Opinion
October 29, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Sheila Abdus-Salaam, J.).
Examining the purposes of the parties to the lease and the rights and obligations created thereby ( see, JIHL Assocs. v. Frank, 137 A.D.2d 655, 656), we agree with the motion court that plaintiff tenants were entitled to rely on the right-to assign clause, by which defendant landlord agreed not to withhold consent to assignment of the subject lease unreasonably. The court properly found, as a matter of law, that consent to assignment of the subject lease had been unreasonably withheld, since defendant landlord did not prove a reasonable ground for its refusal of consent ( see, F F Rest. Corp. v. Wells, Goode Benefit, 61 N.Y.2d 496, 503). Given the extraordinary assignment rights granted in the subject lease, greater than the rights established by statute ( see, Real Property Law § 226-b, and, in particular, the landlord's promise that it would not withhold its consent to a lease assignment unreasonably, the tenants had the right to compel the landlord's consent once it was established that the landlord had no reasonable ground to refuse permission for the assignment. The tenants' rights in this regard are not affected by luxury deregulation laws or regulations, since the subject lease entered into by the landlord, in its presently relevant aspects, affords tenants protections greater than those minimally mandated by the rent stabilization laws ( see, Minick v. Park, 217 A.D.2d 489, 490). We have considered defendant landlord's remaining arguments and find them to be unpersuasive.
Concur — Lerner, P. J., Milonas, Ellerin, Rubin and Williams, JJ.