See generally H. Dubroff, The United States Tax Court — An Historical Analysis, p. 489 (1979). The dissent also cites Estate of Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1014 (1980), as support for the argument that we lack the power to dismiss a case because a petitioner is a fugitive. In Estate of Rosenberg, the taxpayer filed its petition with this Court more than 90 days after the notice of deficiency was mailed to it.
Although the Court sympathizes with petitioners' situation in dealing with damage from Hurricane Ike, the Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and cannot make decisions solely on the basis of equity. See Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987); Woods v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 776, 784-787 (1989); Estate of Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1014, 1017-1018 (1980); Hays Corp. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 436, 442-443 (1963), aff'd, 331 F.2d 422 (7th Cir. 1964). Petitioners did not identify, and the Court is unable to find, any exemption for early distributions from qualified retirement plans for taxpayers who suffered damages and economic losses from Hurricane Ike.
Petitioners should understand that the Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and that we are not at liberty to make decisions based solely in equity. See Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987); Woods v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 776, 784-787 (1989); Estate of Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1014, 10171018 (1980); Hays Corp. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 436, 442-443 (1963), affd. 331 F.2d 422 (7th Cir. 1964) In other words, absent some constitutional defect, we are constrained to apply the law as written, see Estate of Cowser v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 1168, 1171-1174 (7th Cir. 1984), affg. 80 T.C. 783 (1983), and we may not rewrite the law because we may deem its "'effects susceptible of improvement'", see Commissioner v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 252 (1996) (quoting Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984)). Accordingly, petitioners' appeal must, in this instance, be addressed to their elected representatives.
Consequently, our jurisdiction to grant equitable relief is limited. Woods v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 776, 784-787 (1989); Estate of Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1014, 1017-1018 (1980). This Court is limited by the exceptions enumerated in section 72(t).
Even if we were sympathetic to petitioner's situation, which we are not, we have no jurisdiction to grant the equitable relief sought. Estate of Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1014, 1017 (1980). Petitioner's argument that it was a financial hardship to make the contribution is likewise without merit.
We have no jurisdiction to exercise the broad common law concept of judicial power invested in courts of general jurisdiction by Article III of the Constitution. Estate of Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1014, 1017 (1980); Cf. Berkery v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. ___ (1988) (Hamblen, J., concurring). The fringe benefit moratorium does not specify a remedy for its violation and does not expressly confer jurisdiction upon this Court to enforce the moratorium.
However sympathetic we might be to petitioner's plight, our jurisdiction to grant equitable relief is strictly limited and exists only to the extent specifically enumerated by statute. Kellogg v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 167, 176 (1987); Atlantic Veneer Corp. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 1075, 1084 (1985), affd. 812 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1987); Estate of Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1014, 1017-1018 (1980) and cases cited therein. Based upon the express language of sec. 6404(e), we need not address petitioner's argument that interest now may be considered as an addition to tax so that we would have jurisdiction over the interest abatement issue by statutory authority, by analogy to Estate of DiRezza v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 19 (1982), and to section 6662, which provides that the term ‘tax‘ shall be deemed to refer to certain additions to tax, additional amounts and penalties.
Our jurisdiction to grant equitable relief is strictly limited; it exists only to the extent specifically enumerated by statute, and it does not include the power to make tax liability turn on equitable considerations. See Estate of Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1014, 1017-1018 (1980), and cases cited therein. With respect to the request for an injunction, we direct petitioner to section 7421 which generally proscribes the maintenance of suits for the purpose of restraining the collection of tax.
Failure to file within the prescribed period requires that the petition be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Blank v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 400, 403 (1981); Estate of Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1014, 1016-1017 (1980); Estate of Cerrito v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 896, 898 (1980); Stone v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 617, 618 (1980); Estate of Moffat v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 499, 501 (1966). Filing is completed when the petition is received by the Court, unless the exception provided in section 7502 applies.