Rose v. Isenhour Brick Tile Co.

3 Citing cases

  1. Recalde v. Emhart Industries, Inc.

    1999 Ct. Sup. 1272 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999)   Cited 7 times
    In Ricalde Judge Corradino found that the injury occurring was fortuitous and that there was no basis to conclude that the employer believed that there was a substantial certainty of injury. He pointed to the fact that there were no prior histories of injury caused by the machinery or that there had been any violations of OSHA or other safety regulations or that any other employees had been coerced into continuing to work at the machine even if it had, in fact, broken down.

    Accordingly, in an action by an employee against his employer alleging an intentional tort, upon motion for summary judgment by the defendant employer, the plaintiff employee must set forth specific facts which show there is a genuine issue of whether the employer had committed an intentional tort against his employee" See also Rose v. Isenhour Brick Tile Co. Inc., 472 S.E.2d 774, 776 (NC, 1996), North Carolina Supreme Court case briefly describing summary judgment procedure and indicating decision is fact based in a substantial certainty case. The just quoted language from Van Fossen exactly parallels the observations on summary judgment standards made in Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp. , 229 Conn. 99, 105 (1994) which our court alludes to before discussing the facts of the case — there the court said "the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact."

  2. EARP v. PETERS

    CIVIL DOCKET NO.: 5:07CV31 (W.D.N.C. Sep. 30, 2010)

    In addition, there's nothing in the record indicating that Alexander County had been subject to any disciplinary actions or received citations from an OSHA-like regulating authority due to pertinent prior safety violations.Richmond, 308 F.Supp.2d at 668; Rose v. Isenhour Brick Tile Co., 472 S.E.2d 774, 778 (1996); Regan v. Amerimark Bldg. Prods., Inc., 489 S.E.2d 421 (N.C.App. 1997). At best, the record supports a finding of ordinary negligence on the part of Third-Party Defendants.

  3. Alford v. Catalytica Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

    150 N.C. App. 489 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 7 times

    Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a successful Woodson claim does not require actual certainty but substantial certainty. See Rose v. Isenhour Brick Tile Co., Inc., 344 N.C. 153, 159, 472 S.E.2d 774, 778 (1996); Mickles v. Duke Power Co., 342 N.C. 103, 110, 463 S.E.2d 206, 211 (1995); see also Regan v. Amerimark Bldg. Products, Inc., 127 N.C. App. 225, 227, 489 S.E.2d 421, 423 (1997). We conclude that the additional language in Owens was to qualify the dissent's use of "intentional tort" and does not classify a Woodson claim as an additional cause of action separate and apart from an intentional tort.