Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Gregory Munoz, Judge. Super. Ct. No. 06CC08070
Irina Rosa, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Michael S. Steele for Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
BEDSWORTH, J.
Irina Rosa, acting in appropriate persona, appeals from a judgment dismissing her lawsuit for damages allegedly caused by Annabel Lee Cols ton when her car collided with Rosa's. Although Rosa's brief includes no statement of facts or procedural history, and the record she has provided us is incomplete, Cols ton's brief does contain a statement of facts which is consistent with the record and seeks to fill in many of its gaps.
Rosa's complaint was dismissed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030, because she failed to respond to discovery, even after the court had ordered she do so. Rosa's argument on appeal is that the court simply could not dismiss her case without considering the merits of her claim against Cols ton. We understand her frustration, but cannot agree with her. Our legal system requires all parties, whether at fault in the underlying dispute or not, to comply with both their discovery obligations and the court’s orders. One who seeks redress in the courts must respect the court’s rules. In this case, it appears Rosa did not, and she consequently lost her right to have her complaint assessed on the merits. The judgment is affirmed.
According to the complaint, Rosa and Cols ton were involved in an automobile accident on March 26, 2006. Rosa filed this lawsuit against Cols ton on July 14, 2006.
In October of 2006, Cols ton filed a motion for an order compelling Rosa to respond to discovery. That motion was granted on December 6, 2006. Whatever effort Rosa made to respond to the discovery following the court’s order was unsatisfactory to Cols ton, and on January 12, 2007, she filed a motion to dismiss the case based upon Rosa's failure to comply with discovery. On March 21, 2007, the court granted the motion and dismissed the case.
On March 27, 2007, Rosa filed her notice of appeal. On March 29, 2007, she filed an additional document in the superior court, captioned a “Pleading Against Dismissal of Case,” to which she appended interrogatory answers and documents relevant to the merits of her case.
On appeal, Rosca focuses only on the underlying facts of her case, and argues it was improper for the attorneys and the trial court to omit any discussion of those facts, and to focus instead on the time limits for discovery, in determining whether her case should be dismissed.
But the statutes governing a party’s discovery obligations are quite clear. Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010 provides in pertinent part that “[m]isuses of the discovery process include . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [f]ailing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery [and] [¶]. . . [¶] [d]isobeying a court order to provide discovery.” In this case, Rosca did both of those things.
And Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 specifically provides that such misconduct, when committed by the plaintiff, may result in the dismissal of her case: “To the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method or any other provision of this title, the court, after notice to any affected party, person, or attorney, and after opportunity for hearing, may impose the following sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process: [¶] . . . [¶] (d) The court may impose a terminating sanction by one of the following orders: [¶] . . . [¶] (3) An order dismissing the action, or any part of the action, of that party.” (Italics added.) That is what the court did here.
Because the statutes specifically empowering the court to dismiss Rosca’s case do not depend upon the merits of her dispute with Colston, she cannot attack that decision by arguing those merits. To succeed on appeal, Rosca had the burden of demonstrating that the court erred in its assessment of the discovery dispute. “A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.” (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) The appellant has the “burden of overcoming this presumption by showing error on an adequate record.” (Stevens v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1645, 1657.) Rosca has failed to sustain that burden in this case.
The judgment is affirmed. Each party is to bear her own costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J., IKOLA, J.