"Our cases have repeatedly indicated the importance of such findings and conclusions to assure informed appellate review." Rosenberg v. Bunce, 214 N.J.Super. 300, 303, 518 A.2d 1134 (App.Div. 1986). As the Supreme Court and this court have stressed, a court's failure "to perform this essential duty `constitutes a disservice to the litigants, the attorneys and the appellate court.'"
Our cases have stressed the importance of a trial judge's responsibility to provide findings and conclusions to assure informed appellate review. Rosenberg v. Bunce, 214 N.J. Super. 300, 303 (App. Div. 1986). Omission of this duty is particularly problematic where the decision is discretionary, such as a modification of alimony, as the motion judge provides nothing to guide our review of the reasonableness of the exercised discretion.
A proof hearing is not a rubber stamp. See Heimbach, 229 N.J.Super. at 24 n.3 (recognizing that "evidence at a proof hearing may be so inherently incredible that the trial judge is justified in refusing to believe it"); Rosenberg v. Bunce, 214 N.J.Super. 300, 305 (App. Div. 1986) (concluding vacatur was appropriate because of "the uncertainty regarding the merits of [the] plaintiff's claim generated by the vagueness of his complaint").
"Without the benefit of findings and conclusions", our review is impeded and we "can only speculate about the reasons for a trial court's decision." Rosenberg v. Bunce, 214 N.J. Super. 300, 304 (App. Div. 1986). Therefore, we are constrained to remand to the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of law as required under Rule 1:7-4(a) regarding plaintiffs' breach of contract claim against the Greenbaum Rowe defendants.
S.N. Golden Estates, Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 293 N.J. Super. 395, 409 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting Rosenberg v. Bunce, 214 N.J. Super. 300, 304 (App. Div. 1986)). Here, the reasons provided by the trial court for awarding fees to plaintiff consisted of only the following brief statement:
In re Commitment of M.M., 384 N.J. Super. 313, 332 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting Rosenberg v. Bunce, 214 N.J. Super. 300, 304 (App. Div. 1986)). Accordingly,
S.N. Golden Estates, Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 293 N.J. Super. 395, 409 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting Rosenberg v. Bunce, 214 N.J. Super. 300, 304 (App. Div. 1986)). Here, plaintiff sought reimbursement of $89,000 for 243 hours billed at a rate of $350 per hour.
"Without the benefit of such findings and conclusions, we can only speculate about the reasons for a trial court's decision." S.N. Golden Estates, Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 293 N.J. Super. 395, 409 (App. Div. 1996) (citing Rosenberg v. Bunce, 214 N.J. Super. 300, 304 (App. Div. 1986)). Here, the judge made no specific findings as to why her blanket award, or the number of hours she determined, was a reasonable number, let alone specific findings for each firm, attorney, or party.
In the absence of a statement of findings and conclusions, review without remand is more difficult but not foreclosed. See Isko v. Planning Bd. of Livingston, 51 N.J. 162, 175 (1968) (noting the commonality and propriety of affirming a valid determination entered on an erroneous basis); Castriota, supra, 268 N.J. Super. at 421-22 (declining to affirm denial of enforcement of equitable distribution as an unstated exercise of discretion, because equitable distribution in not subject to modification on a showing of changed circumstances); Rosenberg v. Bunce, 214 N.J. Super. 300, 304-05 (App. Div. 1986) (reviewing a denial of a motion to open a default judgment and reversing on the merits); see also R. 2:10-5; Esposito v. Esposito, 158 N.J. Super. 285, 291-92, 300 (App. Div. 1978) (exercising original jurisdiction to modify equitable distribution and affirming determinations not raised on appeal where the judge had retired and the record was adequate).
Linden v. Gleffi, 6 N.J. 246, 252 (1951) ("The failure to give such notice is grounds for setting the default judgment aside."). See also Rosenberg v. Bunce, 214 N.J. Super. 300, 306 (App. Div. 1986). Of course, that is not the end of our analysis. Although not expressly included in Rule 4:50-1, it is well-settled that a defendant claiming excusable neglect must also demonstrate he or she has a meritorious defense.