Opinion
2014-07-31
Madeline Annie ROSARIO, etc., et al., Plaintiffs–Respondents, v. NEW YORK CITY HEALTH & HOSPITALS CORPORATION, etc., Defendant–Appellant.
Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Dona B. Morris of counsel), for appellant. Fitzgerald & Fitzgerald, P.C., Yonkers (John M. Daly of counsel), for respondents.
Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Dona B. Morris of counsel), for appellant. Fitzgerald & Fitzgerald, P.C., Yonkers (John M. Daly of counsel), for respondents.
GONZALEZ, P.J., TOM, FRIEDMAN, ANDRIAS, SAXE, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Douglas E. McKeon, J.), entered August 27, 2012, which granted plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a late notice of claim as to the infant plaintiff alone, and denied defendant's cross motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Upon consideration of the factors relevant to deciding a motion for leave to file a late notice of claim, we find that the court properly granted plaintiff's motion ( see Matter of Dubowy v. City of New York, 305 A.D.2d 320, 759 N.Y.S.2d 325 [1st Dept.2003];General Municipal Law § 50–e[5] ). Plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their delay is not alone fatal to their motion ( id.). Plaintiffs' expert affidavits show that, from the medical records, defendant had actual knowledge of the facts underlying plaintiffs' theory of a departure from the accepted standard of pediatric care with regard to the diagnosis and treatment of the mother's placental infection and her fetal distress and subsequent self-extubation, and defendant's experts failed to refute this showing ( see Alvarez v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. [North Cent. Bronx Hosp.], 101 A.D.3d 464, 955 N.Y.S.2d 330 [1st Dept.2012]. In contrast to Torres v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. [Lincoln Hosp.], 101 A.D.3d 463, 463, 957 N.Y.S.2d 13 [1st Dept.2012],lv. denied21 N.Y.3d 860, 2013 WL 3198287 [2013] ), relied on by defendant, where “the hospital records [did] not suggest any injury attributable to malpractice,” plaintiffs' experts explained how defendant's failures caused additional injuries to the already compromised infant, who was born at 26 weeks' gestation.
Defendant is not substantially prejudiced by the delay since the operative facts of the claim are contained in the records, and the case will turn primarily on those records, rather than on witnesses' memories ( see e.g. Leeds v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 6 A.D.3d 232, 775 N.Y.S.2d 260 [1st Dept.2004] ).