Prior to Kitto, no distinction was made between political subdivisions and the state for purposes of immunity and liability. In Rosedale School Dist. No. 5 v. Towner County, this Court held that because the state was subject to statutes of limitation, it followed that counties and school districts were amenable to statutes of limitation. Rosedale, 56 N.D. 41, 53, 216 N.W. 212, 216 (1927). In its opinion, the Court cited to Metropolitan R.R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 19, 33 L.Ed. 231 (1889).
The equitable rule that the statute of limitations does not run in favor of the trustee against the cestui que trust applies only to express or voluntary trusts, and does not apply to implied or involuntary trusts. Rosedale School Dist. v. Towner County, 56 N.D. 41, 216 NW 212. As between public corporations and officers, title and ownership to such a fund can be neither gained nor lost by its transfer through mistake from one treasury to another, its identity being always defined and recognized. Agnes Twp. v. Grand Forks County, 56 N.D. 505, 218 N.W. 212.
Where the court said the reasonableness of the classification must be looked at from the point of view of the legislature, all reasonable doubts are to be resolved in favor of upholding the statute establishing the classification. Rosedale School Dist. v. Towner County, 56 N.D. 41, 216 N.W. 212; Klingensmith v. Siegel, 57 N.D. 768, 224 N.W. 680. The dealings of building and loan associations with their own stockholders differ from ordinary loan transactions to such an extent as to warrant the legislature in excepting such associations, as to such dealings, from the operation of the provisions of the general usury laws.
Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110, 39 S. Ct. 185, 63 L. Ed. 504. A statute of limitation, in the absence of provision therein to the contrary, runs not only for, but against municipal or public corporations. Metropolitan R. Co. v. Dist. of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1, 11-12, 10 S. Ct. 19, 33 L. Ed. 231; Little v. Emmett Irr. Dist., 45 Idaho 485, 263 P. 40, 56 A.L.R. 822; Rosedale S.D. No. 5 v. Towner County, 56 N.D. 41, 216 N.W. 212, 215. We conclude that such Indian Pueblos were entitled to the benefits of the New Mexico statutes of limitation and that the United States, as their guardian, may plead such statutes in their behalf.
" See, Rosedale School Dist. No. 5 v. Towner County, 56 N.D. 41, 216 N.W. 212 (1927); and Peterson v. United States, 384 F.2d 664 (1967) at 668, which contains an offhand intimation to the contrary. Since the history of adverse possession reaches back to the 1930's, I do find that under principles of adverse possession, the owner of Tract 01-147 is the Stanton Park District.
5 P.2d 435, 438 n. 14 [1979]). See, e.g., Covington County v. O'Neal, 239 Ala. 222, 195 So. 234, 238 [1940] (citing Montgomery County v. City of Montgomery, 195 Ala. 197, 70 So. 642, 643-644 [1916]); Hart v. Sternberg, 205 Ark. 929, 171 S.W.2d 475, 478 [1943]; City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County, 9 Cal.2d 624, 72 P.2d 138, 139-140 [1937] (followed in San Marcos Water D. v. San Marcos Uni. School, 190 Cal.App.3d 1038, 235 Cal.Rptr. 827, 830 [4 Dist. 1987]); R.A. Civitello Co. v. City of New Haven, 6 Conn. App. 212, 504 A.2d 542, 546-547 [1986]; Mayor and Council of Wilmington v. Dukes, 52 Del. 318, 157 A.2d 789, 795 [1960]; State v. Stuart, 46 Ind. App. 611, 91 N.E. 613, 615 [1910]; Great Western Ins. Co. v. Saunders, 223 Iowa 926, 274 N.W. 28, 31-32 [1937]; In re Ernst's Guardianship, 158 Neb. 15, 62 N.W.2d 110, 111 [1954]; Bd. of Trustees of Bergen v. J.P. Fyfe, Inc., supra note 12, 471 A.2d at 39-40; City of Buffalo v. Watkins, 102 Misc.2d 17, 422 N.Y.S.2d 563, 563-564 [1979]; Rosedale School Dist. No. 5 v. Towner County, 56 N.D. 41, 216 N.W. 212, 215-216 [1927]; State v. Gibson, 130 Ohio St. 318, 199 N.E. 185, 186-187 [1935] (followed in City of Kettering v. Berger, 4 Ohio App.3d 254, 448 N.E.2d 458, 465 [1982]); Trustees of Proprietors of Kingston v. Lehigh Valley C. Co., 241 Pa. 469, 88 A. 763, 766 [1913]; Johnson v. Black, 103 Va. 477, 49 S.E. 633, 638 [1905]; and Burns v. Board of Sup'rs of Stafford County, supra note 28, 315 S.E.2d at 858-860. III
It was his duty to collect all taxes due from the taxpayers of the county and to distribute the moneys received from the various taxpayers, respectively, to the state, county, and the subordinate political subdivisions of the county." Rosedale School Dist. No. 5 v. Towner County, 56 N.D. 41, 216 N.W. 212, 217 (1927). In the case of United Accounts, Incorporated v. Dachtler, 100 N.W.2d 93 (N.D. 1959), we said that a county is an agency of the State. It is not suggested that the establishment (in the Constitution) of the counties as agencies of the State, or the establishment of the school districts (by the Legislature) were mere acts of subterfuge to avoid the consequences of the limitation imposed by Section 174 of the Constitution.
This concession is in line with the decisions of this court. In Rosedale School District No. 5 v. Towner County, 56 N.D. 41, 216 N.W. 212 (1927), this court specifically held that counties were amenable to the statutes of limitation of this State. Since the statutes of limitation do apply to claims by counties, we must determine when the claims of the plaintiff counties accrued, since the applicable statute operates from the date of accrual.
We find that certified questions number one and two must be answered in the affirmative. Counties are within the terms of the statute of limitations. It runs for them as well as against them. Rosedale School District No. 5 v. Towner County, 56 N.D. 41, 216 N.W. 212. However, it must be taken by answer as required by Section 28-01-39, N.D.C.C., and Rule 8(c), N.D.R.Civ.P., to be applicable.
"The limitations prescribed in this chapter shall apply to actions brought in the name of the state, or for its benefit, in the same manner as to actions by private parties." In Rosedale School District Number 5 v. Towner County, 56 N.D. 41, 216 N.W. 212, this court determined that counties and school districts are amenable to statutes of limitation. While Section 30-1804 is a statute of nonclaim rather than a statute of limitation and does not fall directly within the application of Section 28-0123 quoted above, its very nature commends its application to claims of the state. As a statute of nonclaim it goes to the existence of the right of action rather than a limitation as to time within which an action may be brought. That difference is pointed out in Mann v. Redmon, 27 N.D. 346, 145 N.W. 1031, 1033, in these words: