; Rothschild v. Foremost Ins. Co., 653 F.Supp.2d 526, 537 (D.N.J.2009).

However, there is no private cause of action under the New Jersey's Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, N.J.S.A. 17:29B-1 et seq. ("UCSPA"). ProCentury Ins. Co. v. Harbor House Club Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 552, 563 (D.N.J. 2009) (dismissing the insured's complaint to the extent it could be construed to state a cause of action under the UCSPA); Rothschild v. Foremost Ins. Co., 653 F. Supp. 2d 526, 537 (D.N.J. 2009) (holding there is no private right of action for violations of the UCSPA and that in passing the UCSPA, the New Jersey Legislature "was primarily concerned with addressing injuries to the public rather than providing individual citizens with another avenue of recovery against insurance providers.").

Defendant Horizon cites Rothschild v. Foremost Insurance Company for the proposition that "courts are not afforded the luxury to change the language of the insurance policy to create ambiguity." See D.E. 17 at 10 (citing Rothschild v. Foremost Ins. Co., 653 F. Supp. 2d 526, 532 (D.N.J. 2009)). The Court agrees with this statement but finds that this goes against Horizon's argument.

The scope of that duty is not to be equated with simple negligence.”). Further, there is no private right of action for policyholders against their insurers based on UCSPA violations or negligence. Pickett v. Lloyd's, 131 N.J. 457, 621 A.2d 445, 468 (1993) (the UCSPA “regulatory framework does not create a private cause of action”); Pierzga v. Ohio Cas. Group of Ins. Cos., 208 N.J.Super. 40, 504 A.2d 1200, 1204 (1986) (affirming dismissal of insured's claims under the UCSPA, noting that the “statute applies to wrongs to the public rather than any individual and violations of the statute do not create individual or private causes of action”); ProCentury Ins. Co. v. Harbor House Club Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 652 F.Supp.2d 552, 563 (D.N.J.2009) (dismissing insured's complaint to the extent it could be construed to state a cause of action under the UCSPA); Rothschild v. Foremost Ins. Co., 653 F.Supp.2d 526, 537 (D.N.J.2009) (holding that there is no private right of action for violations of the UCSPA and that in passing the UCSPA, the New Jersey Legislature “was primarily concerned with addressing injuries to the public rather than providing individual citizens with another avenue of recovery against insurance providers.”). As such, Count III of the Counterclaim is dismissed.Bad faith

When a contract contains ambiguous language and yields two interpretations, the ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the insured. Rothschild v. Foremost Ins. Co., 653 F. Supp. 2d 526, 532 (D.N.J. 2009); Gibson v. Callaghan, 158 N.J. 662, 670-71 (1999). Here, it is important to point out that the parties' dispute does not center on any particular wording of the Policy.

However, neither negligence nor mistake may constitute bad faith on behalf of an insurer. Rothschild v. Foremost Ins. Co., 653 F. Supp. 2d 526, 536 (D.N.J. 2009). "Rather, it must be demonstrated that the insurer's conduct is unreasonable and the insurer knows that the conduct is unreasonable, or that it recklessly disregards the fact that the conduct is unreasonable."

When a contract contains ambiguous language and yields two interpretations, the ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the insured.Rothschild v. Foremost Ins. Co., 653 F. Supp. 2d 526, 532 (D.N.J. 2009); Gibson v. Callaghan, 158 N.J. 662, 670-71 (1999); see also Allen, 44 N.J. at 305. Overall, courts will generally construe terms in favor of coverage "to the full extent that any fair interpretation will allow."

Had the drafters intended that the Endorsement would bar coverage under the Umbrella Policy when coverage is afforded in the general policy, it would have explicitly stated so in the Endorsement's plain terms, and to read it in any other manner would be to render the policy meaningless. Moreover, SIF is correct in its assertion that under both New Jersey and New York law, any ambiguity should be construed against Selective, the drafter of the Selective Policy ( Matter of Mostow v.. State Farm Ins. Co., 88 N.Y.2d 321, 326–27 [1996] ; Rothschild v. Foremost Ins. Co., 653 F.Supp.2d 526 [DNJ 2009] ). However, even more persuasive, no ambiguity exists here.

Moreover, SIF is correct in its assertion that under both New Jersey and New York law, any ambiguity should be construed against Selective, the drafter of the Selective Policy (Matter of Mostow v State Farm Ins. Co., 88 NY2d 321, 326-27 [1996]; Rothschild v Foremost Ins. Co., 653 F.Supp.2d 526 [DNJ 2009]). However, even more persuasive, no ambiguity exists here.