Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co.

7 Citing cases

  1. Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co.

    76 Haw. 454 (Haw. 1994)   Cited 248 times
    Holding that "the timely filing of an administrative complaint with the [state agency] was precondition to civil suit under HRS § 378-2."

    Ross again appealed to this court. On August 29, 1991, we issued an opinion addressing only count I, Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Company (Hawaii) Ltd., Inc., 72 Haw. 350, 816 P.2d 302, reconsideration denied, 72 Haw. 616, 841 P.2d 1074 (1991) ( Ross I). Ross I held that, unless it fit into one of the exceptions in HRS § 378-3 (1985), Stouffer's discharge of Ross pursuant to its no-relatives policy violated HRS § 378-2, because it discriminated against Ross because of his marital status.

  2. Wigent v. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp.

    19 F. Supp. 3d 1012 (D. Haw. 2014)   Cited 5 times
    Explaining that prohibiting married employees from working in the same department is per se discrimination on the basis of marital status under HRS 378-2

    A. Direct Evidence: Whether SH–2 is Per Se Discriminatory Although they have differing interpretations of its impact, both parties acknowledge that the Hawaii Supreme Court's decisions in Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co. (Hawaii) Ltd., Inc., 72 Haw.350, 816 P.2d 302 (Haw.1991) (“ Ross I”) and Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co. (Hawaii) Ltd., Inc., 76 Hawai'i 454, 879 P.2d 1037 (Haw.1994) (“ Ross II”) (collectively “the Ross cases” or “the Ross decisions”) are the leading (and only) Hawaii cases directly addressing H.R.S. § 378–2(1)'s prohibition on marital status discrimination.

  3. Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc.

    923 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1996)   Cited 68 times
    Holding that "[e]xtending the reach of the anti-discrimination law to employment decisions based on to whom a person is married would change the focus of the law from discrimination based on broad categories . . . to a highly individual factor"

    Others have construed "marital status" as having a more expansive meaning, in furtherance of perceived legislative intent. Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co., 72 Haw. 350, 816 P.2d 302 (1991); River Bend Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Human Rights Comm'n, 232 Ill. App.3d 838, 173 Ill.Dec. 868, 597 N.E.2d 842 (1992); Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1979); Thompson v. Board of Trustees, 192 Mont. 266, 627 P.2d 1229 (1981); Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 91 Wn.2d 62, 586 P.2d 1149 (1978).

  4. Boaden v. Dept. of Law Enforcement

    171 Ill. 2d 230 (Ill. 1996)   Cited 83 times
    Defining "marital status" narrowly based on statutory definition-"the legal status of being married, single, separated, divorced, or widowed"

    The court in River Bend upheld the Commission's adoption of the broad meaning of marital status. Accord Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co., 72 Haw. 350, 353-54, 816 P.2d 302, 303-04 (1991). In the present case, the Commission relied on River Bend in again concluding that marital status includes spousal identity.

  5. River Bend Community Unit School District No. 2 v. Human Rights Commission

    597 N.E.2d 842 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 6 times
    Placing the burden on the employer to show that one spouse was unable to effectively supervise another, and noting that the business necessity exception "is a narrow one."

    (See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. Civil Rights Comm'n (1986), 425 Mich. 527, 390 N.W.2d 625; Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Board (1980), 51 N.Y.2d 506, 415 N.E.2d 950; Thomson v. Sanborn's Motor Express, Inc. (1977), 154 N.J. Super. 555, 382 A.2d 53.) Other States, however, have concluded that proscribed conduct does include discrimination based on the spouse's identity. See, e.g., Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co. (Hawaii) Ltd. (1991), 72 Haw. 350, 816 P.2d 302; Thompson v. Board of Trustees, School District No. 12 (1981), 192 Mont. 266, 627 P.2d 1229; Kraft, Inc. v. State (Minn. 1979), 284 N.W.2d 386; Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n (1978), 91 Wn.2d 62, 586 P.2d 1149. Two scholarly comments on the subject have also opined that marital status discrimination does include discrimination based on the identity of one's spouse.

  6. Donato v. American Telephone and Telegraph

    146 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 1998)   Cited 2 times
    Asking "[c]an an individual proceed under the Florida Civil Rights Act by alleging that he was discharged, in violation of the prohibition on marital status discrimination, because he is married to an individual who filed suit against his employer?"

    Courts in other states appear to interpret general prohibitions on marital status discrimination more broadly. See, e.g., Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co., 131 Wn.2d 171, 182 (Wash. 1997) (noting that prior to 1993 legislative amendment which defined "marital status" as the legal status of being married, Washington courts employed broad interpretation and found actions based on spousal conduct constituted discrimination on basis of marital status); Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Company (Hawaii) Ltd., 72 Haw. 350, 355 (Haw. 1991) (policy requiring discharge of one employee if they marry another person working in same department is discrimination on basis of marital status); Thompson v. Board of Trustees, School District No. 12, Harlem, Blaine County, 192 Mont. 266, 271 (Mont. 1981) ("marital status" includes the identity and occupation of one's spouse such that rule against spouses working within same school system was violative of state anti-discrimination statute).

  7. Boaden v. Department of Law Enforcement

    267 Ill. App. 3d 645 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 22 times

    Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co. (Haw.) Ltd. (1991), 72 Haw. 350, 816 P.2d 302; Thompson v. Board of Trustees, School District No. 12 (1981), 192 Mont. 266, 627 P.2d 1229 (holding "marital status" discrimination includes identity and occupation of spouse); Kraft, Inc. v. State (Minn. 1979), 284 N.W.2d 386; Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n (1978), 91 Wn.2d 62, 586 P.2d 1149 (holding that agency had authority to promulgate rule defining "marital status" discrimination to include discrimination based upon marital status, identity of spouse, or spouse's occupation).