The court held that even if the coemployees "may have known certain dangerous parts of the machine were unguarded when they instructed [the plaintiff] to work at the machine, we do not believe this supports an inference that they intended that [the plaintiff] be injured or that they were manifestly indifferent to the consequences of his doing so."Id. at 238, 424 S.E.2d at 394. A similar holding denying a Woodson claim was reached inRose v. Isenhour Brick Tile Co., 344 N.C. 153, 472 S.E.2d 774 (1996), where an employee was killed while operating a brick-setting machine for his employer, a company that manufactured and distributed brick products. Id. at 154, 156, 472 S.E.2d at 775, 776.
The Workers' Compensation Act has traditionally provided the sole remedy for an employee injured on the job as a result of an accident. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-9 and 97-10.1 (1998), Rose v. Isenhour Brick Tile Co., Inc., 344 N.C. 153, 472 S.E.2d 774 (1996); Tinch v. Video Indus. Serv., Inc., 129 N.C. App. 69, 497 S.E.2d 295 (1998). In Woodson v. Rowland, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court established an exception to the exclusivity provisions of the Act and held:
Accordingly, in an action by an employee against his employer alleging an intentional tort, upon motion for summary judgment by the defendant employer, the plaintiff employee must set forth specific facts which show there is a genuine issue of whether the employer had committed an intentional tort against his employee" See also Rose v. Isenhour Brick Tile Co. Inc., 472 S.E.2d 774, 776 (NC, 1996), North Carolina Supreme Court case briefly describing summary judgment procedure and indicating decision is fact based in a substantial certainty case. The just quoted language from Van Fossen exactly parallels the observations on summary judgment standards made in Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp. , 229 Conn. 99, 105 (1994) which our court alludes to before discussing the facts of the case — there the court said "the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact."
In addition, there's nothing in the record indicating that Alexander County had been subject to any disciplinary actions or received citations from an OSHA-like regulating authority due to pertinent prior safety violations.Richmond, 308 F.Supp.2d at 668; Rose v. Isenhour Brick Tile Co., 472 S.E.2d 774, 778 (1996); Regan v. Amerimark Bldg. Prods., Inc., 489 S.E.2d 421 (N.C.App. 1997). At best, the record supports a finding of ordinary negligence on the part of Third-Party Defendants.
Defendant's lack of previous violations of safety regulations distinguishes this case from Woodson, as does the absence of "specific regulations" requiring Defendant to protect its employees from the dangers of toxic mold. See Rose v. Isenhour Brick Tile Co., 344 N.C. 153, 159, 472 S.E.2d 774, 778 (1996). Further, viewing Plaintiffs' allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the allegations fail to show that IBM "recognized the immediate hazards of [its conduct] and consciously elected to forgo critical safety precautions" or that IBM "disregarded all safety measures."
Our Supreme Court has stated that a ruling committed to a trial court's discretion is to be accorded great deference and will be upset only upon a showing that it was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.Rose v. Isenhour Brick & Tile Co., 120 N.C.App. 235, 240, 461 S.E.2d 782, 786 (1995) (citations, internal quotation marks, and some brackets omitted), affirmed,344 N.C. 153, 472 S.E.2d 774 (1996). At the hearing on Temple's motion in the cause, the trial court asked Temple about an incident during discovery when Temple failed to timely disclose a change in certain experts he intended to call.
According to well-established North Carolina law, " a broad discretion must be given to the trial judge with regard to sanctions." Rose v. Isenhour Brick and Tile Co., 120 N.C.App. 235, 240, 461 S.E.2d 782, 786 (1995) (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted), aff'd, 344 N.C. 153, 472 S.E.2d 774 (1996). A trial court does not abuse its discretion by imposing a severe sanction so long as that sanction is " among those expressly authorized by statute" and there is no " specific evidence of injustice."
See Chateau Merisier, Inc. v. Le Mueble Artisanal GEKA, S.A., 142 N.C. App. 684, 687, 544 S.E.2d 815, 817 (2001); N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 37(d) (2001); see also N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 34 (2001) (production of documents). "Not every abuse of discovery merits imposition of punitive sanctions. It is well settled that Rule 37 allowing the trial court to impose sanctions is flexible, and a broad discretion must be given to the trial judge with regard to sanctions." Rose v. Isenhour Brick and Tile Co., 120 N.C. App. 235, 240, 461 S.E.2d 782, 786 (1995) (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted), aff'd, 344 N.C. 153, 472 S.E.2d 774 (1996). The trial court's discretion is accorded great deference and may be overturned only upon a showing that the ruling "was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision."
Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a successful Woodson claim does not require actual certainty but substantial certainty. See Rose v. Isenhour Brick Tile Co., Inc., 344 N.C. 153, 159, 472 S.E.2d 774, 778 (1996); Mickles v. Duke Power Co., 342 N.C. 103, 110, 463 S.E.2d 206, 211 (1995); see also Regan v. Amerimark Bldg. Products, Inc., 127 N.C. App. 225, 227, 489 S.E.2d 421, 423 (1997). We conclude that the additional language in Owens was to qualify the dissent's use of "intentional tort" and does not classify a Woodson claim as an additional cause of action separate and apart from an intentional tort.
In support of the trial court's action, Cooper Steel relies upon several decisions in which our appellate courts have rejected Woodson claims. See, e.g., Hooper v. Pizzagalli Construction Co., 112 N.C. App. 400, 436 S.E.2d 145 (1993), disc. rev. denied, 335 N.C. 770, 442 S.E.2d 516 (1994); Canady v. McLeod, 116 N.C. App. 82, 446 S.E.2d 879, disc. review denied, 338 N.C. 308, 451 S.E.2d 632 (1994); Powell v. S G. Prestress Co. 342 N.C. 182, 463 S.E.2d 79 (1995); Echols v. Zarn, Inc., 342 N.C. 184, 463 S.E.2d 228 (1995); Mickles v. Duke Power Co., 342 N.C. 103, 463 S.E.2d 206 (1995); Jones v. Willamette Industries, 120 N.C. App. 591, 463 S.E.2d 294 (1995), disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 656, 467 S.E.2d 714 (1996); Kelly v. Parkdale Mills, Inc., 121 N.C. App. 758, 468 S.E.2d 458 (1996); Rose v. Isenhour Brick Tile Co., Inc. 344 N.C. 153, 472 S.E.2d 774 (1996); and Tinch v. Video Industrial Services, Inc., 129 N.C. App. 69, 497 S.E.2d 295 (1998). However, plaintiffs counter by citing decisions in which Woodson claims were allowed to proceed.