"Whether [the accused's] touching is for the purpose of sexual gratification is a question for the jury and may be inferred from the act itself." Roughton v. State, 644 So.2d 1339, 1340 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994); Alder v. State, 591 So.2d 133, 135 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 591 So.2d 135 (Ala. 1991). C.R. testified that, more than once, A.T.M. came into the bedroom where she was sleeping and touched her breasts, thighs and legs.
It is well settled that " ‘[t]he victim's testimony alone is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of ... sexual abuse,’ " and "[w]hether [Scott] touched [K.N.] ... to gratify [either party's] sexual desires ‘ "is a question for the jury and may be inferred from the act itself." ’ " Williams v. State, 10 So. 3d 1083, 1087 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting, respectively, Jones v. State, 719 So. 2d 249, 255 (Ala. Crim. App 1996), and Ex parte A.T.M., 804 So. 2d 171, 174 (Ala. 2000), quoting in turn Roughton v. State, 644 So. 2d 1339, 1340 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) ). Thus, the State presented a prima facie case of sexual abuse of a child less than 12 years old, and, as a result, the trial court properly submitted the case to the jury for the jury to pass on the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh the evidence, Buford, supra, which the jury did by finding Scott guilty.
Under § 13A–6–69.1, Ala.Code 1975, “[a] person commits the crime of sexual abuse of a child less than 12 years old if he or she, being 16 years old or older, subjects another person who is less than 12 years old to sexual contact.” Sexual contact is defined in § 13A–6–60(3), Ala.Code 1975, as “any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person not married to the actor, done for the purposes of gratifying the sexual desire of either party.” “ ‘Whether [the accused's] touching is for the purpose of sexual gratification is a question for the jury and may be inferred from the act itself.’ ” Ex Parte A.T.M., 804 So.2d 171, 174 (Ala.2000) (quoting Roughton v. State, 644 So.2d 1339, 1340 (Ala.Crim.App.1994) ). In addition, the courts of this State have long held that the testimony of the victim of a sexual offense is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of sexual abuse.
From that evidence, the jury could have concluded that Pettibone enticed or lured D.S. to his classroom, to the coach's office, or to the locker room to propose sexual contact with her or to fondle or feel D.S.'s sexual parts, or to propose that D.S. feel his sexual parts. As to Pettibone's contention that touching D.S.'s buttocks is insufficient evidence of sexual contact within the meaning of § 13A–6–60(3), Ala.Code 1975, this Court held in Roughton v. State, 644 So.2d 1339 (Ala.Crim.App.1994), that evidence that Roughton touched the victim's buttocks and rubbed the inside of the victim's thighs was sufficient evidence of “sexual contact.” Further, this Court held in Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1036, 1039 (Ala.Crim.App.1981), that the thigh and stomach are intimate parts within the meaning of sexual contact.
Whether Williams touched V.C. in the bathtub to gratify his sexual desires "`is a question for the jury and may be inferred from the act itself.'" Ex parte A.T.M., 804 So.2d 171, 174 (Ala. 2000), quoting Roughton v. State, 644 So.2d 1339, 1340 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994). "[T]he victim's testimony alone is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of either rape or sexual abuse."