( Flex, 125 Ill. App.3d at 1024.) An erroneous construction of a statute by an agency is not binding on appeal. ( Rosenbaum v.Johnson (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 657, 661.) The Act should be liberally construed in favor of allowing benefits.
At all times in this case, the claimant had the burden on the issue of being "able to work" and being "available for work," Yadro v. Bowling, 91 Ill. App. 3d 889 (1980), neither of which were met. Moreover, Illinois law recognizes that the receipt of unemployment insurance benefits is a conditional right and the burden of proving eligibility before the Board rests with the claimant. Rosenbaum v. Johnson, 60 Ill. App. 3d 657, 662 (1972). ¶ 12 The requirement of being able to work is usually a question of health factors that may disable a claimant.
[¶ 10] Some courts have said a claimant who is able to work part-time is eligible for unemployment benefits. See Scardina v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Rev., 537 A.2d 388, 399 (Pa.Commw.Ct. 1988) (holding full-time student who is ready, willing and able to engage in some substantial employment may be eligible for benefits even though availability limited to part-time work); Crocker v. Illinois Dept. of Labor, 459 N.E.2d 332, 336 (Ill.App.Ct. 1984) (stating for purposes of entitlement to unemployment benefits, part-time work is not per se unsuitable); Howard v. Department of Employment, 597 P.2d 37, 39 (Idaho 1979) (affirming claimant's part-time job as suitable work for purposes of determining eligibility for unemployment benefits); Hawkins v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 390 A.2d 973, 975 (D.C. 1978) (stating inability to accept full-time work does not per se render claimant ineligible for benefits); Rosenbaum v. Johnson, 377 N.E.2d 258, 260 (Ill.App.Ct. 1978) (stating claimant who is available for only part-time work was not per se ineligible for unemployment benefits). [¶ 11] Other courts have said a claimant who is only able to work part-time is not eligible for unemployment benefits.
( Mohler v. Department of Labor (1951), 409 Ill. 79, 97 N.E.2d 762.) This requirement is designed to test the current labor force attachment of the claimant for unemployment compensation ( Rosenbaum v. Johnson (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 657, 377 N.E.2d 258), and whether one is available for work depends to a great extent upon the individual's mental attitude as evidenced by the effort put forth in the search for work. Mohler v. Department of Labor (1951), 409 Ill. 79, 97 N.E.2d 762. The record here shows that for 15 consecutive years plaintiff had established a pattern of seasonal employment as a crossing guard.
As a practical matter, the imposition by plaintiff of the condition of 50% administrative functions of any offered work so limited her availability as to effectively remove herself from the labor market. See Rosenbaum v. Johnson (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 657, 377 N.E.2d 258, 260. The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is reversed.
" • 2, 3 While the interpretation given by an administrative agency to its rules and regulations is entitled to respectful consideration, an erroneous construction by the agency is not binding. (See Rosenbaum v. Johnson (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 657, 661, 377 N.E.2d 258, 260; Heifner v. Board of Education (1975), 32 Ill. App.3d 83, 87-88, 335 N.E.2d 600, 603-04.) We believe that the Board's interpretation of Regulation 17F is clearly erroneous. Under the Board's interpretation, the only claimants who could receive benefits under section 1 of Regulation 17F would be those who could show that they were unaware of the Act's existence.
As the receipt of unemployment insurance benefits is a conditional right, the burden of proving eligibility before the Board rests with the claimant. Yadro v. Bowling (1980), 91 Ill. App.3d 889, 893; Rosenbaum v. Johnson (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 657, 662. Under section 603, a claimant may reject work or referral to employment if the job in question is not "suitable."
It is established in this State that the receipt of unemployment insurance benefits is a conditional right and the burden of proving eligibility before the agency is on the claimant. ( Yadro v. Bowling (1980), 91 Ill. App.3d 889, 892-93, 414 N.E.2d 1244; Rosenbaum v. Johnson (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 657, 662, 377 N.E.2d 258; Brown v. Board of Review (1972), 8 Ill. App.3d 19, 23, 289 N.E.2d 40.) The only evidence relevant to the issue of good cause offered by plaintiff was that she failed to apply for the job opening to which she had been referred because she had no funds with which to buy gas for her car. The majority refers to other evidence which, if found in the record, would be relevant to the issue of good cause. It notes, however, that the record is devoid of any evidence in that regard and concludes that plaintiff's excuse she lacked money for gas established a prima facie case she had good cause not to attend the scheduled job interview which was not overcome by the other evidence.
The legislature, however, has considered the common circumstance of a claimant who is or has been employed on a part-time basis while attending school and has unambiguously declared that a person who is principally occupied as a student shall be deemed unavailable for employment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 420(C)(4).) The dispositive question considered by the Board of Review, and presented in this appeal, is not just whether plaintiff was available for work as required by section 500(C) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 420(C); see, e.g., Kocourek v. Bowling (1981), 96 Ill. App.3d 310, 421 N.E.2d 397; Rosenbaum v. Johnson (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 657, 377 N.E.2d 258) and the Board focused, correctly in our view, upon whether plaintiff must be deemed unavailable for work as a person whose principal occupation is as a student as is provided in section 500(C)(4) of the Act. The evidence demonstrates plaintiff was employed on a part-time basis prior to her discharge and during that period was enrolled in an almost full-time educational program.
The finding of "availability for work" likewise is determined from the facts and circumstances of each case, and the statutory requirement is generally satisfied "`where a worker is ready and willing to accept suitable work at a point where there is an available labor market, which work he does not have good cause to refuse.'" ( Rosenbaum v. Johnson (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 657, 660, 377 N.E.2d 258, 260, quoting Mohler v. Department of Labor (1951), 409 Ill. 79, 83, 97 N.E.2d 762, 764; Stricklin v. Annunzio (1952), 413 Ill. 324, 109 N.E.2d 183.) The Department's policy, as reflected in Regulation 14, as well as its specific findings in the present case also indicate that it does not require claimants to satisfy the burden imposed on them of establishing their eligibility for benefits under section 500(C).