Opinion
C. A. 2:23-1264-RBH-PJG
04-21-2023
James R. Rose, Plaintiff, v. Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, L.L.P., Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff James R. Rose, a self-represented state prisoner, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes this case should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and issuance and service of process.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff is an inmate in the McCormick Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”). Plaintiff alleges that the defendant was appointed by a South Carolina state court to represent a class of SCDC prisoners in a lawsuit against the State. Plaintiff alleges that representation lasted from 2006 to 2014 and resulted in a settlement agreement that was made without Plaintiff's knowledge or consent. Plaintiff claims the settlement agreement was not in his best interest and the defendant purposefully colluded with the other parties in the class action lawsuit to prevent the case from going to trial. Plaintiff does not allege that he was a member of the class represented by the defendant.
Regardless, Plaintiff claims that his current conditions of confinement in SCDC, especially mental health treatment, is inadequate. He alleges that when he seeks mental health treatment, SCDC sends correctional officers rather than a physician, which sometimes results in his being placed in solitary confinement without treatment. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the defendant has violated Plaintiff's rights pursuant to the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff seeks damages and ask the court to undo the settlement agreement in the class action lawsuit and allow that case to proceed to trial.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. This statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “is frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “ ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.' ” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
However, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that the defendant-a law firm that Plaintiff alleges was appointed to represent state prisoners in a class action lawsuit-is a “state actor” amenable to suit under § 1983. See West, 487 U.S. at 49 (“To constitute state action, ‘the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible,' and ‘the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.”) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 936 n.18 (1982)); see also Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that whether the defendants are state actors depends on, among other factors, whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority, the extent and nature of public assistance and public benefits accorded the private actor, the extent and nature of governmental regulation over the actor, and whether the state itself regards the actor as a state actor). Private attorneys in a civil lawsuit do not act under color of state law, even if they are court appointed. See Limehouse v. Delaware, 144 Fed.Appx. 921, 923 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding a private attorney's representation of a state defendant in a civil proceeding did not constitute state action); cf. Deas v. Potts, 547 F.2d 800, 800 (4th Cir. 1976) (“A private attorney who is retained to represent a criminal defendant is not acting under color of state law, and therefore is not amenable to suit under s 1983.”); Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154, 1155 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding no state action under § 1983 where the plaintiff's criminal defense attorney was court-appointed); Parkell v. South Carolina, 687 F.Supp.2d 576, 586 (D.S.C. 2009) (“An attorney, whether retained, court-appointed, or a public defender, does not act under color of state law, which is a jurisdictional prerequisite for any civil action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that the defendant is a state actor that can be sued under § 1983.
Additionally, Plaintiff's claim is, on its face, barred by the statute of limitations. See Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 655-56 (4th Cir. 2006) (providing a district court may sua sponte dismiss claims as untimely pursuant to § 1915 “when such a defense plainly appears on the face of . . . a complaint”) (citing Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995)). The applicable statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in South Carolina is three years. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989); Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[T]o determine the timely filing of a § 1983 claim, courts borrow the statute of limitations from the most analogous state-law cause of action. For § 1983 suits, that cause of action is a personal-injury suit.”) (internal citations omitted); Brannon v. Blanton, C/A No. 9:15-2434-CMC, 2016 WL 4232886, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 11, 2016) (“[T]he statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising in South Carolina is three years, regardless of the underlying allegations of the § 1983 claim.”); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530(5). Here, Plaintiff claims the constitutional violations occurred between 2006 and 2014. Plaintiff provides no facts that would plausibly indicate that the three-year statute of limitations should not apply to his claim and begin to run in 2014, at the latest. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims are plainly barred by the applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 claims.
Finally, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that the defendant caused his constitutional rights to be violated. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (providing that a plaintiff in a § 1983 action must plead that the defendant, through his own individual actions, violated the Constitution); see also Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[Constitutional torts . . . require a demonstration of both but-for and proximate causation.”); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (“In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be ‘affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.' ”) (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)). Plaintiff provides no facts that would plausibly show that the defendant's decisions relating to a settlement agreement nearly ten years ago impacts his current conditions of confinement. Plaintiff provides no facts about the settlement agreement, including whether Plaintiffwas a named class member in that lawsuit, or what about the agreement effects his current conditions of his confinement. Consequently, he fails to plausibly allege that the defendant's actions are the cause of Plaintiff's purported constitutional injuries.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the court recommends that the Complaint be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
Plaintiff is warned that if this recommendation is adopted, a future court may find that this action constitutes a strike. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (“In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”); Pitts v. State of South Carolina, F.4th, 2023 WL 2920851 (4th Cir. 2023) (explaining that a future court may decide that a prisoner's previous filings constitute “strikes” under § 1915(g)).
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).