Rosette v. U.S.

18 Citing cases

  1. Potter v. Pierce

    315 P.3d 303 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 2 times

    We review ... legal questions de novo.” Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998–NMSC–046, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 396, 970 P.2d 582 (citation omitted); Rosette, Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 2007–NMCA–136, ¶ 31, 142 N.M. 717, 169 P.3d 704 (“When the facts are not in dispute, the preclusive effect of a prior judgment is a question of law reviewed de novo.”). A. The Elements of Claim Preclusion Have Been Satisfied

  2. Pielhau v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

    314 P.3d 698 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 22 times
    Identifying the purposes of the claim preclusion doctrine

    ” Chaara v. Lander, 2002–NMCA–053, ¶ 20, 132 N.M. 175, 45 P.3d 895. “Res judicata applies if three elements are met: (1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier action, (2) identity of parties or privies in the two suits, and (3) identity of the cause of action in both suits.” Rosette, Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 2007–NMCA–136, ¶ 33, 142 N.M. 717, 169 P.3d 704. Because the Pielhaus do not contest the second element—that the parties are identical in the two suits—we focus on the first and third elements. We review the district court's application of claim preclusion de novo. Moffat v. Branch, 2005–NMCA–103, ¶ 10, 138 N.M. 224, 118 P.3d 732.

  3. In re Cook

    No. 7-04-17704-SA (Bankr. D.N.M. Apr. 6, 2011)

    In New Mexico, collateral estoppel bars relitigation of ultimate facts or issues actually and necessarily decided in previous litigation. Rosette, Inc. v. United States, 142 N.M. 717, 729, 169 P.3d 704, 716, 2007-NMCA-136 at (39) (Ct.App. 2007) (citing Reeves v. Wimberly, 107 N.M. 231, 233, 755 P.2d 75, 77 (Ct.App. 1988)). "[F]ederal and New Mexico law on claim preclusion are similar."

  4. State ex rel. Balderas v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.

    2019 NMCA 16 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 5 times

    {15} "[Claim preclusion] prevents a party or its privies from repeatedly suing another party for the same cause of action when the first suit involving the parties resulted in a final judgment on the merits." Rosette, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior , 2007-NMCA-136, ¶ 33, 142 N.M. 717, 169 P.3d 704. Generally, the doctrine applies where "three elements are met: (1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier action, (2) identity of parties or privies in the two suits, and (3) identity of the cause of action in both suits."

  5. State v. Aramark Corr. Servs., LLC

    321 P.3d 128 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that claim preclusion did not apply where the “[p]laintiff's capacity in the two lawsuits differed”

    {23} “When the facts are not in dispute, the preclusive effect of a prior judgment is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Rosette, Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 2007–NMCA–136, ¶ 31, 142 N.M. 717, 169 P.3d 704. Additionally, in reviewing an appeal from summary judgment, where the “issues on appeal involve only questions of law, we review those questions de novo.”

  6. Braverman v. New Mexico

    No. CIV 11-0829 JB/WDS (D.N.M. Sep. 26, 2012)   Cited 5 times
    Applying New Mexico law to determine the preclusive effect of a New Mexico state court judgment

    The second prong, that the "cause of action in the case presently before the court is different from the cause of action in the prior adjudication," has been used to distinguish collateral estoppel from its partner in finality doctrines, res judicata, not as a binding requirement describing the cause of action in the second suit. See Rosette, Inc. v. United States Dept. Of the Interior, 142 N.M. 717, 729, 169 P.3d 704, 716 (Ct. App. 2007)("In contrast to res judicata, collateral estoppel applies whether or not the two suits involve the same cause of action."). Because collateral estoppel applies to issues, and not to parties, collateral estoppel can be used "either defensively or offensively," meaning that a defendant may use collateral estoppel to preclude an issue which a plaintiff raises, and a plaintiff may use collateral estoppel to preclude a defense which a defendant raises.

  7. Hartnett v. Papa John's Pizza USA, Inc.

    828 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (D.N.M. 2011)   Cited 18 times
    Discussing New Mexico res judicata and collateral estoppel analysis

    “The principles of preclusion operate to promote finality in civil disputes by relieving parties of the burdens of multiple lawsuits, conserving judicial resources, and preventing inconsistent decisions.” Rosette, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 142 N.M. 717, 726, 169 P.3d 704, 713 (Ct.App.2007). Administrative adjudicative determinations may be given preclusive effect “if rendered under conditions in which the parties have the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the issue at the administrative hearing.”

  8. Dailey v. Ulibarri

    No. CIV 08-538 MCA/LFG (D.N.M. Nov. 20, 2009)

    Shovelin v. Central N.M. Elec. Coop., Inc., 115 N.M. 293, 297, 850 P.2d 996, 1000 (1993). More recent New Mexico case law clarifies that the first element includes not only the parties named in the prior proceeding, but also those in privity with them. Rosette, Inc. v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 142 N.M. 717, 729, 169 P.3d 704, 716 (Ct. App. 2007) (using a formulation found in a Tenth Circuit case); Ullrich v. Blanchard, 142 N.M. 835, 839, 171 P.3d 774, 778 (Ct. App. 2007), cert. granted, 143 N.M. 156, 173 P.3d 763 (2007). Once those four elements are established, the court must also examine whether the party against whom estoppel is asserted had a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the issue in the prior litigation.

  9. Ideal v. Burlington Resources Oil Gas Co.

    148 N.M. 228 (N.M. 2010)   Cited 41 times
    Stating the elements of issue preclusion

    {10} Because the facts are not in dispute, we review de novo the question of issue preclusion. Rosette, Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 2007-NMCA-136, ¶ 31, 142 N.M. 717, 169 P.3d 704 ("When the facts are not in dispute, the preclusive effect of a prior judgment is a question of law reviewed de novo."). In this case, whether Plaintiffs were the same party or in privity with the plaintiffs in the 1990-A litigation is dispositive.

  10. Marquez v. Bd. of Trs. for Anton Chico Land Grant

    2019 NMCA 75 (N.M. Ct. App. 2019)

    Because we conclude otherwise, we do not, as the district court did, reach the attendant question whether land grants are subject to § 1983 liability. That is, we may affirm a district court order on grounds it did not rely on if doing so would neither be unfair to Plaintiffs, seeRosette, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior , 2007-NMCA-136, ¶ 30, 142 N.M. 717, 169 P.3d 704, nor require "look[ing] beyond the factual allegations that were raised and considered below[,]" Atherton v. Gopin , 2015-NMCA-003, ¶ 36, 340 P.3d 630 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because the parties addressed the question of whether Plaintiff was a prevailing party both in the district court and now on appeal, and because our consideration of the issue encompasses only those facts previously raised and considered, the applicable criteria are met. Turning to the question of whether Plaintiffs were the prevailing party in the underlying litigation, we look to principles established by federal case law to determine the answer.