Opinion
No. 05-09-00994-CV
Opinion Filed June 1, 2011.
On Appeal from the 68th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 08-11408.
Before Justices MURPHY, FILLMORE, and MYERS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Jeffrey Rosenbaum appeals the trial court's denial of his request to reduce Sladjana Dupor's recoverable medical expenses to the amount Dupor stipulated was "actually paid." See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 41.0105 (West 2008). We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
After sustaining injuries in an automobile collision with a vehicle operated by Rosenbaum, Dupor filed suit. Rosenbaum answered, asserting "the statutory defense set forth in Section 41.0105," and contending "recovery of medical or healthcare expenses is limited to the amount actually paid or incurred by or on behalf of" Dupor. The parties submitted the case to the trial court on stipulated facts contained in a proposed agreed judgment. Rosenbaum stipulated his negligence proximately caused the accident and Dupor's injuries. He also stipulated that "subject to the objections and further stipulations," "the monies now paid in cash that would reasonably compensate [Dupor] for her injuries" included "reasonable and necessary medical expenses in Dallas County, Texas-$26,349.95[.]" Dupor's stipulations included the following statement:
[T]he amount actually paid by or on behalf of [Dupor] is $16,189.84. This amount includes contractual adjustments, health insurance payments, outstanding bills not covered by health care insurance, co-payments made by [Dupor] and [Dupor's] health insurance deductible.
The proposed agreed judgment also included Rosenbaum's written objection, citing section 41.0105, to entry of judgment in the amount of $26,349.95 for reasonable and necessary medical expenses. Rosenbaum argued the application of section 41.0105 to the stipulated facts reduced recoverable medical expenses to the "paid amount of $16,189.84." The trial court denied Rosenbaum's request, circling "OVERRULED" in the proposed judgment, and rendered judgment that Dupor recover, in addition to loss of earnings and pain and suffering, "reasonable and necessary medical expenses in the amount of $26,349.95." Rosenbaum appealed.
Discussion
In a single point of error, Rosenbaum asserts the trial court erred when it failed to apply section 41.0105 to reduce Dupor's medical expenses pursuant to her stipulation "that the amount actually paid by or on behalf of [Dupor] is $16,189.84," thus giving Dupor a windfall recovery. He argues the stipulated facts showed the medical expenses were adjusted downwards and set the maximum amount Dupor could recover for past medical expenses for those "actually paid." Arguing his interpretation is consistent with the "one recovery rule," Rosenbaum asserts there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court's award of damages. Dupor responds that it was Rosenbaum's burden to establish the amount "actually paid or incurred" under section 41.0105, that the stipulations admit amounts are owed that have not been paid, and the stipulations are insufficient to show what, exactly, was written off and why.
Standard of Review
Although Rosenbaum presents his appeal in the context of sufficiency of the evidence, this case was tried on stipulated facts. We apply a de novo standard of review to a case tried on stipulated facts. See Panther Creek Ventures, Ltd. v. Collin Cen. Appraisal Dist., 234 S.W.3d 809, 811 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied). The stipulations are binding on the parties, the trial court, and the reviewing court. Id. We do not draw any inferences or find any facts not embraced in the agreement. Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cty. of Dall. Tax Collector, 228 S.W.3d 475, 478 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.). We do not review the sufficiency of the evidence, but simply review the trial court's judgment to determine if the court applied the law correctly to the stipulated facts. Panther Creek, 234 S.W.3d at 811.
Applicable Law
Section 41.0105 provides that in "addition to any other limitation under law, recovery of medical or health care expenses incurred is limited to the amount actually paid or incurred by or on behalf of the claimant." Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 41.0105. Texas courts have concluded that medical expenses written off by the providers may not constitute amounts "actually paid or incurred" as required by section 41.0105. See Pierre v. Swearingen, 331 S.W.3d 150, 155 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.).
Analysis
The record before us is limited. There is no reporter's record and no discussion regarding Rosenbaum's request to apply section 41.0105. We have only the parties' stipulations and objections as recited in the agreed final judgment. Based on this record, the stipulated facts do not provide all facts necessary to determine the amount by which Dupor's reasonable and necessary medical expenses should be reduced under section 41.0105. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment. The trial court was required to render judgment for Dupor for her reasonable and necessary medical expenses. Pursuant to the stipulations, that amount was $26,349.95. The trial court also was required to reduce Dupor's recovery pursuant to section 41.0105, provided the court had the necessary information to make the adjustment. See id. at 155-56 (evidence required to support amount claimed as deduction). Dupor stipulated the amount "actually paid" was $16,189.84 and that such amount included "contractual adjustments, health insurance payments, outstanding bills not covered by health care insurance, co-payments made by [Dupor] and [Dupor's] health insurance deductible." She did not stipulate, however, that the $16,189.84 included all adjustments or reductions or that $16,189.84 was the amount "actually paid or incurred." The record must contain information sufficient to make the section 41.0105 calculation. We are not permitted to make inferences in our review of the stipulated facts, Roman Catholic Diocese, 228 S.W.3d at 478, and therefore cannot assume or conclude what Dupor intended in her stipulation that $16,189.84 was actually paid. Without an inference as to that stipulated fact, there is no basis for reducing the reasonable and necessary medical expenses to "the amount actually paid or incurred by or on behalf of [Dupor]" under section 41.0105. See, e.g., Pierre, 331 S.W.3d at 155-56 (records showing amounts were "adjusted" insufficient under section 41.0105 without further explanation). The trial court awarded the only amount proved by the stipulations as to reasonable and necessary medical expenses. We therefore overrule Rosenbaum's sole point of error. In light of our conclusion, we need not address Rosenbaum's remaining arguments. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
Conclusion
Having overruled Rosenbaum's sole point of error, we affirm the trial court's judgment.