Opinion
September 26, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Delaney, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
It is firmly established that, while leave to amend a pleading shall be freely granted (see, CPLR 3025 [b]), a motion to amend is committed to the broad discretion of the trial court (see, Edenwald Contr. Co. v City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 957; Kramer Sons v Facilities Dev. Corp., 135 A.D.2d 942; Fulford v Baker Perkins, 100 A.D.2d 861), and the resulting determination "will not lightly be set aside" (Beuschel v Malm, 114 A.D.2d 569).
The record before us reveals that the plaintiff unduly delayed in seeking to amend her complaint despite her awareness of the alleged facts underlying the proposed amendment prior to the commencement of this action. Moreover, she has failed to provide a reasonable and acceptable excuse for the delay (see, e.g., Bertan v Richmond Mem. Hosp. Health Center, 106 A.D.2d 362; Fulford v Baker Perkins, supra; Williams v New York Univ. Hosp., 88 A.D.2d 540), and the defendant husband has adequately demonstrated that he engaged in certain motion and appellate practice in reliance upon the allegations of the original complaint, such that he would suffer substantial prejudice if the motion for leave to amend were now granted (see generally, Mayers v D'Agostino, 58 N.Y.2d 696; Axelrod v Axelrod, 106 A.D.2d 913; Shanahan v Shanahan, 92 A.D.2d 566). Under the circumstances, we discern no improvident exercise of discretion in the denial of the motion. Brown, J.P., Sullivan, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.