition by municipal officers is essential for the appointment of the guardian of an insane person, Coolidge v. Allen, supra ( 82 Me. 23, 19 A. 89); that bonds are requisite in connection with licenses to sell real estate, Snow v. Russell et al., supra ( 93 Me. 362, 45 A. 305, 74 Am. St. Rep., 350); that the appointment of a guardian for a minor involves the written consent of a parent, Taber et al. v. Douglass et al., supra ( 101 Me. 363, 64 A. 653); and that particular facts must be alleged and proved to support the issue of a license to sell real estate, Roukos, Appellant, supra ( 141 Me. 83, 39 A.2d 663). These are prerequisites.
See also Tripp v. Clapp, 126 Me. 534, 537, 140 A. 199; Roukos, Appellant, Etc. In Re Estate of Roukos, 141 Me. 83, 89, 39 A.2d 663; Knapp, Appellant, Etc. In Re Estate of Fred E. Knapp, 149 Me. 130, 138, 99 A.2d 331.