Opinion
AANCV146016638
03-16-2016
Naomi Rottman v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Milford
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Theodore R. Tyma, J.
The plaintiff, Naomi Rottman, is an aggrieved owner of residential property located within 100 feet of residential property owned by the defendants, Steven Pepe and Davida Pepe (Pepes), and, in that capacity, appeals pursuant to General Statutes § 8-8 from a decision of the defendant, Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Milford (board). The Pepes' property is located at 7 Beach Avenue, Milford, Connecticut. The plaintiff's property, which abuts the north side of the Pepes' property, is located at 5 Beach Avenue. The plaintiff claims that the board erred in granting the Pepes' application for a variance of § 3.1.4.1 of the Milford Zoning Regulations (regulations). The issue to be decided is whether the board properly granted the Pepes' application for a variance permitting them to build a newly constructed home that is setback less than thirty feet from the front yard lot line, which is the minimum requirement in the zoning district.
Based on the plaintiff's testimony at the hearing on the present appeal, the court finds that the plaintiff is statutorily aggrieved as the owner of abutting property pursuant to General Statutes § 8-8(a)(1). The defendants do not make any claim to the contrary, but in their answers to the complaint they left the plaintiff to her proof on the issue.
The Pepes submitted a prior application for variance with the board that was received on May 22, 2014. Therein, the Pepes requested two variances, the same front yard variance at issue in the present appeal, and a side yard variance. The Pepes advanced the same reasons in support of their claimed hardship as in this action. A public hearing was held on June 10, 2014. The board denied the application without prejudice to the Pepes to address specific concerns raised by the members, including concerns about parking, and the location of the garage and residence on the property.
The Pepes' property is located in a coastal area of Milford commonly known as Woodmont. The property has a long and rectangular shape, measuring approximately 50 feet in width and 225 feet in length. The property is bounded by Beach Avenue on its northwest side and Long Island Sound on its southwest side. The two longer sides of the lot separate the property from its Beach Avenue neighbors, including the plaintiff. The lot is improved by an existing single-family residence that was constructed in 1900. The residence is a legal nonconforming building as it existed prior to Milford's adoption of the regulations on June 11, 1930. There is also a detached garage on the lot that is located one foot from the front lot line.
The Pepes' property is situated in an R-12.5 zoning district, which is defined in the regulations as a one-family residential district. Milford Zoning Regs., art. III, § 3.1.4. The lot and building requirements for the R-12.5 district are set forth in § 3.1.4.1 of the regulations. The existing conditions on the lot are nonconforming in terms of the minimum lot area and width required by the regulations. The regulations provide for a minimum lot area of 12, 500 square feet. Id. The Pepes' lot area is 11, 211 square feet. An area of 4816 square feet of the total lot area is located within the mean high water line, which reduces the buildable area. Also, the lot width regulation in the district requires that a lot be eighty feet wide. Id. The Pepes' lot is only fifty feet wide. Approximately 1750 square feet of the lot is also in a special flood hazard area, known as a VE Zone, meaning the area is subject to high wave activity. It is legal to build in such a zone, although the Pepes' architect and the Federal Emergency Management Authority recommend against it.
On June 18, 2014, the Pepes applied to the board for a variance from § 3.1.4.1 of the regulations claiming a legal hardship. More particularly, the Pepes sought a variance from the minimum thirty-feet front yard setback requirement to a 16.3-feet setback from the front lot line. The plans provide for the existing house and detached garage to be razed, and replaced by a single, newly constructed principal building to serve as a personal residence. Generally, the plans provide for the construction of an approximately 3, 500 square feet home with a garage attached to the front center of the structure. The plans include a driveway leading to the street. The driveway would provide parking for multiple vehicles.
The board held a public hearing on the Pepes' application on July 8, 2014. Attorney Max Case, representing the Pepes, addressed the board and provided an overview of their variance request. He noted that the lot does not comply with the R-12.5 district requirements for minimum lot area and width; the lot narrows in shape from front to back due to the fact that Beach Avenue does not run in a straight line at the property; and that the properties across the street from the Pepes' property are located in an R-5 zoning district, which district requirements would not require the Pepes to apply for a front yard variance. Also, the architect for the Pepes, Jaime Millard (Millard) representing Michael Greenberg & Associates, reviewed the plans for the proposed newly construction residence. Millard stated that the existing house is situated in " the new V zone line from a FEMA standpoint, meaning that it is subject to high wave activity and, you know, wouldn't be prudent to build in that location if at all possible. So, one of the first things we did . . . was to recommend to the Pepes that we kind of move the house out of the V zone, that comes from our own, my own professional opinions, from the recommendations from our office as well as FEMA in Hartford. So one of the first things we did was move this house out of harm's way and I think that's a wise waterfront thought process." Millard further noted that " the size of the house dictated that . . . we are going to be a very narrow house . . ." and concluded that " we're really trying to be very respectful of both the nonconformity of the lot, the V zone line that runs through the property, as well of being mindful of doing a house that was aesthetically pleasing and in scale with the property it sits on."
Attorney Thomas Lynch, representing the plaintiff, addressed the board and requested that the Pepes' application be denied. Lynch primarily claimed that the Pepes failed to establish a hardship in support of their application. He characterized their situation as a " self-created" hardship, and asserted that the proposed residence to be " totally out of character with the area." Lynch noted that the Pepes could build their home in the existing footprint and within the required setbacks. As for the Pepes' proposal to move the house further away from Long Island Sound, Lynch commented that " the house can go closer to the water, it can be elevated to meet the flood elevations required in the area by moving it back . . ."
The chairman of the board thereafter closed the public hearing and called for a vote on the Pepes' application. A transcript of the July 8, 2014 hearing, which is part of the record, reflects:
Chairman: [T]his hearing is closed. The only variance we're looking at is the front driveway 16.3. I think the house fits on the lot. They moved the garage to the center. The height of the house is a good height. It is pulled forward from the beach probably, that's probably, in my view I think that's a good reason. The scale of the house is, I think, good for the neighborhood. I don't see how else they could have improved on this. They've come back with our suggestion where it was 4.9, it's now 10.9. Those are my comments.
Mr. Soda: I agree with you there they took our suggestions and they centered the garage which is a big improvement. I echo the comments as well. I mean, I think when we make recommendations, you know we hope that the applicant takes them to heart and I do believe they took them to heart here. I think that it's in character with the neighborhood. I mean I've driven down there. I've seen the houses that are on there. The front yard variance that they are requesting exceeds many of the current front yard variances that are out there. I personally think that they did a good job addressing the needs and I do think that there is a hardship.
Chairman: Any other comments. We need a motion.
J. Vaccino: I'd like to make a motion to approve.
W. Soda: I second that.
Chairman: Reason.
J. Vaccino: So, I make the motion to approve based on the Flanigan survey that's presented before us today and reason for approval is the hardship of the lot being in existence before the zoning regulations and the reduction of the originally planned and submitted nonconformity.
Chairman: We have a motion to approve and a second on the motion. Mr. Dubois.
G. Dubois: With the motion.
Chairman: Mr. Vaccino.
J. Vaccino: With the motion.
Chairman: Mr. Soda.
W. Soda: With the motion.
Chairman: I'm with the motion, it's passed.
The four-member board unanimously approved the Pepe's application. The plaintiff timely filed the present appeal of the board's decision with the Superior Court.
In her complaint, the plaintiff alleges that, in granting the requested variance, the board " acted illegally, arbitrarily and in abuse of discretion in approving the Defendants/Applicants" application because (a) the approval failed to comply with all standards set forth in the Milford Zoning Regulations for variance of the regulations requested; (b) the decision of the board is contrary and inconsistent to Milford Zoning Regulations; (c) the reasons given by the board are not substantially supported by the record; (d) the record specifically is void of logical and legally sustainable reasons for approval; [and] (e) the board failed to find the existence of an exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship as prescribed by . . . General Statutes § 8-7, to allow the requested variances sought by the" defendants. The Pepes denied the foregoing allegations in their answers.
The parties submitted written briefs, and an initial hearing on the appeal was held on July 21, 2015. A supplemental return of record was filed on September 1, 2015. At the court's request, the parties filed supplementary briefs. A second hearing was held on December 2, 2015.
I
STANDARD OF REVIEW OF BOARD'S DECISION
The standard of review applicable to appeals from a decision of a zoning board is well settled. " In reviewing a decision of a zoning board, a reviewing court is bound by the substantial evidence rule . . . We must determine whether the trial court correctly concluded that the board's act was not arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion . . . Courts are not to substitute their judgment for that of the board . . . and decisions of local boards will not be disturbed so long as honest judgment has been reasonably and fairly exercised after a full hearing . . . Upon appeal, the trial court reviews the record before the board to determine whether it has acted fairly or with proper motives or upon valid reasons . . . We, in turn, review the action of the trial court.
" When a zoning board states the reasons for its action, the question for the court to pass on is simply whether the reasons assigned are reasonably supported by the record and whether they are pertinent to the considerations which the [board] is required to apply under the zoning regulations . . . The court should not go behind the official statement of the board . . . In the absence of a statement of purpose by the zoning [board] for its actions, it [is] the obligation of the trial court, and of [the Appellate Court] upon review of the trial court's decision, to search the entire record to find a basis for the [board's] decision." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Amendola v. Zoning Board of Appeals . 161 Conn.App. 726, 735-36, 129 A.3d 743 (2015).
In this case, although board members discussed the characteristics of the property and the surrounding neighborhood, the plans, and their respective reasons for granting the front yard variance, the record does not contain a collective statement of the board's reasons for granting the variances. See Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 233 Conn. 198, 208-09, 658 A.2d 559 (1995) (" although individual members of the board discussed reasons for granting the owners a variance, the board did not state a collective, official reason for its action"). The record containing the minutes of the board's meeting reflects that two of the four board members, the chairman and Soda, briefly expressed their views prior to voting on the plaintiff's application. Another member, Vaccino, moved to approve the application and expressed his reasons as in support of the motion as being hardship and " the reduction in the originally planned and submitted nonconformity." The board thereafter unanimously voted to approve the requested variance without further comments. As a result, the court must review the entire record to ascertain whether the evidence reveals any proper basis for the board's decision to grant the variance in the present case.
II
REVIEW OF BOARD'S GRANTING OF VARIANCE BASED ON HARDSHIP
Before considering the specific claim advanced in this appeal, the court will first review the standard for granting a variance. " General Statutes § 8-6 provides a municipal zoning board of appeals with the power to grant a variance from compliance with local zoning regulations to a specific piece of property. Although a zoning board of appeals has such power, the variance power should be used sparingly for [t]he granting of a variance is no insignificant matter, as it runs with the land in perpetuity . . . and constitutes permission to act in a manner that is otherwise prohibited under the zoning law of [a] town . . . As a result, a zoning board may not exercise this authority unless two basic requirements are satisfied: (1) the variance must be shown not to affect substantially the comprehensive zoning plan, and (2) adherence to the strict letter of the zoning ordinance must be shown to cause unusual hardship unnecessary to the carrying out of the general purpose of the zoning plan . . . Moreover, a zoning board may grant a variance only where a situation falls fully within the specified requirements . . . [U]nless great caution is used and variances are granted only in proper cases, the whole fabric of town- and city-wide zoning will be worn through in spots and raveled at the edges until its purpose in protecting the property values and securing the orderly development of the community is completely thwarted . . . Therefore, without such a showing of hardship, one does not simply get a zoning variance.
" The first part of the test, that the use requested by the variance application is in accord with the comprehensive zoning plan, is usually met when the use to be allowed by the variance is consistent with other uses in the area . . .
" The second part of the test, that the zoning regulation cause unusual hardship to the land unnecessary to carrying out the zoning plan, is generally more difficult to satisfy, but remains an absolute necessary as a condition precedent to the granting of a zoning variance . . . The applicant has the burden of proving hardship and must establish both the existence of a sufficient hardship and that the claimed hardship is . . . unique . . . The claimed hardship must originate in the zoning ordinance . . . meaning that because of some peculiar characteristic of [the] property, the strict application of the zoning regulation produces an unusual hardship, as opposed to the general impact which the regulation has on other properties in the zone . . . In other words, a legal hardship must [relate] to the property for which the variance is sought and not to the personal hardship of the owners thereof . . . Thus, a property owner's [d]isappointment in the use of property does not constitute exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship . . . and principles of equity, fairness to the applicant, and lack of adverse consequences to surrounding properties do not meet the test for a legally recognized hardship . . . Finally, the hardship must be different in kind from that generally affecting property in the same zoning district . . . As a result, [t]he existence of similar lots . . . make[s] it difficult or impossible to prove unusual or unique hardship." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Amendola v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 161 Conn.App. 737-39.
There is substantial evidence in the record that the Pepes' variance application complies with the city's comprehensive zoning plan. Their plan to construct a single-family residence on, and exceeding, the footprint of the legally existing nonconforming residence is in accord with the zoning in that district, which is a beach area with small and irregularly shaped lots beset by setback and other zoning issues. See Eagan v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 20 Conn.App. 561, 564-65, 568 A.2d 811 (1990) (concluding variance application to construct single-family home in violation of lot area and setback regulations complied with comprehensive zoning plan in residential zoning district where many single-family homes in immediate area were built on small lots and enjoyed similar setbacks).
The court must next address the Pepes' claim that application of the regulation at issue causes unusual hardship to their lot unnecessary to meet the city's zoning plan. The regulations require a thirty-foot setback from the front yard lot line to the Pepes' proposed building. The hardship claimed by the Pepes, which the board found, is that the nonconforming size and shape of the lot constitutes a hardship because they are unable to build the house depicted in their plans. There is no dispute that the Pepes can build a newly constructed home within the footprint of the existing structure and setbacks.
There is evidence in the record that properties located on Beach Avenue are of similar areas and shapes. The front yard setback regulation on which the Pepes' claim of hardship is based has the same general impact on other properties located in the R-12.5 zoning district as it has on the Pepes' property. See Verillo v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 155 Conn.App. 657, 682, 111 A.3d 473 (2016) (" the hardship must be one different in kind from that imposed upon properties in general by the ordinance"). The hardship claimed by the Pepes does not arise from the application of the zoning regulations to the lot, but from the personal desires of the Pepes depicted in the plans. These circumstances do not give rise to an unusual hardship under our law. " Our case law precludes the granting of a variance based on a property owner's personal preference for constructing an addition that is frustrated by zoning regulations." Amendola v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 161 Conn.App. 742-43. In other words, this case may present a personal hardship to the Pepes, but not a unique legal hardship arising from the peculiar characteristics of their property. See (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Verillo v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 155 Conn.App. 691 (" It has long been held that disappointment in the use of property can hardly constitute practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship within the meaning of a zoning law or regulation").
There is no substantial evidence in the record that supports the board's decision to grant the Pepes' variance application based on a hardship. The record discloses that the Pepes failed to demonstrate to the board that because of some unusual characteristic of their property, a literal enforcement of the regulations results in unusual hardship to them that is beyond their control. Therefore, the board acted arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of their discretion in granting the Pepes' application for a variance.
III
ANALYSIS OF CLAIMED INDEPENDENT GROUND FOR VARIANCE
The Pepes additionally claim that the board's granting of their application for a variance was proper because there is substantial evidence in the record that the proposed residence would eliminate a few nonconformities on the property, which elimination provides an independent ground for the granting of a variance. More particularly, the Pepes assert that there is evidence in the record that the proposed principal building will eliminate three existing nonconformities: the side yard setbacks on each side of the existing residence, and the side yard setback on the northeast side of the existing garage.
The regulations provide that each side yard have a minimum setback of ten feet from the side yard lot line, and that an accessory building such as the existing garage have a minimum side yard setback of four feet from the line. Milford Zoning Regs., art. III, § 3.1.4.1. The existing residence has side yard setbacks of 6.8 feet and 9.3 feet, respectively, which violate the ten-feet setback regulation. The proposed principal building would have side yard setbacks of at least ten feet, which would eliminate the existing side yard nonconformities relating to the existing residence. The Pepes also claim that their proposed principal building will eliminate the nonconforming side yard setback concerning the existing detached garage, which presently is 3.9 feet from the side yard lot line, because the proposed principal building with the attached garage will be at least ten feet from the side yard lot line.
" We recognize that nonconforming uses should be abolished or reduced to conformity as quickly as the fair interest of the parties will permit--[i]n no case should they be allowed to increase . . . The accepted method of accomplishing the ultimate object is that, while the alien use is permitted to continue until some change is made or contemplated, thereupon, so far as is expedient, advantage is taken of this fact to compel a lessening or suppression of the nonconformity." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted.) Adolphson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 205 Conn. 703, 710, 535 A.2d 799 (1988). " That a variance will eliminate a nonconforming use constitutes independent grounds for sustaining the granting of a variance." Stancuna v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 66 Conn.App. 565, 572, 785 A.2d 601 (2001).
" In Adolphson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 205 Conn. at 703, 535 A.2d 799, our Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court upholding the granting of a variance from a regulation prohibiting the operation of an automobile repair shop. Id., at 705-07, 535 A.2d 799. The defendants wanted to operate the repair shop instead of a nonconforming aluminum casting foundry. Id., at 705, 535 A.2d 799. The court recognized that nonconforming uses should be abolished or reduced to conformity as quickly as the fair interest of the parties will permit . . . [W]hile the alien use is permitted to continue until some change is made or contemplated, thereupon, so far as is expedient, advantage is taken of this fact to compel a lessening or suppression of the nonconformity." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 710, 535 A.2d 799. The Supreme Court also emphasized the finding of the trial court that the proposed use would be far less offensive to the neighborhood and surrounding residents than a foundry. Id. In Stancuna v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 66 Conn.App. at 565, 785 A.2d 601, this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court upholding the granting of a variance from regulations requiring certain side yard setback. Id., at 566, 785 A.2d 601. The court concluded that the variance would eliminate a nonconforming residential use of the property and allow a commercial use in a commercial zone. Id., at 572, 785 A.2d 601. The court also noted that the variance was in keeping with the town's comprehensive plan and that the changes appurtenant to the variance would conserve the public health, safety and welfare of the neighborhood. Id. " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hescock v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 112 Conn.App. 239, 259, 962 A.2d 177 (2009).
In Vine v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 281 Conn. 553, 572 916 A.2d 5 (2007), our Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court and remanded the case to that court " to consider the plaintiff's claim that the trial court improperly determined that the [zoning] board properly reversed its decision on [the applicant's] . . . application for a variance." The applicant sought to modify three lots to constitute two lots, and filed an application for a variance from the 150-foot square requirement in the residential zone. Id., 556. Our Supreme Court " conclude[d] that Adolphson and Stancuna provide an alternate ground for affirming the board's decision, regardless of whether [the applicant] can build three houses on the property in its current configuration or, as [the applicant] now claims, the site conditions and separate utility regulations would allow it to build houses on only two of the lots. In either case, granting the variance would increase the size and buildable area of the lots, resulting in a development that more nearly conforms to the technical requirements of the town's zoning regulations. Moreover, if [the applicant] currently can build three houses on the property, granting the variance to allow conversion of the property into two buildable lots would reduce the density of the development, which presumably would be less offensive to the surrounding residents . . . Even if [the applicant] currently is limited to building two houses on the property, granting the variance could not result in a more offensive use of the property . . ." We are compelled to agree with the board that it would elevate form over substance to insist on that principle when there is no claim or evidence that granting the variance could result in even minimal harm to the neighborhood or undermine in any way the overarching zoning scheme, especially when there is substantial evidence to support a conclusion that it would result in a more conforming use." (Citations omitted.) Id., 570-71.
Adolphson, Stancuna, and Vine are cases, involving reductions in nonconforming uses of property, referred to as use variance cases. The present action concerns a legal nonconforming building, and is a lot variance case. The existing buildings on the lot have been made nonconforming by the adoption of the zoning regulations many years after the buildings were constructed. It is undisputed that the existing principal building fails to comply with the minimum lot area, coverage and side yard requirements in the regulations. Significantly, the principal building complies with the front yard setback requirement as it is more than the required thirty feet from the front yard lot line, and the existing garage is not subject to a front yard setback because it is an accessory building. The Pepes applied for a variance from the requirement of a front yard setback of at least thirty feet in order to be able to build their proposed principal building 16.3 feet from the front lot line, which is 13.7 feet short of the required setback.
In Hescock v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 112 Conn.App. 239, 962 A.2d 177 (2009), our Appellate Court considered whether the law developed in Adolphson, Stancuna, and Vine concerning nonconforming use of property cases applied to nonconforming building cases like the present action. In part, Hescock concerned an appeal from a zoning board's granting of a variance involving the razing of an existing residence and construction of a new one on a lot in a beach area of Stonington, Connecticut. Id., 242-43. The defendants owned the property and the plaintiffs were statutorily aggrieved neighbors. Id., 241-42.
The defendants filed an application for variance from a section of the regulations that all new construction shall be located a minimum of 100 feet from the mean high tide. Id., 242. The defendants' existing home was located forty-four feet from the high tide line, and they wanted to locate their proposed residence forty-seven feet from the line. In their application, the defendants claimed that the proposed residence would meet all of the flood zone regulations with the exception of the 100-feet requirement. Id., 243. The zoning board of appeals granted the defendants' requested variance. Id. The board stated that the application " will diminish existing non-conformity and will address and improve flood zone issues." Id., 251.
The plaintiffs appealed to the superior court from the board's decision granting a variance. Id., 243. The court, Purtill, J., dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, and the plaintiff's appellate appeal ensued. Id.
In part, the plaintiffs' appeal was based on their claim that the trial court wrongly concluded that the board approved the defendants' variance application without making a finding of legal hardship. Id., 256-57. In its decision, the trial court " concluded that elimination of nonconformities served as an independent basis for granting a variance . . . and that compliance with flood zone regulations and increased compliance with the 100 foot setback requirement justified the granting of the variance in the absence of unusual hardship." (Citations omitted.) Id., 256.
In Hescock, our Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and reasoned as follows: " We do not see any basis on which to distinguish the present case from Vine, Adolphson or Stancuna . The board found that the grant of a fifty-three foot variance is justified by a decrease in noncompliance with the 100 foot setback requirement set forth in § 7.7.8.3.1 and the elimination of noncompliance with all the remaining flood zone regulations. Compare Vine v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 281 Conn. at 570-72, 916 A.2d 5 (variance from square footage requirement justifies granting variance where it reduced nonconformity and did not cause even minimal harm to neighborhood); Adolphson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 205 Conn. at 708-10, 535 A.2d 799 (nonconforming use of property to operate automobile repair shop justified because it is less offensive to neighborhood than nonconforming use to operate foundry); Stancuna v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 66 Conn.App. at 572, 785 A.2d 601 (variance from setback requirement justified where it eliminated nonconforming use, was consistent with town's comprehensive development plan and did not undermine health, safety and welfare of surrounding neighborhood). In the present case [meaning Hescock ], there was substantial evidence that the new construction would reduce and eliminate existing nonconformities and present less of a hazard in case of a flood, and there was no evidence that replacing the existing house would result in even minimal harm to the neighborhood. It is important to also note that the board concluded that with time, all of the houses in the neighborhood would conform to the flood zone requirements and that the defendants were on the cutting edge of new development. Adolphson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, at 710, 205 Conn. 703, 535 A.2d 799 ('[t]he accepted method of accomplishing the ultimate object is that, while the alien use is permitted to continue until some change is made or contemplated, thereupon, so far as is expedient, advantage is taken of this fact to compel a lessening or suppression of a nonconformity').
" We conclude that the court properly upheld the board's conclusion that the elimination and reduction of nonconformances in the present case presented an independent basis for granting a variance." Id., 260-61.
There is no dispute in the present case that the existing detached garage is an accessory building. The regulations define such a use as " [a] building which is clearly incidental or subordinate customarily in connection and located on the same lot with the principal building or use." Milford Zoning Regs., art. XI, § 11.2. The regulations do not require any minimum front yard setback for accessory structures. Milford Zoning Regs., art. III, § 3.1.4. Therefore, the existing garage located one foot from the front lot line is not a front yard nonconformity. The regulations define a private garage as " [a]n accessory building or portion of a principal building used for the storage of vehicles as an accessory use, " and a principal building as " a building in which is conducted the main or principal use of the lot on which such building is located." Id. The proposed private garage is attached to the principal structure and, as based on the foregoing definitions, constitutes a portion of the principal building. As opposed to the existing garage, the proposed garage is not an accessory building under the regulations. It is part of the principal building that is subject to the thirty-feet front yard setback requirement. It is for that reason that it was necessary for the Pepes to apply for a variance from the front yard setback as their proposed principal building is to be located only 16.3 feet from the front lot line. In other words, the proposed principal building requires a front yard setback variance, and the board's granting of the variance results in a front yard nonconformity where none previously existed. These circumstances distinguish the present action from Hescock, and the rationale supporting the Adolphson line of cases. Additionally, the elimination the three existing nonconformities with the side yard setback requirements, standing alone, are minimal in scope and do not bring this case within the narrow Adolphson line of cases exception. See Russo v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Westport, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-14-6043211-S (September 14, 2015, Radcliffe, J.) (61 Conn. L. Rptr. 7) (" The elimination of minimal variances in order to build a larger structure does not provide a basis for invoking the limited exception recognized in Adolphson and Stancuna .").
" [U]nless great caution is used and variances are granted only in proper cases, the whole fabric of town-and city-wide zoning will be worn through in spots and raveled at the edges until its purpose in protecting the property values and securing the orderly development of the community is completely thwarted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pleasant View Farms Development, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 218 Conn. 265, 271, 588 A.2d 1372 (1991). The court concludes that the Adolphson line of cases do not apply to the present case. Therefore, the record does not support an independent legal basis for the board to grant the Pepes' variance application.
IV
In view of the foregoing, the plaintiff's appeal is sustained.