Opinion
No. FST CV 06 40009426 S
September 6, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiffs, Philip Rosztoczy and Donna Sheehan, appeal from a decision of the defendant planning and zoning commission of the town of Darien (commission), in which it granted an application filed by the defendant Nancy Hyland, executrix of the estate of Marie Eddy (Hyland), to subdivide an approximately 2.143-acre property at 40 Noroton Avenue in Darien (subject property).
Subsequently, on February 28, 2006, Hyland filed a subdivision application proposing a three-lot subdivision on the same property. (Return of Record [ROR], Item 3.) This application also sought waivers of five sections of the Darien subdivision regulations (regulations), including: (1) that the side lines of all lots be at right angles to street lines, (Article IV, § B4); (2) that the street opening for the proposed new street (Eddy Lane) be at least 500 feet from nearby street openings onto the same major road (Article IV, § E7); (3) that four-cornered intersections be avoided if possible and a distance of at least 150 feet be maintained between center lines of offset intersecting streets (Article IV, § E9); (4) that there be at least 100 feet between the terminus of a cul-de-sac and an adjoining property boundary (Article IV, § F2); and (5) that the development meets setback requirements (Article IV, § B5). (ROR, Item 31.)
The commission held public hearings on the application on February 28, 2006, and March 28, 2006. (ROR, Item 31.) Commission member Peter Bigelow recused himself from both meetings because he had contracted with Hyland to purchase a strip of the property contingent on the commission's approval of the subdivision application. (ROR, Item 31.) His wife, Margaret Bigelow, appeared and testified in support of the application at the March 28, 2006 public hearing. (ROR, No. 52, pp. 68-69.)
On May 23, 2006, the commission unanimously approved the subdivision application and, noting its ability pursuant to Article VII, § A, to waive certain subdivision regulation requirements, approved each of the five waivers necessary to approve the application. (ROR, No. 50.) In its written decision, the commission noted its reasons for granting the waivers, including: the size and shape of the parcel; the existing and past use of the property for more than one residence; the accessory structures and uses associated with those dwellings; the limited number of proposed lots; the proposed private low volume residential street compared with the nearby public through streets; and the preservation of the existing house on the "west side/front" of the site and adjacent to Noroton Avenue. (ROR, No. 31.) In addition, the commission determined that the waivers would not have a significant adverse effect on adjacent property or public health and safety. (ROR, No. 31.)
General Statutes § 8-8 governs appeals from a municipal planning and zoning commission to the Superior Court. "A statutory right to appeal may be taken advantage of only by strict compliance with the statutory provisions by which it is created." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cardoza v. Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 78, 82, 557 A.2d 545 (1989).
"[P]leading and proof of aggrievement are prerequisites to a trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of an administrative appeal . . . It is [therefore] fundamental that, in order to have standing to bring an administrative appeal, a person must be aggrieved." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bongiorno Supermarket, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 266 Conn. 531, 537-38, 833 A.2d 883 (2003). "Aggrievement presents a question of fact for the trial court and the party alleging aggrievement bears the burden of proving it." Id., 538-39. A plaintiff may prove aggrievement by testimony at the time of trial; Winchester Woods Associates v. Planning Zoning Commission, 219 Conn. 303, 308, 592 A.2d 953 (1991); or "by the production of the original documents or certified copies from the record." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Quarry Knoll II Corp. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 256 Conn. 674, 703, 780 A.2d 1 (2001).
"Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lewis v. Planning Zoning Commission, 275 Conn. 383, 391, 880 A.2d 865 (2005). Section 8-8(a)(1) provides in relevant part: "In the case of a decision by a zoning commission, planning commission, combined planning and zoning commission or zoning board of appeals, `aggrieved person' includes any person owning land that abuts or is within a radius of one hundred feet of any portion of the land involved in the decision of the board."
The plaintiffs allege in their complaint and subsequently testified at trial that they own property that abuts or is directly across the street from Hyland's property on Noroton Avenue. During the trial, the plaintiffs testified as to their ownership, and submitted deeds demonstrating that they are the owners of abutting property. Accordingly, the court finds that the plaintiffs are statutorily aggrieved because they have proven that they own land that either abuts, or is directly across the street from Hyland's property.
Pursuant to § 8-8(b), appeals from a municipal planning and zoning commission to the Superior Court "shall be commenced by service of process in accordance with subsections (f) and (g) of this section within fifteen days from the date that notice of the decision was published as required by the general statutes." Section 8-8(f) provides in relevant part that "process shall be served by leaving a true and attested copy of the process with, or at the usual place of abode of, the chairman or clerk of the board, and by leaving a true and attested copy with the clerk of the municipality."
On June 1, 2006, the commission published notice of its decision in the Darien News Review. Thereafter, on June 14, 2006, the plaintiffs commenced the present appeal by service of process on the Darien town clerk, Donna Rajczewski. (Marshall's return.) Accordingly, the appeal is timely and service was proper.
When reviewing the actions of an administrative agency, a court is "limited to determining only whether the board's actions were unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal . . . Where a zoning agency has stated its reasons for its actions, the court should determine only whether the assigned grounds are reasonably supported by the record and whether they are pertinent to the considerations which the [board] was required to apply under the zoning regulations . . . It is well settled that a court, in reviewing the actions of an administrative agency, is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the agency or to make factual determinations on its own." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) RR Pool Patio, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 257 Conn. 456, 470, 778 A.2d 61 (2001).
"In reviewing a decision of a zoning board, a reviewing court is bound by the substantial evidence rule, according to which, [c]onclusions reached by [a zoning] commission must be upheld by the trial court if they are reasonably supported by the record. The credibility of the witnesses and the determination of issues of fact are matters solely within the province of the [commission] . . . The question is not whether the trial court would have reached the same conclusion, but whether the record before the [commission] supports the decision reached . . . If a trial court finds that there is substantial evidence to support a zoning board's findings, it cannot substitute its judgment for that of the board." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Municipal Funding, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 270 Conn. 447, 453, 853 A.2d 511 (2004).
In their complaint, the plaintiffs challenge the commission's grant of Hyland's subdivision application. Specifically, they allege that the commission's approval was arbitrary, illegal and in abuse of its discretion in that: (A) the waiver provisions of the regulations lack the specificity required by General Statutes § 8-26; (B) the waiver provisions fail to specify the particular regulations that may be waived under prescribed circumstances; (C) the commission terminated the public hearing without giving opponents of the application an opportunity to address or comment on new information represented by the applicant, thereby denying the opponents their due process rights; (D) the commission approved a subdivision which conflicted with applicable zoning regulations in violation of § 8-26; (E) the commission approved a subdivision which conflicted with applicable subdivision regulations in violation of § 8-26; (F) substantial evidence in the record did not support the commission's findings that waivers of the various subdivision regulations would not have significant adverse effects on adjacent property or on public health and safety; and (G) a member of the commission, who entered into an agreement with the applicant to acquire a portion of the property, had his spouse speak in support of the application, thereby indirectly appearing before the commission in violation of General Statutes § 8-11.
Although the plaintiffs' complaint is grounded in the aforementioned allegations, they failed to brief the majority of those claims. "Issues that are initially raised in a zoning appeal which are not briefed by the plaintiff will be considered abandoned and will not be decided." Cybulski v. Planning Zoning Commission, 43 Conn.App. 105, 109 n. 3, 682 A.2d 1070, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 949, 686 A.2d 123 (1996). Accordingly, any grounds not adequately briefed are deemed waived and will not be addressed by the court.
In the present case, the plaintiffs maintain that the waiver provisions contained in the regulations fail to comply with § 8-26. They assert that the regulations fail to specify the conditions under which a waiver may granted. In response, the defendants argue that the regulations, when read as a whole, are sufficiently precise to provide guidance to the commission and the general public regarding the conditions under which a waiver may be granted. They insist that the individual regulations upon which the plaintiffs premise their argument can be supplemented by other sections of the regulations.
Section 8-26 addresses the ability of the commission to waive subdivision requirements and provides in relevant part: "Such regulations may contain provisions whereby the commission may waive certain requirements under the regulations by a three-quarters vote of all the members of the commission in cases where conditions exist which affect the subject land and are not generally applicable to other land in the area, provided that the regulations shall specify the conditions under which a waiver may be considered and shall provide that no waiver shall be granted that would have a significant adverse effect on adjacent property or on public health and safety."
"Vague regulations which contain meaningless standards lead to ambiguous interpretations in determining the approval or disapproval of different subdivisions. Adequate, fixed and sufficient standards of guidance for the commission must be delineated in its regulations so as to avoid decisions, affecting the rights of property owners, which would otherwise be a purely arbitrary choice of the commission; such a delegation of arbitrary power is invalid . . . The subdivision regulations upon which the commission, acting administratively, should rule must contain known and fixed standards applying to all cases of a like nature, and must conform to the principle that a regulation, like a statute, cannot be too general in its terms . . . The test of a permissible subdivision regulation is whether the criteria contained in the commission's regulations are as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires and are reasonably adequate and sufficient to guide the commission and to enable those affected to know their rights and obligations." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ghent v. Planning Commission, 219 Conn. 511, 517-18, 594 A.2d 5 (1991).
"The regulations are to be construed as a whole since particular words or sections of the regulations, considered separately, may be lacking in precision of meaning to afford a standard sufficient to sustain them . . . It is unrealistic to demand detailed standards which are impracticable or impossible . . . As the complexity of economic and governmental conditions increases, the modern tendency is liberal in approving broad regulatory standards so as to facilitate the operational functions of administrative boards or commissions . . . Although some of the standards may be general in their terms, they are reasonably sufficient to identify the criteria to be evaluated in their enforcement in order to meet the many variables involved since it would be impossible to establish one standard which would adequately cover all future cases." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Forest Construction Co. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 155 Conn. 669, 679-80, 236 A.2d 917 (1967).
The Connecticut Supreme Court has addressed this particular issue only twice. In Sonn v. Planning Commission, 172 Conn. 156, 158, 374 A.2d 159 (1976), the court evaluated the following subdivision regulations: "Except in cases of unusual topography or property lines, through lots bounding on two . . . generally parallel streets will not be permitted." In Sonn, the court determined that the phrase "`unusual topography or property lines' gives broad, almost unfettered, authority to the planning commission, acting administratively, to bow down to expediency rather than serve the public welfare. We have said, for instance, that the words `practical difficulties,' without additional guidelines, are in themselves insufficient to afford a guide to determine whether a variation should be granted." Id., 160. Additionally, in Ghent v. Planning Commission, supra, 219 Conn. 517, the court examined a subdivision regulation providing that "[d]ead-end streets will be approved by the Commission only when the Commission feels that the extension of the street is impractical." In that case, the court "view[ed] the word `impractical' . . . as being as being so vague and imprecise that neither the commission nor the public is fairly apprised of the circumstances under which a dead-end street would be permitted." Id., 518.
In the present case, the plaintiffs take issue with four subdivision regulations that the commission waived in granting the application. First, the commission waived Article IV, § B4, which provides: "All side lines of lots shall be at right angles to straight street lines and radial to curved street lines, unless a variation from this rule will give a better street or lot plan, as determined by the Commission." The commission also waived Article IV, § E7, which provides: "Minor or secondary street openings into a major road shall, in general, be at least 500 feet apart." Additionally, the commission waived Article IV, § F2, which provides: "The terminus of permanent cul-de-sac streets shall normally not be nearer to an adjoining property boundary than one hundred (100) feet, or to the minimum lot depth prescribed by the Planning and Zoning Commission, whichever is greater." Finally, the commission waived a requirement of Article IV, § E9, which provides in relevant part: "A distance of at least 150 feet shall be maintained between center lines of offset intersecting streets."
Although the plaintiffs appear to argue that Article IV, § F2 of the regulations lacks the specificity required by § 8-26, they fail to provide any analysis for their position. Accordingly, it is submitted that the plaintiffs have abandoned their argument with regard to that section.
Unlike Sonn and Ghent, the subdivision regulations at issue in the present case do specify adequately the conditions under which a waiver of those regulations will be granted. The provisions in question indicate that the requirements contained in the regulations may be waived. The phase, "unless a variation from this rule will give a better street or lot plan, as determined by the Commission" does identify the conditions under which the commission may determine whether "a better street or lot plan" exists. The word "normally," and the phrase "in general," adequately specifies the conditions under which the commission shall grant a waiver. The language used in Article IV, § B9 provides notice that the commission may waive the requirement that "[a] distance of at least 150 feet shall be maintained between center lines of offset intersecting streets."
In addition, the defendants maintain that the commission may supplement the individual regulations at issue with other sections contained in the regulations. Specifically, the defendants urge the court to read the regulations at issue in conjunction with the broad policy language contained in Article I, § B, and Article II, § A, of the regulations.
Article I, § B, entitled "policy and purposes" provides: "The policy of the planning and zoning commission is to consider land subdivisions as part of a plan for the orderly, efficient, economical and environmental sound development of the Town. The policy means, among other things, that these regulations are designed to achieve the following purposes in carrying out this policy: (1) land to be subdivided shall be of such character that it can be used for building purposes without danger to health or public safety . . . (4) proper measures shall be taken to prevent or minimize erosion, sedimentation, or other adverse effects on the natural environment; (5) proposed streets must be in harmony with the existing or proposed principal thoroughfares shown on the Town's Plan of Development as adopted by the Commission, especially in regard to safe intersections with such thoroughfares; the proposed streets must be so arranged and of such width as to provide an adequate and convenient system for present and prospective traffic needs and necessary access for emergency vehicles; (6) lots, streets, and related elements must be designed to protect and preserve natural features and avoid unnecessary degradation of the natural environment . . . The Commission's policy requires, furthermore, that the necessary improvements, measures and services to enable healthy, safe and economical development shall be provided as an integral part of new subdivisions or resubdivisions."
Article II, § A, entitled "general requirements," provides in relevant part: (1) Approval of plans for subdivisions or resubdivision will be given by the Commission in accordance with the requirements and procedures established by these Regulations . . . (3) Land of such geophysical nature that, in its present state, cannot be issued for building purposes because of danger to health, or the public safety, because of peril from fire or flood, or other conditions, such as difficult drainage, configuration, inaccessibility, temporary flooding, erosion, steep sloping topography, wetlands, swamps, large rock outcrops, or high ground-water level, shall not be planned for residential use, nor for other such uses as may increase danger to health, life or property, or aggravate or create a flood hazard, unless appropriate measures have been taken by the subdivider to correct such hazard in accordance with the specifications declared a part of these Regulations or the specific requirements established by the Planning and Zoning Commission, pursuant to these Regulations.
Darien's subdivision regulations are "as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires and are reasonably adequate and sufficient to guide the commission and to enable those affected to know their rights and obligations." Forest Construction Co. v. Planning and Zoning Commission, supra, 155 Conn. 680. As noted in Forest Construction, "[t]he regulations are to be construed as a whole since particular words or sections of the regulations, considered separately, may be lacking in precision of meaning to afford a standard sufficient to sustain them." Id. Notably, § 8-26 says that "the regulations shall specify the conditions under which a waiver may be considered." (Emphasis added.) It does not say that each of the provisions to be waived itself must specify the conditions under which a waiver may be considered.
Thus, it is inappropriate to look at the particular requirements waived by the commission in a vacuum to see whether those requirements, standing alone, contain the requisite guidance. Rather, one must look at the subdivisions regulations overall to determine whether they provide sufficient criteria to allow those affected to know their rights.
In the present case, the "Policy and Purposes" section of the subdivision regulations sets forth many criteria to be considered by the commission in evaluating whether to approve subdivision applications. That section provides the following criteria to guide the commission and to allow those affected to know their rights:
orderly, efficient, economical and environmentally sound development
health and public safety
effects on the natural environment
harmony with existing or proposed principal thoroughfares
safe intersections with such thoroughfares
adequate and convenient system for present and prospective traffic needs
access for emergency vehicles
healthy, safe, and economical development
While these requirements are relatively broad, there are many cases holding that broad subdivision regulations may nevertheless be sufficiently precise to guide the commission and to enable those affected to know their rights and obligations. In Forest Construction Co. v. Planning and Zoning Commission, supra, 155 Conn. 669, the commission denied the plaintiff's subdivision application because it called for a single access road to the proposed subdivision. The plaintiff appealed the commission's denial of his subdivision application on the ground that nothing in the subdivision regulations prohibited such a single access and, therefore, that there were no regulatory standards to guide the commission's decision. Id., 673. The Supreme Court disagreed. Id., 680. The court pointed to a subdivision regulation that provided, "The Commission reserves the right to reject applications for the development of land when such development might be hazardous to the health and welfare of the community." Id., 675. The court also noted that the regulations provided that proposed subdivisions had to conform to the zoning regulations, the preamble of which stated, "The purpose of these regulations is to promote the health, safety and general welfare of the Town of Bethany by preventing the overcrowding of land and avoiding undue concentration of population, by preventing or lessening congestion of the public highways, by securing safety from fire, panic, and other dangers, and facilitating adequate provision for transportation." Id., 679. The court found the regulations to be sufficiently precise.
Additionally, in Nicoli v. Planing Zoning Commission, 171 Conn. 89, 90, 368 A.2d 24 (1976), the commission voted to approve the plaintiff's subdivision application, subject to the following condition: "No zoning approval or building permit shall be issued for the construction of any residential building within this subdivision until such time as he proposed public road with the subdivision is connected to a public street or highway in the town of Easton." The plaintiff appealed, contending that, as there was no explicit requirement that there be connections which provided access to the subdivision by Easton public roads, the commission lacked the power to impose such a condition. Id., 93. The Supreme Court disagreed. Id., 94.
Similarly, in Barberino Realty Corp. and Development Corp. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 222 Conn. 607, 619, 610 A.2d 1205 (1992), the court reviewed a regulation requiring that the commission take "adequate safeguards" for the protection of other properties and provide for "adequate" traffic circulation and parking. In that case, the Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff could not meet its burden of "showing that the regulations are unconstitutionally vague." Id., 619-20.
Other cases also reveal regulations that are arguably broad, yet were found to provide sufficient guidance and standards. In Smith-Groh, Inc. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 78 Conn.App. 216, 826 A.2d 249 (2003), the court found that the phrase "reasonable cost," as used in a zoning regulation, provided an ascertainable standard. Additionally, in Shailer v. Planning and Zoning Commission, 26 Conn.App. 17, 22 n. 2, 596 A.2d 1336 (1991), the court upheld the following subdivision regulation: "The Commission . . . may waive specific requirements of these Regulations with respect to a particular subdivision where, owning to conditions especially affecting such subdivision, a literal enforcement of these Regulations would result in practical difficulty and unusual hardship or undesirable land development, so that substantial justice will be done and the policy and intent of these Regulations will be preserved. No waiver shall be granted that would have a significant adverse impact on adjacent property or on public health and safety."
Thus, there is substantial precedent establishing that regulations such as those at issue in the present case are sufficiently precise to provide guidance to the commission and to enable those affected to know their rights and obligations.
Therefore, under the law and the facts, this court finds that the plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that the subdivision regulations are vague and invalid. The subdivision regulations provide sufficient guidance to allow all involved to know the criteria that the commission should consider in deciding whether to grant a waiver. The subdivision regulations allow the commission the discretion to evaluate waiver requests in view of all of the criteria that are present in the subdivision regulations.
As an alternative ground for their appeal, the plaintiffs maintain that the commission was prohibited from waiving the requirement contained in Article IV, § E9. Specifically, they argue that, because § 8-26 permits the commission to waive "certain requirements," the commission may only waive those requirements that it "has legislatively singled out as being subject to waiver." They assert that, unlike some of the other regulations at issue, the requirement waived in Article IV, § E9, does not use language that would indicate that the promulgated rule contained in that section is subject to waiver. The defendants respond by arguing that the plaintiffs' interpretation of § 8-26 is incorrect and that such an interpretation would "render the power conferred by § 8-26 unworkable and undermine the recognized flexibility required in subdivision review."
As noted, § 8-26 addresses the ability of the commission to waive subdivision requirements and provides in relevant part: "Such regulations may contain provisions whereby the commission may waive certain requirements . . ." (Emphasis added.) Additionally, Article VII of the regulations essentially tracks the language used in § 8-26, and permits the commission to waive "certain" requirements. Finally, the requirement that the commission waived in Article IV, § E9, provides: "A distance of at least 150 feet shall be maintained between center lines of offset intersecting streets."
In the present case, the plaintiffs have cited no law to support their position, nor could the court find any. Instead, they rely exclusively upon the definition of the word "certain" in support of their argument. Black's Law Dictionary defines "certain" as "in law, capable of being identified or made known, without liability to mistake or ambiguity, from data already given. Free from doubt." Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). While such a definition tends to support the plaintiffs' position, the defendants have noted that there are several definitions of the word "certain." They point to one definition in which "certain" is defined as "of a specific but unspecified character, quantity, or degree." (Emphasis added.) Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (9th Ed. 1987). Under this definition, the defendants would not be required to specify, in the regulations, those requirements that may be waived.
Here, both parties offer a plausible definition for the word "certain." Nevertheless, the court has noted that "[a]s the complexity of economic and governmental conditions increases, the modern tendency is liberal in approving broad regulatory standards so as to facilitate the operational functions of administrative boards or commissions." Forest Construction Coy. Planning Zoning Commission, supra, 155 Conn. 679. Requiring the commission to single out each requirement that is subject to waiver would not serve to "facilitate the operational function" of the commission. Accordingly, because the plaintiffs offer no law in support of their position, and because both parties offer a plausible definition of the word "certain," this court rejects the plaintiffs' narrow construction of § 8-26.
Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the March 28, 2006 public hearing testimony of Margaret Bigelow, recused commission member Peter Bigelow's wife, violated General Statutes § 8-11, which provides for disqualification of commission members who have conflicts of interest. Although Peter Bigelow correctly recused himself from participating in the hearing or decision pursuant to § 8-11, the plaintiffs argue that Margaret Bigelow spoke not only on her own behalf, but also on behalf of her husband, thus acting "as a proxy for a disqualified Commission member, thereby violating the letter and spirit of § 8-11." The plaintiffs point to Margaret Bigelow's use of the pronoun "we" to underscore their argument that, through his wife, Peter Bigelow did in fact appear before the commission to urge approval of the application.
General Statutes § 8-11 provides in relevant part: "No member of any zoning commission or board and no member of any zoning board of appeals or of any municipal agency exercising the powers of any zoning commission or board of appeals, whether existing under the general statutes or under any special act, shall appear for or represent any person, firm, corporation or other entity in any matter pending before the planning or zoning commission or board or said board of appeals or any agency exercising the powers of any such commission or board in the same municipality, whether or not he is a member of the board or commission hearing such matter. No member of any zoning commission or board and no member of any zoning board of appeals shall participate in the hearing or decision of the board or commission of which he is a member upon any matter in which he is directly or indirectly interested in a personal or financial sense."
The defendants respond by arguing that Margaret Bigelow's testimony did not violate § 8-11, and that the plaintiffs have failed to provide case law or other authority in support of their "novel" argument. Rather, they argue that Peter Bigelow's recusal was sufficient and appropriate under § 8-11, which it argues does not encompass family members. In addition, the defendants note that Margaret Bigelow's use of the pronoun "we" was ambiguous and did not necessarily implicate Peter Bigelow or demonstrate that she appeared for or on behalf of her husband.
See Massimo v. Planning Commission of Naugutuck, 41 Conn.Sup. 196, 199-200, 564 A.2d 1075 (1989).
At trial, the plaintiffs conceded that this argument is not sufficient, standing alone, to warrant overturning the commission's decision in the present case. The court agrees, and finds the plaintiffs' argument regarding Margaret Bigelow's testimony insufficient to reverse the commission's decision.
Moreover, there is insufficient evidence of wrongdoing that would warrant this court's admonishing the commission, per the plaintiff's request.
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs' appeal of the commission's decision to grant Hyland's subdivision application is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
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