Rose v. Porter

6 Citing cases

  1. Peterson v. Grieger, Inc.

    57 Cal.2d 43 (Cal. 1961)   Cited 38 times
    Holding that it was reasonable for a trier of fact to find implied permission where a first valet was given permission to park a vehicle and the first valet gave permission to a second valet to move the vehicle to an overflow lot because the second valet's use did not exceed the "time, purpose, or area" restrictions imposed

    Thus the jury could have reasonably inferred either that Grieger gave Cole implied permission to have his automobile driven to a nearby parking lot if necessary, or that such operation did not amount to a substantial violation of the physical limits of Grieger's implied permission. (Compare with Henrietta v. Evans, supra, 10 Cal.2d 526, 528; Burdine v. Severin Motors, Inc., 147 Cal.App.2d 751, 756-757 [ 305 P.2d 1008]; Rose v. Porter, 101 Cal.App.2d 333, 336-337 [ 225 P.2d 245].) It should be noted in this connection that the operator was not joyriding when the accident occurred, but was merely carrying out a routine procedure used at Cole's parking lot during busy periods.

  2. Garmon v. Sebastian

    181 Cal.App.2d 254 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960)   Cited 6 times

    ( Henrietta v. Evans, 10 Cal.2d 526, 528 [ 75 P.2d 1051].)" (See also Burdine v. Severin Motors, Inc., 147 Cal.App.2d 751, 757 [ 305 P.2d 1008]; Rose v. Porter, 101 Cal.App.2d 333, 337 [ 225 P.2d 245].) [5] The existence of the requisite permission cannot be left to speculation or conjecture.

  3. Elkinton v. Cal. State Auto. Assn.

    173 Cal.App.2d 338 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)   Cited 28 times
    In Elkinton, supra, 173 Cal.App.2d 338, the court concluded substantial evidence supported the jury's finding that a daughter had her mother's implied permission to drive her mother's car. (Id. at p. 345.)

    [5] Where the issue of implied permissive use is involved, the general relationship existing between the owner and the operator, is of paramount importance. Where, for example, the parties are related by blood ( Phillips v. Cuccio, 5 Cal.App.2d 520 [ 42 P.2d 1050]; Casey v. Fortune, 78 Cal.App.2d 922 [ 179 P.2d 99]; Pierce v. Standow, 163 Cal.App.2d 286 [ 329 P.2d 44]), or marriage ( Garrison v. Booth, 10 Cal.App.2d 738 [ 52 P.2d 535]), or where the relationship between the owner and the operator is that of principal and agent ( Prickett v. Whapples, 10 Cal.App.2d 701 [ 52 P.2d 972]; Scheff v. Roberts, 35 Cal.2d 10 [ 215 P.2d 925]; Blank v. Coffin, 20 Cal.2d 457 [ 126 P.2d 868]), weaker direct evidence will support a finding of such use than where the parties are only acquaintances ( Mucci v. Winter, 103 Cal.App.2d 627 [ 230 P.2d 22]), or strangers ( Engstrom v. Auburn Auto Sales Corp., 11 Cal.2d 64 [ 77 P.2d 1059]; Helmuth v. Frame 46 Cal.App.2d 381 [ 115 P.2d 852]; Rose v. Porter, 101 Cal.App.2d 333 [ 225 P.2d 245]; di Rebaylio v. Herndon, 6 Cal.App.2d 567 [ 44 P.2d 581]). Of the above cases only those falling within the last group (mere acquaintances and strangers) hold that the evidence of permissive use was insufficient as a matter of law. [6] Where, as in the instant case, the relationship between the owner and operator is that of parent and child, the evidence should be reviewed in the light of the authority which the law confers upon the parent to control the child, and the authority to administer restraint and punishment in order to compel obedience to reasonable and necessary directions.

  4. Burdine v. Severin Motors, Inc.

    147 Cal.App.2d 751 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957)   Cited 4 times

    [4] It is well established that when possession of an automobile is delivered to another for a limited time, purpose or use, a substantial deviation therefrom absolves the owner from liability. ( Henrietta v. Evans, 10 Cal.2d 526 [ 75 P.2d 1051]; Engstrom v. Auburn Auto. Sales Corp., 11 Cal.2d 64 [ 77 P.2d 1059]; Barcus v. Campbell, 90 Cal.App.2d 768 [ 204 P.2d 65]; Rose v. Porter, 101 Cal.App.2d 333 [ 225 P.2d 245].) In the Engstrom case it was pointed out that an inference of permissive use could not reasonably be drawn from evidence that the car was being operated by one who had stolen it. [3b] Beyond question, this Pontiac car was sold for $10, and sold with the understanding that it was to be junked, and the same principles should be applied here as in a case where a car was stolen.

  5. Hellman v. Colonial Insurance Company

    475 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir. 1973)   Cited 1 times

    These findings are not attacked, but appellant urges that the "liberal" or Arizona rule that a "general consent" is sufficient to govern the California Vehicle Code, rather than the "conservative" view, that if no consent is proved for the vehicle's use outside the state, then no coverage exists. The latter is the California view. Henrietta v. Evans, 10 Cal.2d 526, 75 P.2d 1051 (1938); Rose v. Porter, 101 Cal.App.2d 333, 225 P.2d 245 (1950). The burden of proof to establish requisite permission is on the plaintiff, and is a question of fact. Garmon v. Sebastian, 181 Cal.App.2d 254, 5 Cal.Rptr. 101 (1960); Couch on Insurance, § 45.460, p. 447.

  6. Irvine v. Wilson

    137 Cal.App.2d Supp. 843 (Cal. Super. 1955)   Cited 7 times

    permission. (Henrietta v. Evans, 10 Cal.2d 526 ; Mucci v. Winter, 103 Cal.App.2d 627 ; Fountain v. Bank of America, 109 Cal.App.2d 90 .) Here there was no express permission by Mrs. Pollard, and while knowledge on her part is no longer considered necessary to establish implied permission (Burgess v. Cahill, 26 Cal.2d 320 [159 A.L.R. 1304]; Scheff v. Roberts, supra), and the inference has been drawn from evidence of permission for general use and the surrender of possession to another (Souza v. Corti, 22 Cal.2d 454 [147 A.L.R. 861]; Hobbs v. Transport Motor Co., 22 Cal.2d 773 ; Davidson v. Ealey, 69 Cal.App.2d 254 ), or the driver's use of the vehicle on other occasions (Phillips v. Cuccio, 5 Cal.App.2d 520 ), the circumstances here present do not demand the finding of implied permission as a matter of law. (Henrietta v. Evans, supra; Engstrom v. Auburn Auto. Sales Corp., 11 Cal.2d 64 ; Rose v. Porter, 101 Cal.App.2d 333 .)          The authority of Mr. Wilson, so far as the record indicates, was limited to those uses which would promote the sale.