ANSTEAD, J. We have for review Hankey v. Yarian, 719 So.2d 987 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) based on certified direct conflict with the decision in Rothschild v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 707 So.2d 952 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). We have jurisdiction.
Hankey, 755 So.2d at 97 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Rothschild v. NME Hosps., Inc., 707 So.2d 952, 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)). Each time a tolling period starts, the statutory limitation "clock stops until the tolling period expires and then begins to run again." Id. (quoting Rothschild, 707 So.2d at 953).
In other words, the 120 days is not counted against the limitations period. See Evans v. Oberon Holding Corp., No. 97-CA00710 COA, 1998 WL 526497, at *3 (Miss.Ct.App., August 18, 1998) (concluding that even if amended complaint related back to original complaint which was filed two days before expiration of statute of limitations, plaintiffs claim was nonetheless time-barred based on her failure to serve defendant within two days of expiration of tolling period); Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified School Dist., 64 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1047, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 777, 792 (1998) ("Tolling refers to suspending or stopping the running of the statute of limitations. It is analogous to a clock stopping, then restarting."); Rothschild v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 707 So.2d 952, 953 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1998) ("Since a tolling provision interrupts the running of the statutory limitations period, the statutory time is not counted against the claimant during the ninety-day period. In essence, the clock stops until the tolling period expires and then begins to run again."); cf. Sullivan v. Trustmark Nat'l Bank, 653 So.2d 930, 931 (Miss.
I do not believe the Legislature intended for there to be an inconsistent application of these statutes. I conclude that the correct analysis of these statutes was set forth in the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Rothschild v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 707 So.2d 952 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), authored by Judge Warner. The essence of what the district court recognized in Rothschild is that the extension of the statute of limitations authorized by section 766.104(2) and the tolling period of section 766.106(4) need to be understood to be separate statutory provisions:
The Court in Hankey also held that “toll” as used in subsection 766.106(4) means a suspension of the statute of limitations, stating: “In essence, the clock stops until the tolling period expires and then begins to run again.” 755 So.2d at 797 (quoting Rothschild v. NME Hosps., Inc., 707 So.2d 952 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ). That language is echoed in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650(b)(1) which states that “Notice of Intent to initiate litigation sent by certified mail to and received by any prospectivedefendant” operates as notice to any other “prospective” defendant with a legal relationship to the “prospective” defendant receiving notice.
§ 766.104(2), Fla. Stat. (1999). Under the statute, once the extension is purchased, the statute of limitations becomes two years plus ninety days. See Hankey v. Yarian, 755 So.2d 93 (Fla. 2000); Burbank v. Kero, 813 So.2d 292 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Rothschild v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 707 So.2d 952 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). With the extension purchased pursuant to section 766.104(2), the statute of limitations would have run December 29, 2001. Petitioner received the notice of intent to initiate litigation on December 13, 2001, well within the limitations period. A timely filed notice of intent to initiate litigation tolls the running of the statute of limitations period for ninety days.
" Both the Fourth and Fifth Districts have held that "[t]his ninety-day period . . . is tacked onto the end of the statute of limitations period as an extension." Rothschild v. NME Hosps., Inc., 707 So.2d 952, 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). See also Peregrem v. Horan, 669 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).
The 90 day automatic extension purchased by the plaintiffs under section 766.104(2) extended the limitations period to March 6, 1997, but the plaintiffs did not file suit until June 19, 1997, beyond the limitations period. We recognize that in Rothschild v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 707 So.2d 952 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) the Fourth District held that the 90 day notice of intent period is a tolling provision and that the statutory limitation period is suspended during this period. We find this holding to be in conflict with Tanner.