Opinion
2012-04-17
Rachel ROSENBAUM, et al., appellants, v. ROSS–RODNEY HOUSING CORP., et al., respondents.
Subin Associates, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Brooke Lombardi of counsel), for appellants. Law Offices of Jeffrey S. Shein & Associates, P.C. (Carol R. Finocchio, New York, N.Y. [Mary Ellen O'Brien], of counsel), for respondents.
Subin Associates, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Brooke Lombardi of counsel), for appellants. Law Offices of Jeffrey S. Shein & Associates, P.C. (Carol R. Finocchio, New York, N.Y. [Mary Ellen O'Brien], of counsel), for respondents.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, A.P.J., L. PRISCILLA HALL, PLUMMER E. LOTT, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Partnow, J.), dated January 28, 2011, which, upon, in effect, the denial of their motion pursuant to CPLR 4401, made at the close of the evidence, for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability, upon a jury verdict on the issue of liability, and upon the denial of their motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence, is in favor of the defendants and against them, dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs' motion pursuant to CPLR 4401, made at the close of the evidence, for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability. Considering the facts in a light most favorable to the defendants, and resolving all questions as to the witnesses' credibility in the defendants' favor, there was a rational process that would lead the trier of fact to find in favor of the defendants ( see Szczerbiak v. Pilat, 90 N.Y.2d 553, 556, 664 N.Y.S.2d 252, 686 N.E.2d 1346; Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493, 499, 410 N.Y.S.2d 282, 382 N.E.2d 1145; Shallash v. New Is. Hosp., 66 A.D.3d 988, 991, 887 N.Y.S.2d 641; Healy v. Carmel Bowl, Inc., 65 A.D.3d 665, 667, 884 N.Y.S.2d 473).
The Supreme Court also properly denied the plaintiffs' motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence. The evidence did not preponderate so heavily in the plaintiffs' favor that the jury could not have reached a verdict in favor of the defendants by any fair interpretation of the evidence ( see Seong Yim Kim v. New York City Tr. Auth., 87 A.D.3d 531, 532, 928 N.Y.S.2d 315; Semel v. Guzman, 84 A.D.3d 1054, 1055–1056, 924 N.Y.S.2d 414; Nicastro v. Park, 113 A.D.2d 129, 132–134, 495 N.Y.S.2d 184).
The plaintiffs' remaining contentions are without merit.