By the same token, a defendant has no right to receive or spend state funds for the appointment of experts or investigators in habeas corpus proceedings, even in death penalty cases. Ross v. Hopper, 240 Ga. 369 (2) ( 240 S.E.2d 850) (1977), cert. den., 435 U.S. 1018 (1978); Harris v. Hopper, supra. The habeas court did not err in overruling this motion.

Ross petitioned for state habeas corpus relief, but, after a hearing, relief was denied. That decision was affirmed in Ross v. Hopper, 240 Ga. 369, 240 S.E.2d 850 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1018, 98 S.Ct. 1890, 56 L.Ed.2d 397 (1978). Meanwhile, Ross filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the superior court, alleging that his trial jury was influenced by doubt as to the constitutional validity of the Georgia death penalty statute.

Insofar as the defendant asserts that his ex-wife's testimony was perjured, he has failed to show, as required, that her testimony was perjured or that the state knowingly used her perjured testimony. Ross v. Hopper, 240 Ga. 369 (1) ( 240 S.E.2d 850) (1977); see Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 ( 78 S.C. 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 9) (1957). We find no error.

This enumeration of error is without merit. 4, 5, 6, 7. Enumerations of error 4, 5, 6 and 7 are without merit for the reasons stated by the habeas court. Ross v. Hopper, 240 Ga. 369, 370 ( 240 S.E.2d 850) (1977). 8. Enumeration 8 is without merit for the reason stated by the trial court with respect to juror Pue.

See Self v. State, 108 Ga. App. 201, 202 (5) ( 132 S.E.2d 548). See also Ross v. Hopper, 240 Ga. 369 (1), 370 ( 240 S.E.2d 850), which requires proof that the testimony under which he was convicted was not only perjured but was "knowingly and intentionally used by the state to obtain a conviction." Accord, Kitchens v. State, 160 Ga. App. 492, 493, supra.

5. Appellant has not met his burden of showing that the police chief's testimony concerning photographs taken at the scene of the crime was perjured or that it was knowingly and intentionally used by the state to obtain a conviction. Accord, Ross v. Hopper, 240 Ga. 369 (1) ( 240 S.E.2d 850) (1977). Nor were these photographs immaterial or irrelevant and thus improperly admitted in evidence.

The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, stating it had fully considered all of Ross' contentions but found that he was fairly tried and convicted. Ross v. Hopper, 240 Ga. 369, 240 S.E.2d 850, 853 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1018, 98 S.Ct. 1890, 56 L.Ed.2d 397 (1978). The en banc opinion sets forth the facts of the offenses of which Ross was convicted and the other sentences imposed, 756 F.2d at 1484-85, as well as the procedural history of the case.

After a hearing, relief was denied. That decision was affirmed in Ross v. Hopper, 240 Ga. 369, 240 S.E.2d 850 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1018, 98 S.Ct. 1890, 56 L.Ed.2d 397 (1978). Appellant filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief in the Southern District of Georgia.

The Georgia courts appear willing to entertain habeas corpus proceedings challenging the imposition of the death penalty on federal constitutional grounds. See, e. g., Ross v. Hopper, 1977, 240 Ga. 369, 240 S.E.2d 850; Wilkes, Postconviction Habeas Corpus Relief in Georgia: A Decade After the Habeas Corpus Act, 12 Ga.L.Rev. 249, 258-59 (1978). Ga. Code Ann. § 50-127 (1977 Cum. Pocket Part) is the habeas provision applicable to persons, like the petitioner, imprisoned by virtue of a sentence imposed by a Georgia court.

Subsequently, when petitioner appealed the Tattnall County court's decision, the Georgia Supreme Court summarily discounted petitioner's argument. Ross v. Hopper, 240 Ga. 369, 372, 240 S.E.2d 850, 853 (1977). Given these findings by the Georgia courts, the Court gave petitioner the opportunity at its hearing on January 26, 1981, to show cause why the presumption of correctness created by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) should not attach to the determination made by the State courts.