In making this determination, "the Court must view the evidence in favor of the non-moving party by extending any reasonable favorable inference to that party." Roth v. Marina Assocs., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70952, at *9 (D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2009). In other words, "the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party's] favor."

To be sure, the Court notes that whether Mr. Witter exceeded the reasonable scope of his invitation is a question for the jury. Roth v. Marina Assocs., No. 07-2596, 2009 WL 2496803, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2009). The Court notes, however, that the duty to maintain a safe premises only extends to the area “within the scope of the invitation.”

For the purpose of this inquiry, "the Court must view the evidence in favor of the non-moving party by extending any reasonable favorable inference to that party." Roth v. Marina Assocs, No. 07-2596, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70952, at *9 (D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2009). In other words, "the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party's] favor."

In this case, whether a protruding metal wall hook placed at a child's eye level in the children's clothing section of a department store creates a dangerous condition is not beyond the ken of a lay jury. It is also not beyond a jury's common judgment and experience to determine whether defendant is liable for breaching a duty of care to plaintiffs by maintaining that dangerous condition. See, e.g., Roth v. Marina Associates, 2009 WL 2496803, 7-8 (D.N.J. 2009) (finding that expert testimony was not required to determine whether the several-inch drop-off of a sidewalk tree planter is a dangerous condition or whether defendant breached its duty by not maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe way, or whether stepping into the planter caused plaintiff's accident); Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 625 A.2d 1110, 1121 (N.J. 1993) (finding that tripping on a step that one is not expecting and is difficult to see does not involve a matter that is beyond the comprehension of jurors); cf. Shipley v. Target Corp., 2007 WL 987155, 3 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2007) ("Resolution of the alleged dangerous condition, the steepness of the embankment, is dependent on plaintiff's contention that it was improperly graded. Under the circumstances presented, a determination of whether the grade of the embankment created a hazard sufficient to establish an unreasonably dangerous condition is "beyond the ken of the average juror.'").