26 C.F.R. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(iii). Plaintiff asserts that prepayments for medical care are not ordinarily allowed as a current deduction, citing to Rose v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 521 (1969); Bassett v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 619 (1956); Hunt v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 226 (1972). in this case, the expenses incurred for the construction of the home to address Mrs. Zipkin's medical condition should be considered prepayments for medical care, as the home provided no medical benefit to Mrs. Zipkin until it was proved habitable by Mrs. Zipkin. Plaintiff also asserts that the amount of deduction could not be ascertained until after the home was complete, as the deduction is the difference between the actual cost of construction and the home's fair market value.

‘ Commissioner v. Bilder, supra at 505. E.g., Rose v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 521 (1969), affd. per curiam 435 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1970); Carasso v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 1139 (1960), affd. 292 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1961). The next substantive change in section 213(e) (redesignated as section 213(d) by the Tax Equity & Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, 421) occurred when Congress passed the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, supra, and added new section 213(d)(2).

Such activity alone does not qualify as medical care, and the retirement community did not regularly engage in providing the type of care or services indicated in section 213(e)(1). Rose v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 521 (1969), affd. per curiam 435 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1970). And, indeed, during their residence there, neither Osborn nor Inga received any medical care or nursing services from the retirement community.

Although living in the facilities might have been beneficial to Susan, such benefit is not sufficient to make the lodging part of institutional medical care. The petitioners' situation is similar to that of the taxpayer in Robert M. Rose, 52 T.C. 521 (1969), where a doctor recommended that the taxpayers' daughter live in a ‘dust-free’ apartment because of her severe asthma. While the father remained in the family house, the 10-year-old daughter and her mother moved into a dust-free apartment near the hospital.

Although living in the facilities might have been beneficial to Susan, such benefit is not sufficient to make the lodging part of institutional medical care. The petitioners' situation is similar to that of the taxpayers in Robert M. Rose, 52 T.C. 521 (1969), where a doctor recommended that the taxpayers' daughter live in a "dust-free" apartment because of her severe asthma. While the father remained in the family house, the 10-year-old daughter and her mother moved into a dust-free apartment near the hospital.