Giving great weight to the jury's recommendation does not mean that the trial judge is bound by the jury's recommendation. See Ross v. State, 386 So.2d 1191, 1197 (Fla. 1980). Rather, regardless of the jury's recommendation, the trial judge must conduct an independent analysis of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

§ 921.141(3). The jury's advisory sentence is entitled to "great weight" in the trial court's determination, Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975), but the court has an independent obligation to determine the appropriate punishment, Ross v. State, 386 So.2d 1191, 1197 (Fla. 1980). Third, the Florida Supreme Court automatically reviews all cases in which the defendant is sentenced to death.

Id. at 910. Ault contends that Tedder was overruled by Ross v. State, 386 So.2d 1191, 1197 (Fla. 1980), in which this Court rejected a trial court's decision to sentence the defendant to death, holding that the trial court had given undue weight to the jury's verdict. However, we find that the trial court in this case applied the correct standard:

This subnormality, he argues, renders his entire confession nonvoluntary and inadmissible. The fact of mental subnormality or impairment alone does not render a confession involuntary, Ross v. State, 386 So.2d 1191 (Fla. 1980), except in those rare cases involving subnormality or impairment so severe as to render the defendant unable to communicate intelligibly or understand the meaning of Miranda warnings even when presented in simplified form. Cooper v. Griffin, 455 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1972).

Notwithstanding the jury recommendation, whether it be for life imprisonment or death, the judge is required to make an independent determination, based on the aggravating and mitigating factors. Randolph v. State, 463 So.2d 186, 192 (Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 907, 105 S.Ct. 3533, 87 L.Ed.2d 656 (1985); Engle v. State, 438 So.2d 803, 813 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1074, 104 S.Ct. 1430, 79 L.Ed.2d 753 (1984); Ross v. State, 386 So.2d 1191, 1197 (Fla. 1980). Moreover, this procedure has been previously upheld against constitutional challenge.

" 378 So.2d, at 772.Smith v. State, 515 So.2d 182, 185 (Fla. 1987) ("[W]e approve the death sentence on the basis that a jury recommendation of death is entitled to great weight"), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 971 (1988); see also LeDuc v. State, 365 So.2d 149, 151 (Fla. 1978) ("The primary standard for our review of death sentences is that the recommended sentence of a jury should not be disturbed if all relevant data w[ere] considered, unless there appear strong reasons to believe that reasonable persons could not agree with the recommendation"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979); Ross v. State, 386 So.2d 1191, 1197 (Fla. 1980) (same); Middleton v. State, 426 So.2d 548, 552-553 (Fla. 1982) (approving trial court's imposition of death sentence and reiterating that jury had recommended death), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1230 (1983); Francois v. State, 407 So.2d 885, 891 (Fla. 1981) (same), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1122 (1982); cf. Grossman v. State, 525 So.2d, at 839, n. 1 ("We have . . . held that a jury recommendation of death should be given great weight").The Florida courts have long recognized the integral role that the jury plays in their capital sentencing scheme.

In making the sentence determination, the trial court must give “great weight” to the jury's advisory sentence. Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla.1975); see alsoRoss v. State, 386 So.2d 1191, 1197 (Fla.1980); LeDuc v. State, 365 So.2d 149, 151 (Fla.1978). In Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld Florida's judge-based death sentencing procedure under the Eighth Amendment.

, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 733, 98 L.Ed.2d 681 (1988).Ross v. State, 386 So.2d 1191 (Fla. 1980), is not inconsistent with the proposition that the trial judge must give great weight to a jury recommendation of death. In Ross, the jury recommended death and the trial judge imposed a death sentence, indicating in his findings that he was bound by the jury's recommendation.

Muhammad refused to cooperate on three separate occasions with Drs. Barnard and Carrera. Dr. Amin's examination found Muhammad competent. Appellant refers us to Ross v. State, 386 So.2d 1191 (Fla. 1980), wherein we held that an unequivocal finding of competency by one expert is sufficient and it is not error to refuse to appoint a second expert when the defense fails to present evidence that further examination is needed. Here, appellant argues, Dr. Amin's report was not unequivocal and the evidence in the proffer suggested the need for further examination.

Suggs's third claim is that newly discovered evidence reveals that his sentencing judge failed to exercise her independent judgment over the decision to sentence him to death under the law as it existed when he was sentenced. Suggs quotes statements his sentencing judge made in a memoir and a letter to the Governor in support of commuting Suggs's sentence to life, arguing that she not only deferred to the jury's vote, contrary to section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1989), and Ross v. State, 386 So.2d 1191 (Fla. 1980), but also that she shifted her responsibility to the appellate court, contrary to Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). This claim is meritless.