Utah courts, however, recognize a narrow exception to this no-duty rule "[w]hen an abutting landowner makes `special use' of a public sidewalk." Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, ¶ 12, 67 P.3d 1017; see also Tripp, 450 P.2d at 100 (stating that an abutting landowner's duty arises only when he "creates through use or otherwise some unsafe or dangerous condition" (quotations and citation omitted)); Basinger v. Standard Furniture, 118 Utah 121, 220 P.2d 117, 119 (1950); Salt Lake City v. Schubach, 108 Utah 266, 159 P.2d 149, 153 (1945) (noting that when a landowner "constructs a coal hole, or makes some other special use of the public sidewalk, he undertakes to see that such structure is kept in proper condition so that no member of the public using such sidewalk is injured thereby"). Specifically, this court held in Rose v. Provo City that "[w]hen an abutting landowner makes `special use' of a public sidewalk . . . he has a duty that runs with the land to use `due care' to keep it in a `suitable and safe' condition for the public to travel over."
¶ 18 In contrast to the court of appeals' assertion that duty was submitted to the jury in the form of questions surrounding foreseeability, appellate courts have consistently held that "[t]he determination of whether a legal duty exists falls to the court." Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, ¶ 14, 143 P.3d 283; see also Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, ¶ 8, 67 P.3d 1017 ("[W]hether a duty of care is owed is `entirely a question of law to be determined by the court.'" (quoting Lamarr v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 828 P.2d 535, 538 (Utah Ct.App. 1992))); AMS Salt Indus., 942 P.2d at 319 ("[T]he question of whether a duty exists is a question of law.
¶82 Proximate cause typically presents "a question of fact for the jury." Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, ¶ 10, 67 P.3d 1017. And "if there is any doubt about whether something was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, the court must not decide the issue as a matter of law."
¶7 To answer whether UPS is liable for the harm to Wood, the threshold issue is whether UPS owed a legal duty of care to Wood at the time of his injury. "Whether a duty of care is owed is entirely a question of law to be determined by the court." Rose v. Provo City , 2003 UT App 77, ¶ 8, 67 P.3d 1017 (quotation simplified). "Duty must be determined as a matter of law and on a categorical basis for a given class of tort claims."
Thus, we review a trial court's denial of either motion for correctness. See Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, ¶ 11, 5 P.3d 616 (judgment notwithstanding the verdict); Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, ¶ 7, 67 P.3d 1017 (directed verdict). We assume Union Carbide raises the bulk supplier issue as an appeal from the denial of its JNOV motion, as it does for its causation argument.
"Proximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact[.]" Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, ¶ 10, 67 P.3d 1017. However, "where the proximate cause of the injury is left to conjecture, the plaintiff must fail as a matter of law."
Further, even if City Market were deemed to possess the parking spaces for purposes of premises liability, Hevelone still would not have been a business invitee of City Market while crossing the driveway and fire lane belonging to the mall. See id. (holding that a prospective attendee of a university basketball game was not a business invitee of the university while the attendee was crossing a public way between the university's parking lot and its basketball arena); see also Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, ¶ 12, 67 P.3d 1017 (holding that a landowner has a duty to use due care to keep an abutting public way in a suitable and safe condition only when the landowner makes "special use" of the public way for some other purpose than merely using it as a public way). Hevelone's complaint and the other materials before the trial court establish that Hevelone was not on City Market's property at the time of her injury. Accordingly, Hevelone was not City Market's business invitee at the time of her injury and City Market owed her no duty as a matter of Utah premises liability law.
Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 487 (Utah Ct.App. 1991), aff'd, 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993). Defendants argue, and the trial court agreed, that although "[p]roximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury," Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, ¶ 10, 67 P.3d 1017, summary judgment is appropriate in this case because, "where `the proximate cause of the injury is left to conjecture, the plaintiff must fail as a matter of law.'" Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680, 683 (1943) (citation omitted).
Whether a duty of care is owed is entirely a question of law to be determined by the court. See Utah Power Light Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 983 F.2d 1549, 1562 (10th Cir. 1993); Rose v. Provo City, 67 P.3d 1017, 1020 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). The existence of a duty of reasonable care depends in part on the extent to which a reasonable person can foresee that his acts may create a significant likelihood of causing harm to others.