Opinion
FBTCV166059085S
01-30-2018
Federico ROSAS v. Darryl MOSS, et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Anthony D. Truglia, Jr., J.
Facts and Procedural Background
This case involves a three-car, chain-reaction collision. The plaintiff, Federico Rosas, originally brought this action against defendants Darryl Moss and Sekena C. Moss. In his original complaint, the plaintiff alleged the following facts. On September 30, 2014, at approximately 7:38 a.m., the plaintiff was operating his motor vehicle in a northerly direction on Interstate 95 (I-95) in Norwalk. On the same date and time, Darryl Moss was operating a vehicle owned by Sekena C. Moss directly behind the plaintiff’s vehicle on I-95. The Mosses’ motor vehicle struck the rear of the plaintiff’s motor vehicle, causing the plaintiff to suffer injuries and losses as set forth in his complaint.
The plaintiff alleged in his original complaint that the collision was caused by the negligence and carelessness of Darryl Moss in one or more of seven distinct ways, including operating his motor vehicle at excessive speed, given traffic, road and weather conditions in violation of General Statutes § 14-218a, following too closely in violation of General Statutes § 14-240(a), failing to keep his vehicle under control, and failing to apply his brakes properly in order to avoid striking the plaintiff’s vehicle. As a result of the collision, the plaintiff alleges, he sustained " severe, painful, and possibly permanent injuries" and was forced to incur substantial medical expenses as a result of the accident.
General Statutes § 14-218a provides in relevant part: " No person shall operate a motor vehicle upon any public highway of the state ... at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable, having regard to the width, traffic and use of highway, road or parking area, the intersection of streets and weather conditions ... Any speed in excess of such limits, other than speeding as provided for in section 14-219, shall be prima facie evidence that such speed is not reasonable, but the fact that the speed of a vehicle is lower than such limits shall not relieve the operator from the duty to decrease speed when a special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions ..."
General Statutes § 14-240(a) provides: " No driver of a motor vehicle shall follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having regard for the speed of such vehicles, the traffic upon and the condition of the highway and weather conditions."
In the second count of his complaint, the plaintiff re-asserts the allegations of negligence and carelessness by Darryl Moss against Sekena C. Moss, the owner of the vehicle, in accordance with General Statutes § 52-182.
General Statutes § 52-182 provides in relevant part: " Proof that the operator of a motor vehicle ... was the husband, wife, father, mother, son or daughter of the owner shall raise a presumption that such motor vehicle ... was being operated as a family car ... within the scope of a general authority from the owner, and shall impose upon the defendant the burden of rebutting such presumption."
The Mosses filed an answer (entry # 106) on December 5, 2016, in which they admit to the ownership and operation of the motor vehicle that collided with the plaintiff’s vehicle on the day of the accident. The Mosses, however, deny or leave the plaintiff to his proof as to all of the material allegations of negligence against them. The Mosses also filed a special defense in which they allege that, if the plaintiff did sustain injuries and losses as a result of the collision between the two vehicles, his injuries and losses were caused by his own inattentiveness and failure to keep his vehicle under reasonable and proper control.
On February 3, 2017, the Mosses filed a summons and complaint for apportionment in accordance with General Statutes § 52-102b (entry # 111) against Donna Jo Hughes, claiming that Hughes may be liable for all or a portion of the plaintiff’s damages. The plaintiff then filed a timely amended complaint asserting a direct claim against Hughes pursuant to § 52-102b(d) (entry # 113). In his amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges that his injuries and losses were caused by Hughes’ negligence and carelessness in one or more of four ways. The plaintiff alleges that Hughes: (1) failed to keep her motor vehicle under proper control and failed to maintain a lookout for other vehicles; (2) " stopped her motor vehicle suddenly without warning on the travel portion of the highway" ; (3) " exercised no precaution to warn the following traffic by signaling or otherwise that her motor vehicle was slowing down and stopping on the travel portion of the highway" ; and (4) " failed to keep a proper lookout for other vehicle using the highway especially the plaintiff and [the Mosses’] vehicle to her rear."
General Statutes § 52-102b provides in relevant part: " A defendant in any civil action to which section 52-572h applies may serve a writ, summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable pursuant to said section for a proportionate share of the plaintiff’s damages in which case the demand for relief shall seek an apportionment of liability ... The person upon whom the apportionment complaint is served, hereinafter called the apportionment defendant, shall be a party for all purposes ..."
General Statutes § 52-102b(d) provides: " Notwithstanding any applicable statute of limitation or repose, the plaintiff may, within sixty days of the return date of the apportionment complaint served pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, assert any claim against the apportionment defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the original complaint."
The plaintiff was deposed during pretrial discovery in this case. During his deposition, the plaintiff was asked to describe what happened in the moments immediately preceding the accident. He testified as follows:
Q. Tell me how the accident happened. A. The car in front of me stopped and I- and I stopped before, and the car who was coming behind me struck me. Q. Now, had you been driving behind the car in front of you for a period of time before the accident happened? A. Yes. Q. For how long? A. Some minutes, nothing more. Q. Did there come a time that the car in front of you came to a stop before this accident happened? A. Yeah, the traffic stopped. The car stopped and I stopped behind it. * * * * Q. And how fast were you traveling when the car in front of you came to a stop? A. Fifteen miles an hour. Q. Were you surprised when the car in front of you came to a stop? * * * * A. No, because it stops along with the traffic. Q. Were you able to bring your car to a stop after the car in front of you stopped? A. Yes. Q. Were you at a complete stop when you were hit from behind? A. Yes. Q. Did you hit the car in front of you before you were hit from behind? A. No. Q. And how long were you at a stop before you were hit from behind? A. Couple [of] seconds, I believe. Q. And how far were you from the stopped car in front of you when you were hit from behind? Can you estimate in car lengths? A. Maybe 2 feet. * * * * Q. Okay. Did you see [Hughes] do something wrong? A. I only saw her stopping so I stopped behind her. * * * * Q. Okay. Did you see anything that would lead you to believe her stopping was wrong? * * * * A. No, I cannot say anything about that.
Hughes now moves for summary judgment as to the third count of the plaintiff’s amended complaint and as to the Mosses’ apportionment complaint on the ground that there is no evidence to indicate that she did anything that might have contributed to the cause of the collision in which the plaintiff was allegedly injured. Hughes argues that the plaintiff’s sworn deposition testimony establishes that Hughes brought her vehicle to a controlled, full stop in order to avoid traffic ahead of her on the roadway and that the plaintiff then brought his vehicle to a controlled, full stop before being struck from behind, a few seconds later, by the Mosses’ vehicle. Hughes argues that " [t]he opposing parties cannot point to anyway ... that Hughes was negligent" and summary judgment should, therefore, be granted in her favor as to all claims against her.
Hughes also filed an affidavit in support of her motion in which she states that, on the date and time in question, she had " brought [her] vehicle to a complete and controlled stop for traffic ahead." In her affidavit, Hughes also states that she " was at a complete stop for a few seconds, looked in [her] rear view mirror and ... saw [the plaintiff’s vehicle] approaching [her] vehicle from behind." Finally, she states that both her vehicle and the plaintiff’s vehicle " were at a complete stop for a few seconds when the accident occurred."
The plaintiff and the Mosses object to Hughes’ motion for summary judgment. in support, the Mosses offer Darryl Moss’ affidavit, in which he avers that " [j]ust prior to the impact, [he] observed [that the] traffic up ahead had cleared and vehicles proceeded to move forward." He then states that he " observed a vehicle, two cars ahead of me, driven [by] ... Hughes, stop suddenly despite traffic clearing in the lane in front of her vehicle. This caused the [plaintiff] to stop as well." The plaintiff and the Mosses argue that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Hughes acted negligently by bringing her vehicle to a sudden stop in the traveled portion of the roadway when there was apparently no reason for her to do so. If so, they argue, Hughes’ negligence may have contributed to the cause of the accident, and the jury should have the opportunity to apportion liability between the defendants. The plaintiff and the Mosses argue that this issue of fact should be submitted to the jury for their consideration and that Hughes’ motion for summary judgment should be denied.
The court heard argument on the motion on January 8, 2018, and reserved decision on the motion.
Discussion
" Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ... The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried." (Citations omitted.) Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989). " In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ... As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 318, 901 A.2d 1207 (2006). " [I]t is only [o]nce [the] defendant’s burden in establishing his entitlement to summary judgment is met [that] the burden shifts to [the] plaintiff to show that a genuine issue of fact exists justifying a trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 320, 77 A.3d 726 (2013). " In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court’s function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist." Nolan v. Borkowski, 206 Conn. 495, 500, 538 A.2d 1031 (1988).
" As the party moving for summary judgment, the [movant] is required to support its motion with supporting documentation ..." Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756, 796, 653 A.2d 122 (1995); see also Practice Book § 17-45 (" A motion for summary judgment shall be supported by appropriate documents, including but not limited to affidavits, certified transcripts of testimony under oath, disclosures, written admissions and other supporting documents" ). Likewise, " [t]o oppose a motion for summary judgment successfully, the nonmovant must recite specific facts ... which contradict those stated in the movant’s affidavits and documents ... The opposing party to a motion for summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue ... The existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counter-affidavits and concrete evidence." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Walker v. Dept. of Children & Families, 146 Conn.App. 863, 870, 80 A.3d 94 (2013), cert. denied, 311 Conn. 917, 85 A.3d 653 (2014).
The court may consider not only the facts presented by the parties’ affidavits and exhibits, but also the " inferences which could be reasonably and logically drawn from them ..." United Oil Co. v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 381, 260 A.2d 596 (1969). Nevertheless, " [a]lthough the court must view the inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion ... a party may not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Walker v. Dept. of Children & Families, supra, 146 Conn.App. 871. Finally, " [w]hile [a party’s] deposition testimony is not conclusive as a judicial admission; General Statutes § 52-200; it is sufficient to support entry of summary judgment in the absence of contradictory competent affidavits that establish a genuine issue as to a material fact." Collum v. Chapin, 40 Conn.App. 449, 450 n.2, 671 A.2d 1329 (1996).
Hughes relies on the holding of Corsi v. Pascal, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-04-4004535-S (June 13, 2007, Holden, J.). In Corsi, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the driver of the middle vehicle in a multi-car collision. The operator of the middle vehicle submitted an affidavit in support of his motion stating that he was stopped in traffic when the accident occurred. The party opposing the motion for summary judgment failed to introduce any evidence that the middle vehicle was not stationary, or that the middle vehicle was operated in an otherwise negligent manner. The court in Corsi noted that " [i]n the context of multi-car accidents, judges of the [Superior Court] have consistently granted summary judgment where it is undisputed that the middle vehicle was stopped at the time of the accident and the plaintiff fails to submit any evidence that the driver of the middle vehicle operated his car negligently." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., citing Posner v. Jones, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV-04-4000766-S (August 3, 2005, Aurigemma, J.).
In the present case, it is undisputed that the plaintiff brought his vehicle to a stop directly behind Hughes’ car in the moments just before the collision. Hughes offers an affidavit in which she states that she brought her vehicle to a full, controlled stop in the moments just before the collision occurred. The plaintiff’s deposition testimony also conclusively establishes that the plaintiff brought his vehicle to a full and controlled stop directly behind Hughes’ car in the moments just before the collision. Darryl Moss’ affidavit further attests that, prior to the collision, both Hughes and the plaintiff had stopped their respective vehicles. Hughes has, therefore, carried her burden of establishing that she in no way contributed to the collision which allegedly caused injury to the plaintiff and that she would be entitled at trial to a directed verdict in her favor.
The court acknowledges that summary judgment is disfavored in negligence cases, which are highly fact-specific. " Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fogarty v. Rashaw, 193 Conn. 442, 446, 476 A.2d 582 (1984). " [I]f there is room for a reasonable disagreement [as to causation,] the question is one to be determined by the trier as a matter of fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McDermott v. State, 316 Conn. 601, 616, 113 A.3d 419 (2015). Nevertheless, " [a]lthough the issue of causation generally is a question reserved for the trier of fact ... the issue becomes one of law when the mind of a fair and reasonable person could reach only one conclusion, and summary judgment may be granted based on a failure to establish causation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 240 Conn. 300, 307, 692 A.2d 709 (1997).
In the present case, the evidence before the court establishes that Hughes did not cause, and could not have caused, the collision between Mosses’ and the plaintiff’s vehicle. The burden then shifts to the parties opposing summary judgment to show, despite the movant’s proof, that a genuine issue of fact does exist for the trier of fact to determine. See, e.g., Mott v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 139 Conn.App. 618, 626, 57 A.3d 391 (2013) (" On a motion by [the] defendant for summary judgment the burden is on [the] defendant to negate each claim as framed by the complaint ... It necessarily follows that it is only [o]nce [the] defendant’s burden in establishing his entitlement to summary judgment is met [that] the burden shifts to [the] plaintiff to show that a genuine issue of fact exists justifying a trial" ). Even if the court views the inferences drawn from the parties’ evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and co-defendants in this case and assumes that Hughes had " failed to keep her vehicle under proper control and failed to maintain a proper and adequate lookout for other vehicles" on the road- as argued by the plaintiff and the Mosses- the time line in this case is undisputed. The affidavit and deposition testimony before the court conclusively establishes that Hughes brought her vehicle to a full stop and that the plaintiff then came to a full stop behind Hughes’ vehicle; several seconds pass before the collision occurs. Darryl Moss’ affidavit neither addresses nor contradicts these key points. " [T]he ‘genuine issue’ aspect of summary judgment requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred ... A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002). The mere fact that traffic may have started to clear ahead of Hughes’ vehicle- before or after she brought her vehicle to a stop- does not provide any basis for the trier of fact to find that she in some way contributed to the accident. Moss’ affidavit notwithstanding, the undisputed evidence before the court allows no reasonable inference that would permit the trier of fact to find that Hughes acted negligently or proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Hughes’ motion for summary judgment is granted as to the third count of the plaintiff’s amended complaint and as to the Mosses’ apportionment complaint.