Opinion
(8557) (8558)
Argued November 6, 1990
Decision released January 2, 1991
Appeal, in each case, from the decision by the defendant denying the appeal from the tax assessment on certain real property, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the cases were consolidated and tried to the court, Lewis, J.; judgments dismissing the appeals, from which the plaintiffs filed separate appeals to this court. Affirmed.
Randy Lynn Cohen, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Michael S. Lynch, with whom, on the brief, were Susan M. Wood and Keith Dunnigan, for the appellee (defendant).
The plaintiffs appeal from the judgments of the trial court dismissing their appeals from the defendant's refusal to reduce the assessor's valuation of property owned individually by each plaintiff. The trial court found that the plaintiffs had failed to sustain their burden of proving that the property had been overvalued and dismissed their appeal.
Because both cases involve the same principals of both plaintiff corporations, because the same appraiser testified in both cases using the same methodology, and because the defendant used the same assessment technique for all of the properties involved, the trial court rendered one memorandum of decision for both cases. The plaintiffs appeal separately from this decision and the resulting judgments.
The plaintiffs challenge the trial court's acceptance of the defendant's methodology for calculating property values. In essence, the plaintiffs challenge the trial court's factual findings and its determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses. On appeal, it is the function of this court to determine whether the factual findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous. See Practice Book 4061. "[W]here the factual basis of the court's decision is challenged we must determine whether the facts set out in the memorandum of decision are supported by the evidence or whether, in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the whole record, those facts are clearly erroneous." Pandolphe's Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217, 221-22, 435 A.2d 24 (1980). "The credibility of `expert witnesses and the weight to be accorded to their testimony are within the province of the trier of facts, who is privileged to adopt whatever testimony he reasonably believes to be credible.' New Haven Water Co. v. Board of Tax Review, 166 Conn. 232, 240, 348 A.2d 641 (1974) . . . ." (Citations omitted.) Ferri v. Pyramid Construction Co., 186 Conn. 682, 690, 443 A.2d 478 (1982).
A review of the record indicates that the evidence supports the trial court's thoughtful memorandum of decision.