Opinion
No. 14983
January 10, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is a summary process action brought by the plaintiff, Camilla Ross, against the defendant, Edwin St. Germain, seeking to evict him from the property of 276 Washington Street, Norwich, Connecticut. As discussed more fully, infra it is clear to this court that Ms. Ross is entitled to possession and judgment in this case.
To avoid confusion, because of the number of other cases filed by Mr. St. Germain, the court will refer to the parties by their proper names rather than as the plaintiff or the defendant.
Sadly, it is also clear to this court that Ms. Ross' property rights have been abused by the relentless dilatory pleadings and tactics of the defendant. Our judicial system and its resources have suffered as well.
The basic facts of this case are simple and straight forward: the court finds that Ms. Ross is the owner of 276 Washington Street and that the defendant has admitted this fact on numerous occasions. The court also finds that Ms. Ross served a valid notice to quit upon the defendant on February 6, 2006 and proved her case to the court. The court finds that the "special defenses" and "counterclaims" raised by the defendant are completely without merit. In a normal summary process case, Ms. Ross would have obtained her judgment as a matter of course and gained forthwith the judgment of possession to which she is entitled.
Mr. St. Germain, however, has made this anything but a normal summary process case.
No less than three other judges of this jurisdiction, either explicitly or implicitly, also have found Mr. St. Germain's actions to be without merit and dilatory. See the attached transcript of St. Germain v. LaBrie et al, DN 14820, Schimelman, J., December 21, 2005 (Mr. St. Germain may not bring a summary process action regarding this property; "Mr. St. Germain is not the record titleholder . . . and had no authority . . . to sublet these particular premises to anyone . . ."); see also Judge Schimelman's April 3, 2006 Memorandum of Decision on Motion to Reargue (motion denied because St. Germain lacks standing); see the attached Memorandum of Decision, May 17, 2006, DN 14983, Foley, J., ("The pleadings in this case have been copious and voluminous. Mr. St. Germain's dilatory pleadings are a monumental tribute to delay in resolving this case"); see the attached Memorandum of Decision, January 19, 2006, DN K21N CR05 0096539, DN K21 CR05 0095930, Foley, J., (The court finds [Mr. St. Germain's] testimony not credible and, when truthful, intentionally misleading . . . his pleadings, while novel, are tedious, voluminous and of dubious legal import." . . . if Mr. St. Germain is impecunious, it is self-imposed and will not be recognized as a basis for fee waivers); see attached order of August 22, 2006, Randolph, J., (attempt to limit the filing of motions in this case); see the attached Court Order of August 28, 2006, Randolph, J., (Court found no presumption that the property belongs to St. Germain and St. Germain may not have a motion for use and occupancy).
A court has the power to take judicial notice of relevant files involving the same party pending in other court cases. See State v. Carey, 228 Conn. 487, 497 (1994); State v. Bunkley, 202 Conn. 629, 648 (1987); Guerriero v. Galasso, 144 Conn. 600, 605 (1957); DeLuca v. Park Commissioners, 94 Conn. 7, 9-10 (1919).
Further, apparently Mr. St. Germain has admitted that he also has angered a Federal Bankruptcy judge in cases that he has pending there. See the attached Memorandum of Decision, January 19, 2006 DN K21N CR05 0096539, DN K21 CR05 0095930, Foley, J.
This court concurs with the aforementioned findings. Aware that Mr. St. Germain has appeared pro se, this court, in addition to its other duties, has spent innumerable hours both before and after the hearing on the merits going over the countless "pleadings" filed by the defendant in an attempt to glean some valid and cognizable claim therein. The attempt was as profitless as it was arduous and the court is left with the deep and abiding belief that Mr. St. Germain has purposely engaged in a "scorched earth" or "Stalingrad defense:" see e.g., Anom v. Ofori-Tenkorang, 2005 Ct.Sup., 2973, FA 01-184721 (Tierney, J.) [ 38 Conn. L. Rptr. 800]; which is aimed at frustrating the proper course of justice. "Although our courts are consistently . . . solicitous of the rights of pro se litigants, the rules of practice cannot be ignored to the detriment of other parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Oakland Heights Mobile Park, Inc. v. Simon, 36 Conn.App. 432, 436, 651 A.2d 281 (1994), on appeal after remand, 40 Conn.App. 30, 668 A.2d 737 (1995).
A copy of the clerk's docket sheet for this case is attached hereto.
"[I]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of pro se litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the pro se party . . . Although we allow pro se litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ruiz v. Gatling, 73 Conn.App. 574, 575, 808 A.2d 710 (2002).
In addition, Mr. St. Germain, in January 2006 initiated a forcible entry and detainer action against Ms. Ross and other named defendants; see DN CV06-4005420. On April 3, 2006, Judge Hurley dismissed the action on the grounds that the same issues had been determined by Judge Schimelman. Such an obstructionist aim is also evinced by Mr. St. Germain's conduct during the hearing on the merits. Despite numerous warnings by the court to Mr. St. Germain to discontinue asking irrelevant lines of questioning, he would continue with questions in the same vein until the court was forced to stop the proceedings on several occasions and issue sterner warnings. "The trial court has inherent authority to control the proceedings before it to ensure that there [is] no prejudice or inordinate delay." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ins. Co. of the State of Pennsylvania v. Waterfield, Superior Court, Judicial District of Windham at Putnam, Docket No. CV 03 0071645 (April 13, 2006, Riley, J.), citing Merritt v. Fagan, 78 Conn.App. 590, 594, 828 A.2d 685, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 916, 833 A.2d 467 (2003). Further, despite numerous admissions by Mr. St. Germain that Ms. Ross is the owner of the property, on or about August 10, 2006, Mr. St. Germain, without right to do so, filed a lis pendens under this docket number and also under another action DN 15286, which further demonstrates an intent to abuse the judicial process. This court, by a separate memorandum of decision, has ordered that lis pendens dissolved, and in DN 15286, this court has granted Ms. Ross' motion to dismiss.
The court notes further, that on July 20, 2006, Mr. St. Germain filed yet another summary process action against Ms. Ross and the people that he allowed to live in the premises, which is DN 15286. A review of this "filing" reveals that it is in substance the same claims that were dismissed by Judge Schimelman on December 21, 2005. Ms. Ross' lawyer filed a motion to dismiss on July 31, 2006, claiming it should be dismissed on the basis of res judicata and collateral estoppel, asserting that St. Germain still had no standing or right to bring the action. In addition, Ms. Ross asserted that St. Germain's claims were noncognizable in a summary process case because they contained claims for monetary damages and injunctive relief. A hearing was held on August 28, 2006, before Judge Randolph, which primarily concerned DN 15286. A copy of that hearing is attached hereto.
During the course of that hearing, Ms. Ross' attorney brought up her pending motion to dismiss and additional motions filed by Mr. St. Germain. Ms. Ross' attorney noted that he considered them incomprehensible, harassing in nature, and that it was causing additional expenses for Ms. Ross. After hearing from the two parties, including a request for a default judgment by Mr. St. Germain, which was denied, the court, Randolph, J., found that the trial in re DN 14983, Ross v. St. Germain, would be dispositive of the issues in DN 15286 and scheduled the trial in DN 14983.
Thereafter in DN 15286, Mr. St. Germain filed something called "action in the nature of mandamus" with the Appellate Court, which was denied by the Appellate Court. He then drafted something called a "Motion for Reconsideration in Support of Action in the Nature of Mandamus," which has not been filed with the Appellate Court because he has requested a $70.00 fee waiver and which this court denied. This court agrees with Ms. Ross that she is entitled to a dismissal of that action as a matter of law, based upon Mr. St. Germain's lack of standing, because his claims are barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel, and because his claims are not cognizable in a summary process case. Further, the issues in DN 15286, also are dismissed for mootness inasmuch as this court finds Ms. Ross is entitled to judgment in this docket number. See Memorandum of Decision, dated January 10, 2007.
This court is not satisfied that Mr. St. Germain has a constitutional or statutory right to appeal without payment of fees, cost and expenses in a summary process case. See Practice Book § 63-6. Therefore, it is denied. Further, this court has reviewed Judge Foley's prior decisions denying fee waiver for Mr. St. Germain, and reviewed all of the files, fee waiver applications before the court and the documents submitted by Mr. St. Germain in support of his application. This court finds no substantial change in circumstances that would call Judge Foley's decision into question. Therefore, for the reasons stated by Judge Foley and this court's independent review, this court finds that Mr. St. Germain is not entitled to the waiver of fees in this case. No further hearing is necessary under the particular circumstances of this case. The court is aware that in Mr. St. Germain's criminal cases, this court did grant Mr. St. Germain's application for public defender representation. In those cases he faces felony counts and possible incarceration and has a constitutional and statutory right to counsel; see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-297(f). The standard there is whether he has the financial ability to secure competent legal counsel. Id.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
"Summary process is a special statutory procedure designed to provide an expeditious remedy . . . It enable[s] landlords to obtain possession of leased premises without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which, under the common-law actions, they might be subjected by tenants wrongfully holding over their terms . . . Summary process statutes secure a prompt hearing and final determination . . . Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Young v. Young, 249 Conn. 482, 487-88, 733 A.2d 835 (1999). "The ultimate issue in a summary process action is the right to possession." Southland Corporation v. Vernon, 1 Conn.App. 439, 443, 473 A.2d 318 (1984).
The court makes the following findings of fact: The court finds the testimony of Ms. Ross to be credible. Ms Ross is the fee simple owner of the subject premises, which is a residential dwelling and which she obtained from the defendant. Apparently, Ms. Ross and Mr. St. Germain had a personal relationship and cohabitated in the house from 1997 to 1999, but the relationship ended at some point, Ms. Ross left and Mr. St. Germain was allowed to remain but was supposed to make the mortgage payments. In 2005, the amount of the mortgage payment was $1,843.00. During the summer of 2005, without Ms. Ross' consent, and indeed, against her express wishes, Mr. St. Germain allowed people to move into the premises. At some point, Mr. St. Germain stopped making the mortgage payments but never told Ms. Ross, but when she found out she was forced to bring the mortgage current. Then, prior to November 2005, Mr. St. Germain agreed to make payments to Ms. Ross on a weekly basis for his current use of the premises and to repay the missed mortgage payments.
On November 19, 2005, Mr. St. Germain was arrested as a result of an altercation with someone on the property and a protective order was issued which forbid the defendant from entering the premises of 276 Washington Street, Norwich, Connecticut. This protective order is still in effect. See DN CR05-96539.
At the end of November 2005, Mr. St. Germain began a summary process action against Ms. Ross and the people that he had allowed to live in the premises without Ms. Ross' consent. As noted, this action was dismissed by Judge Schimelman because Mr. St. Germain had no right to bring it.
In December 2005, Ms. Ross made it clear that she did not want Mr. St. Germain occupying the premises by virtue of serving him with a notice to quit, claiming that he had failed to pay weekly rent. She also filed a summary process claim against him, but it was dismissed due to a defect.
Thereafter, Ms. Ross hired an attorney and began the present action by filing a valid notice to quit. The plaintiff's notice to quit notified Mr. St. Germain that he was to quit possession of 276 Washington Street because of 1) termination of lease by lapse of time, and 2) "You once had a right or privilege to occupy the premises but that right to occupy has terminated." The court finds from the evidence presented that the plaintiff has met her burden under either theory of the notice to quit. Therefore, judgment will enter on her behalf.
As noted, Mr. St. Germain has filed an "answer," "special defenses" and "counterclaims." While Mr. St. Germain has appeared pro se, that cannot excuse what the court finds to be meritless, frivolous and dilatory claims. "There are no special rules authorizing a lesser standard of compliance for pro se parties. Any litigant may choose to proceed without representation, but all are bound by the same standards." Basilicato v. Department of Public Utility Control, CT Page 9565 197 Conn. 320, 324, 497 A.2d 48 (1985). "[T]he right to appear pro se, like the right of an attorney to appear for a client, is not absolute but subject to the condition that the rules of practice be followed. The right will be forfeited upon the repeated and wilful failure to follow the rules or the repeated filing of frivolous pleadings." Fairfield University v. Newton, Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield, Docket No. 93 0307005 (March 14, 1996, Levin, J.).
"The signing of any pleading, motion, objection or request shall constitute a certificate that the signer has read such document, that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay." (Emphasis added.) Practice Book § 4-2(b). "Courts have an inherent power to disregard . . . pleadings which have been interposed for the purpose of thwarting the orderly progress of a case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tolland Bank v. Larson, 28 Conn.App. 332, 336, 610 A.2d 720 (1992).
Claims for money damages are not permitted in summary process cases. "[T]he nature of a summary process proceeding under the [Landlord and Tenant] Act is one for possession and any responsive pleading must be related to the issue of possession or occupancy. A counterclaim that seeks relief in the form of compensatory and punitive damages is not permitted in a summary process action because prayers for monetary relief do not implicate the right to possession. Fellows v. Martin, 223 Conn. 152, 154, [ 611 A.2d 412] (1992) . . . Complaints and counterclaims seeking money damages are not permitted in summary process lawsuits, either tenant against landlord or landlord against tenant. Atlantic Refining Co. v. O'Keefe, 131 Conn. 528, 531, [ 41 A.2d 109] (1945)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perrone Realty, LLC v. JP Enterprises of New Milford, LLC, Superior Court, Judicial District of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 1810093 (July 22, 2005, Shaban, J.) [ 39 Conn. L. Rptr. 696].
As noted, the court has reviewed Mr. St. Germain's answer, "special defenses" and "counterclaims" which were filed in this case. They are verbose, at times nonsensical and frivolous, and almost completely bereft of pertinent legal authority. It is not necessary for the court to deal with them in any detail except to note that they are improper for several basic reasons.
The court agrees with Ms. Ross' "Reply to Special Defenses" that Mr. St. Germain's "special defenses" are incomprehensible and fail to apprise the plaintiff of the factual basis of the alleged "defenses" and that filing a request to revise by Ms. Ross would have only generated more cost and delay to her case without any hope of receiving a more comprehensible revised pleading.
First, Mr. St. Germain's claims are no more than an attempt to reassert the summary process action that was dismissed by Judge Schimelman on December 21, 2006, because Mr. St. Germain had no right to bring it. Mr. St. Germain still does not have such a right. Moreover, with the exception of Ms. Ross, the claims pertain to parties who are not before the court. See attached transcript. This court has not heard or found anything in the voluminous record before it that would cast any doubt on Judge Schimelman's decision, or Judge Hurley's either.
Mr. St. Germain's request to join these alleged parties was denied by the court on May 17, 2006; see order of Foley, J.; and a "Motion to Reargue Motion for Joinder" was denied by the court, Foley, J., on June 7, 2006.
Second, as part of Mr. St. Germain's counterclaims, his claims for relief request a hearing in monetary damages for each and every counterclaim. As noted, such claims are improper and cannot stand. Fellows v. Martin, 223 Conn. 152, 154, (1992). Finally, the court is of the opinion that they were interposed for the purposes of delay and thus should be disregarded on that ground also.
Mr. St. Germain specifically states in his "special defenses" that the "counterclaim" "shall be considered included as made part hereto." Thus, he has additionally, and just as fatally infected his "answer" and "special defenses."
On January 5, 2007, Mr. St. Germain filed more "motions" in DN 14983 and DN 15286 entitled "Emergency Motions for Hearing."
This "motion" filed under DN 15286 and 14983 references the temporary injunction issued by Judge Hurley in KNL-CV06-4005044, the action which Judge Hurley dismissed on the merits on April 3, 2006. Mr. St. Germain did not file an application for waiver of fees to appeal until August 7, 2006, which was initially denied on October 10, 2006, by Gordon, J. On December 22, 2006, the court, Gordon, J., sua sponte, reversed its decision and waived the fees. Mr. St. Germain has since filed an appeal in that docket number.
The present motion is at best frivolous and vexatious and perhaps intentionally misleading. The court and court staff wasted considerable time on January 5th to unravel the true procedural facts contained therein. The motion was without merit and denied that day.
In addition, this court is aware through the clerk's office that Mr. St. Germain has made innumerable and unnecessary phone calls and visits to the clerk's office, further distracting the court staff and wasting judicial resources. This behavior was noted previously by Judge Foley; see Memorandum of Decision, dated January 19, 2006. Not only has this behavior not abated, but it may have increased.
This court further notes that should such filings continue, it would entertain a motion enjoining Mr. St. Germain from filing frivolous vexatious and harassing litigation.
"[T]he court has the inherent authority to enjoin vexatious litigation. `It is well settled that equity may enjoin vexatious litigation . . . This power of equity exists independently of its power to prevent a multiplicity of actions. It is based on the fact that it is inequitable for a litigant to harass an opponent, not for the attainment of justice, but out of malice . . . To be vexatious, litigation must be prosecuted not only without probable cause but also with malice.'" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Trinity United Methodist Church v. Cleaver, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. CV 04 4000933 (October 20, 2006, Peck, J.), citing Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. v. Pearson, 139 Conn. 186, 194, 91 A.2d 778 (1952); see also Adgers v. Keller, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 05 4004154 (February 21, 2006, Jones, J.) (where plaintiff was enjoined from filing new civil actions or writs of habeas corpus without prior court approval).
"[I]n determining whether or not to restrict a litigant's future access to the courts, [the court] should consider the following factors: (1) the litigant's history of litigation and in particular whether it entailed vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant's motive in pursuing the litigation, e.g., does the litigant have an objective good faith expectation of prevailing;? (3) whether the litigant is represented by counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused needless expense to other parties or has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their personnel; and (5) whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect the courts and other parties. Ultimately, the question the court must answer is whether a litigant who has a history of vexatious litigation is likely to continue to abuse the judicial process and harass other parties." Safir v. United States Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1099, 107 S.Ct. 1323, 94 L.Ed. 175 (1987).
"If a litigant has a history of filing vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits, courts may impose sanctions, including restrictions on future access to the judicial system." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hong Mai v. Doe, 406 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2005).
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Ms. Ross is entitled to judgment of possession. Judgment shall enter accordingly.
As if more evidence of the vexatious and harassing nature of the litigation in this case was needed, on January 9, 2007, Mr. St. Germain filed yet another set of applications for waivers of fees for the apparent purposes of filing another Entry Detainer proceeding and a lockout complaint and application for temporary injunction, all pertaining to 276 Washington Street, Norwich, despite the fact that such claims have been dismissed on previous occasions.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO REARGUE
Plaintiff, Edwin C. St. Germain, has moved to reargue this court's decision of December 21, 2005, dismissing his summary process action on the basis of lack of standing.
Based upon evidence presented, the court found the plaintiff, Edwin St. Germain, is not the owner of the property. The property is owned by his former business partner, Camilla Ross, and the mortgage on the property is in her name. Since 1977, St. Germain has lived in the property, paying towards the mortgage. He may have, at one time, run his businesses from the property but the businesses are now in bankruptcy.
The plaintiff filed an application for fee waiver. He states that he owns no real estate personally but he lists the mortgage as a monthly expense. In a letter attached to the fee waiver, he states that he is not able to work due to his obligations of coming to court, doing legal research and meeting with his attorneys. Although in this letter he swears under oath that he nets nothing from the rents collected during the winter and may make $50 profit in the summer, in his memorandum in support of the motion before the court, he argues that the rents exceed the amount paid towards the mortgage by $2,000 each month.
When his businesses failed, he pursued the defendants to rent rooms in the property from him on an oral weekly basis. The owner of the property, Ross, claimed that St. Germain had no authority to sublet the rooms and was specifically told not to do so. St. Germain has really not contested his initial lack of authority, but claimed that he later told Ross of the situation and she waived her rights by allowing him to continue subletting.
At some point, a physical altercation occurred between St. Germain and one of the renters. On November 21, 2005, a full protective order was issued against St. Germain barring him from returning to the property and from having any contact with the renters. His motion to alter or amend the protective order was denied and he is still ordered away from the property.
One week later, on November 28, 2005, be had notices to quit served on the renters based on nonpayment and lapse of time. Summary process complaints were filed on the same grounds. The complaint alleged that the renters did not pay their rent beginning on dates after the protective order was issued. Therefore, the rents were paid until the date of the protective order.
One tenant filed a special defense arguing that he paid the rent to St. Germain up until the protective order was issued. Thereafter, he paid the rent to Ross, the owner of the property. At the hearing, Ross confirmed that after the altercation and arrest of St. Germain, she was contacted by the renters who were concerned. Since then she has been collecting the rent from all the renters, gives them receipts and has even issued them one-year leases. In addition, she commenced an eviction action against St. Germain.
Rather than seeing this as just being the payment of rent under a written lease, St. Germain somehow characterizes this situation as a fabrication of documents in return for the payment of money and the giving of receipts to cover for the defendants. He argues that the protective order prevents him from warning the defendants to protect them from being implicated in this fraud.
On December 21, 2005, this court, after hearing, dismissed the plaintiff's summary process action, ruling that the plaintiff lacked standing. The plaintiff has moved to reargue and has filed an extensive memorandum in support. Some of the law cited in the memorandum is applicable, most is not. He basically argues that he is a tenant in possession who has sublet his property.
This situation presents the question: does a tenant have standing to commence an eviction action as a landlord against sublessees where the tenant: (1) was told not to sublease, (2) was arrested after an altercation and is now barred by a protective order from entering the property, and (3) is himself the subject of an eviction action. Although looking at the ultimate outcome of the matter cannot be the basis of the court's decision of standing, if the tenant were found to have standing under these facts, this would lead to almost certain defeat in the underlying action because: (1) the renters paid their rent until the tenant was barred from the premises, (2) they thereafter paid their rent to the property owner who (3) now issued them one-year leases. In addition, St. Germain has admitted that he has no money to pay any rent without the payments of the renters whom he is asking the court to evict in this action. The plaintiff basically wants all of the paying renters to be ordered out of the property and for him to be allowed back in without any ability to pay rent.
The plaintiff is correct that under certain circumstances, a tenant who subleases the property can have standing to evict his sublessees. In Western Boot Clothing Co. v. L'Enfance Magique, Inc., 81 Conn.App. 486, 840 A.2d 574, cert. denied, 269 Conn. 903, 852 A.2d 737 (2004) the Appellate Court "[took] judicial notice that subleases are common in the world of commercial real estate." Id., 490. The court read General Statutes § 47a-1(e) in connection with General Statutes § 47a-23 and stated that "[w]e do not believe that our legislature intended to give an owner and lessor, but not a sublessor, an expeditious means of obtaining possession of the premises from a commercial tenant for nonpayment of rent." Id. The court is not aware of a Connecticut case that discusses eviction by a sublessor against a sublessee in a noncommercial context, but there appears no reason to believe that a noncommercial tenant would not also have that right.
The section defines "owner" as someone "in whom is vested . . . all or part of the beneficial ownership and, a right to present use and enjoyment of the premises . . ."
The section gives a right to commence a summary process action to "the owner or lessor . . ."
See General Statutes §§ 47a-1(d) and (l) which define landlord as "the owner, lessor or sublessor of the dwelling unit" and tenant as "the lessee, sublessee or person entitled . . . to occupy a dwelling unit . . ."
Although a tenant can theoretically be considered to be an "owner" for eviction purposes, for the plaintiff to have standing and to be considered an owner, however, he would have to be someone in whom is vested the beneficial ownership and a right to the present use and enjoyment of the premises. General Statutes § 47a-1(e). Under the facts of this case, the plaintiff has neither the beneficial ownership nor the right to the present use and enjoyment of the premises.
Accordingly, the motion to reargue is denied as the plaintiff lacks standing.
Memorandum of Decision: Re Fee Waivers
This Court has been presented again by the pro se defendant with an application for waiver of fees for transcripts and filing fees. A written decision has been previously filed denying the request of this defendant. Generally, this court routinely grants such applications. In this case, the undersigned has had an extended opportunity to see the defendant in various legal settings including foreclosure cases in the Judicial District of Windham, criminal cases in Norwich and this, the second of two housing cases involving certain property located at 276 Washington Street, Norwich CT. The defendant had been living in this property but has been removed pursuant to a Protective Order issued in one of the pending criminal cases.
From testimony previously presented in a summary process action which this court dismissed on a legal technicality (DN 21-14833), it appears that several years ago the defendant, Edwin St. Germain, transferred the property at 276 Washington Street to the plaintiff, Camilla Ross, formerly known as Camilla Caruso. The defendant continued to live in one of the apartments on the property until his removal following an altercation with other tenants.
Over the course of the past ten years or more, the defendant has engaged in the acquisition of numerous parcels of property and buildings frequently setting up limited partnerships which appear to have been controlled exclusively by the defendant. From documents submitted to this court it appears that he has filed for bankruptcy protection for those limited liability corporations. At the request of the court he has submitted schedules filed in bankruptcy for the St. Germain Group, LLC and the Norwich Historic Preservation Trust, LLC. Edwin St. Germain has signed the documents for each limited liability corporation as the managing member and owning 100% of the stock. The St. Germain Group lists assets at 1,050,040 and debts at $2,527,528. The Norwich Historic Preservation Trust lists assets at $1,404,950 and liabilities of $1,308,040.51. There is no indication that Edwin St. Germain has filed for personal bankruptcy protection.
None of the schedules in bankruptcy mention the property at 276 Washington Street as an asset although the defendant does list Camilla Caruso, (Camilla Ross) as a creditor in the amount of $280,000. It also lists Jack Ross as a creditor for $19,000. The defendant's limited corporations are represented in bankruptcy by Coan, Lewendon, Gulliver and Miltenberger, LLC of New Haven.
The defendant is attempting to defend this summary process action seeking his permanent removal from 276 Washington Street, on the basis that there is no lease to terminate and that he is, in fact, either a legal or equitable owner of the property at 276 Washington Street, Norwich, CT.
These convoluted factual background indicates two things:
1) While the defendant may be insolvent, he is not impecunious. The thrust of his arguments in court are that he has an ownership interest in the property on Washington Street. He does not list the property or ownership interest in his bankruptcy schedules nor on his financial affidavits filed with this court. Under the caption real estate owned, the defendant cryptically writes "None personally owned by the movant herein." The court is not convinced that he is indigent nor that he is completely candid with the court.
His motion for fee waiver is again denied.
2) This case has been brought as a summary process action. The pleadings have been copious and voluminous. The defendant's dilatory pleadings are a monumental tribute to delay in resolving the case. The clerk's office has opened a second file to manage the extensive pleadings. Whatever this case is called, it is not summary. It belongs in the civil court where the court has the time to hear convoluted and lengthy hearings. The Geographical Area court does not have the capacity to devote the time necessary to hear and decide complex civil proceedings. Sua sponte, the case is transferred to the Judicial District of New London at New London for further civil proceedings.
DN K21N CR05 0096539
DN K21N CR05 0095930
Memorandum of Decision RE Indigency, fee waivers, etc.
Edwin St. Germain has applied to this court for waiver of fees for entry fees, filing fees, and marshal's fees in other cases which this court has uniformly denied. In the presently pending matter, the defendant has ordered a transcript from the Court Reporter's office which has been prepared. When the time came to pick it up, the defendant announced he had a waiver of the fee. The reporter asked for a copy. The waiver Mr. St. Germain produced as granted in a civil action commenced by the defendant in the Judicial District of New London (Handy, J.) It was not a fee waiver granted in this criminal file. The reporter rightfully declined to deliver the transcript.
Not receiving the transcript, the defendant applied ex post facto for a fee waiver again before this court which, as before, was denied. The defendant then asked for a hearing on his application which was granted and assigned for a hearing on January 18, 2006.
After hearing the court makes the following findings:
1. The defendant is a forty-two year old, healthy appearing, urbane, articulate, well-dressed man who accurately describes himself as "self-unemployed." He does not describe himself as married and claims no dependents.
2. The defendant attended the Norwich Technical school "with an electrical background." He maintains that he has been in real estate development for twenty-five years. He has operated two businesses producing magazines for the real estate industry, Connecticut Homes Magazine and New England Foreclosure magazine which he sold in 1994.
3. The defendant currently owns one-hundred percent of five limited liability companies, the St. Germain Group LLC, the Norwich Historic Preservation Trust, LLC, Partners Trust LLC, Corporate Asset Management LLC, and the Historic Jonathon Chester Inn, LLC. None of these appear as assets on his financial affidavit.
4. The defendant describes the St. Germain Group, LLC as having a parcel of property in Plainfield, CT. Which either has or is approved for, a seventy-two unit housing subdivision for which he had entered in to a purchase and sale agreement for one million-eight hundred thousand dollars. He indicates the debt on the property at one million two-hundred thousand dollars. This court, sitting in the Judicial District of Windham in 2004, ordered the foreclosure of that property when the defendant failed to pay a secured creditor. On the day before the scheduled sale of that property in July 2005, the defendant indicates he filed for bankruptcy protection. That bankruptcy case is still pending. The defendant has gratuitously testified that he has two cases pending in the Federal bankruptcy court and that he has angered the judge in bankruptcy.
5. Mr. St. Germain applied for this waiver and attached a financial affidavit which is a model of obfuscation. No where does it show the equity he may have in the 72-unit subdivision property in Plainfield. He claims, under the heading of real estate: "None owned by movant herein personally." A statement no doubt technically correct but designed to mislead the court. In testimony before this court in the case of Camilla Ross v. Edwin St. Germain DN 21-14833, the defendant maintained that he has an equitable interest in property at 276 Washington Street, Norwich, CT which, by virtue of a buy and sell agreement he prepared, would benefit him in the amount of $180,000. The court finds his testimony not credible and, when truthful, intentionally misleading. His financial affidavit wholly misrepresents his resources.
6. The defendant indicates that he spends everyday in the law library "to defend myself." He indicates that he has not sought gainful employment.
7. The defendant indicates that he recently attempted to initiate an action for entry and detainer against his former business partner and present or former landlord, Camilla Ross. (Dismissed by the court, Schimelman, J.) He is the defendant in a summary process action brought against him. He is the plaintiff in an action for injunction brought in the New London Judicial District, Edwin C. St Germain v. Gary LaBrie KNL CV 0640050. He is the defendant in the now stayed, Windham foreclosure action. He has two criminal cases presently pending against him as a result of confrontations with his house-mates/tenants. He has two bankruptcy cases pending.
Additionally, a review of judicial branch records indicate the following other suits involving Edwin St. Germain and his business pursuits:
St. Germain Group v. Camputero WWM CV 020067148
Goldschmidt v. St. Germain Group WWM CV 030069799
Goldschmidt v. St. Germain Group WWM CV 030126813
Bankers Trust Co. v. Edwin C. St. Germain KNL CV 010559637
Thames Valley v. St. Germain Group KNO CV 054101162
8. In the more recent cases presently pending in the state courts he seeks to have costs waived and/or paid by the State of Connecticut for marshal's, reporters and court costs. At the same time he applies to have a protective order modified in criminal DN CR05-96539 from 10:00 AM to 10:00 PM daily so that he may conduct his businesses from the residence at 276 Washington Street in Norwich. The court is left to wonder what business he is conducting for twelve hours each day that generates no income.
9. The defendant has visited the office of the Deputy Clerk to the point of constituting a daily distraction to her and members of her staff. The defendant's various pleadings, while novel, are tedious, voluminous and of dubious legal import. The patience of the court staff has been nearly subdued. This court has the inherent power and constitutional obligation to protect itself from abusive litigants and from people who would make excessive demands upon the court's staff. The court may limit a pro se party's access to the courts if that conduct impairs the ability of the court to carry out its constitutional functions and prevents persons in public service from carrying out their duties. The defendant's conduct has approached those limits. The clerk of the court is not required to teach pro se litigants Connecticut Legal Practice and Procedure. If the defendant persists in bothering the court staff he will be directed to file his documents by mail or other delivery service.
10. The court further finds, that if Mr. St. Germain is impecunious, it is self-imposed and will not be recognized as a basis for fee waivers. He is healthy, able, educated, and available to be gainfully employed.
Based upon the foregoing, after hearing, the defendant's application for waiver of fees and costs is denied.