Opinion
04-22-00143-CV
08-24-2022
Philip Martin ROSS, Appellant v. COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, Appellee
From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2019-CI-21028 Honorable Robert E. Cadena, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
This appeal arises from a disciplinary proceeding against attorney Philip M. Ross. Ross sought a declaratory judgment in the Bexar County trial court conducting his disciplinary proceeding that would void a Comal County trial court's order in a guardianship proceeding.
The Commission for Lawyer Discipline filed a plea to the jurisdiction against Ross's declaratory judgment action. The Commission's plea was granted, and Ross appeals.
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court's order.
Background
The Commission initiated a disciplinary petition against Ross; the petition alleged he committed professional misconduct in two cases. This appeal concerns only one of the two cases: a guardianship proceeding involving decedent Sybil Sims.
A. Guardianship Court
In the guardianship proceeding, Ross participated as an attorney and a party in the Sims matter which was adjudicated by the Comal County Court at Law No. 1 (the guardianship court). There, the guardianship court removed Ross as Sims's attorney, voided the trust Ross created transferring Sims's property to himself, and struck Ross's pleadings. Ross appealed, and the Third Court of Appeals upheld the guardianship court's actions. See Ross v. Sims, No. 03-16-00179-CV, 2017 WL 672458 (Tex. App.-Austin Feb. 15, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
B. Disciplinary Court
In his disciplinary proceeding, Ross answered the Commission's petition, and he chose trial by district court-which was assigned to a district court in Bexar County (the disciplinary court). See, e.g., Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 3.02, reprinted in Tex. Gov't Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A-1.
In his answer, Ross requested additional relief: he asked the disciplinary court to declare that he has capacity as the trustee to convey Sims's former residence to her legal heirs in the guardianship proceeding. See generally Ross, 2017 WL 672458, at *1-2 (giving the background facts for the guardianship case).
The Commission responded to Ross's request for declaratory judgment by filing a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss Ross's request for declaratory judgment. The Commission presented multiple independent bases to show that the disciplinary court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Ross's request for declaratory judgment-which sought to void the guardianship court's orders.
The disciplinary court granted the Commission's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Ross's request for declaratory judgment.
Ross appeals the disciplinary court's interlocutory order.
Standard of Review
To challenge the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over a plaintiff's cause of action, a governmental unit may use a plea to the jurisdiction. See Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 149 (Tex. 2012); Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 843 (Tex. 2007).
To defeat the defendant's plea to the jurisdiction, "[a] plaintiff has the burden to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction." See Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019) (citing Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150).
If the trial court grants the plea, the plaintiff may appeal from the interlocutory order that "grants [the] plea to the jurisdiction by [the] governmental unit." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8); accord Shady Shores, 590 S.W.3d at 549.
On appeal, whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150; Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).
"Where the jurisdictional issue or facts do not implicate the merits of the case, and . . . the facts relevant to jurisdiction are undisputed, the court should make the jurisdictional determination as a matter of law based solely on those undisputed facts." City of San Antonio v. Huron, No. 04-19-00570-CV, 2020 WL 3065426, at *3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio June 10, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting Univ. of Tex. v. Poindexter, 306 S.W.3d 798, 806 (Tex. App.-Austin 2009, no pet.)). "[A court] must grant the plea to the jurisdiction if the plaintiff's pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction." Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150; accord Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227.
Declaratory Judgment Action
"A declaratory judgment action may not be used to collaterally attack, modify, or interpret a prior judgment." Depumpo v. Thrasher, No. 05-14-00967-CV, 2016 WL 147294, at *5 (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 13, 2016, no pet.) (citing Martin v. Dosohs I, Ltd., Inc., 2 S.W.3d 350, 353 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) ("We follow the majority in Texas and hold that declaratory relief is an inappropriate vehicle for interpreting previous judgments.")).
"A collateral attack is an attempt to avoid the binding force of a judgment in a proceeding not instituted for the purpose of correcting, modifying, or vacating the judgment, but in order to obtain some specific relief which the judgment currently stands as a bar against." Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2005); accord Dall. Cty. Tax Collector v. Andolina, 303 S.W.3d 926, 930 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.).
Parties' Arguments
In his third issue, Ross argues that the disciplinary court erred when it granted the Commission's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed his request for declaratory judgment. Ross insists that the disciplinary court had jurisdiction to declare that the guardianship court's orders were void because the guardianship court "did not have jurisdiction to declare the Sybil Sims Trust void and enjoin the Trustee from managing the Trust."
The Commission responds with several bases to affirm the disciplinary court's order dismissing Ross's declaratory judgment action, including that it had no subject matter jurisdiction over Ross's collateral attack against the guardianship court's orders.
Discussion
To reiterate, in the guardianship case, the guardianship court rendered orders adverse to Ross, Ross appealed, and the Third Court of Appeals affirmed the challenged orders. Ross, 2017 WL 672458, at *8.
In this disciplinary case, Ross sought relief from the guardianship court's orders.
A. Requested Declaratory Relief
Ross's original answer to the Commission's disciplinary petition denied the Commission's allegations, and it sought a declaratory judgment as "[a] person interested under a . . . will." See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.004(a). He sought the following declaratory relief:
Respondent requests a declaration that he has capacity as trustee pursuant to his declaration of trust and record owner of Sybil's former residence to convey said property to Sybil's heirs as directed in her will and requested by her heirs. (Alteration in original).
B. Pleadings Negate Jurisdiction
To successfully defend against the Commission's plea to the jurisdiction, Ross had the burden "to affirmatively demonstrate the [disciplinary] court's jurisdiction." See Shady Shores, 590 S.W.3d at 550 (citing Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150). However, Ross's pleadings affirmatively negate the disciplinary court's jurisdiction. Cf. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150.
Specifically, Ross's request for the disciplinary court to declare that he had "capacity as trustee pursuant to his declaration of trust and record owner of Sybil's former residence to convey said property to Sybil's heirs as directed in her will and requested by her heirs" attempts to avoid the effect of the guardianship court's judgment in his disciplinary proceeding; it is a collateral attack. See Browning, 165 S.W.3d at 346.
Ross may not couch his collateral attack as a request for declaratory judgment. See Martin, 2 S.W.3d at 353 (stating "the [plaintiffs'] use of a declaratory judgment suit was inappropriate to seek interpretation of another court's prior order and constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the court's previous partition order"); see also Depumpo, 2016 WL 147294, at *5 (A declaratory judgment action may not be used to collaterally attack, modify, or interpret a prior judgment."). Ross's pleadings, which attempt an impermissible collateral attack using a request for declaratory judgment, affirmatively negate the disciplinary court's jurisdiction over his declaratory judgment action. See Martin, 2 S.W.3d at 353; see also Depumpo, 2016 WL 147294, at *5.
C. Disposition
The disciplinary court did not err when it granted the Commission's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Ross's declaratory judgment action. See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150. We overrule Ross's third issue. Because Ross's three other issues depend on the viability of his declaratory judgment action, we overrule them as well.
Conclusion
In this disciplinary proceeding, Ross attempted to obtain declaratory relief against the guardianship court's orders, but his requested relief was an impermissible collateral attack-which may not be presented in a declaratory judgment action. The disciplinary court did not err when it granted the Commission's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Ross's declaratory judgment action. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order.