Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Super. Ct. No. BC 356305, Kenneth R. Freeman, Judge.
Bingham McCutchen, D. Wayne Jeffries and Kristen M. Grace for Defendants and Appellants SuperShuttle Franchise Corporation, SuperShuttle International, Inc., and SuperShuttle Los Angeles, Inc.
No appearance for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
ROTHSCHILD, J.
Defendants moved to compel some but not all plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims. The trial court denied the motion because compelling arbitration of some but not all claims could lead to conflicting rulings on common issues of law or fact. Defendants appeal, and we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In their lawsuit against defendants SuperShuttle Franchise Corporation, SuperShuttle International, Inc., and SuperShuttle Los Angeles, Inc., plaintiffs alleged that they were franchisees of defendants and that defendants terminated them because of their involvement in a labor dispute. Plaintiffs alleged six causes of action against all defendants.
Defendants petitioned to compel arbitration of the claims of nine plaintiffs (hereafter “the arbitration plaintiffs”), arguing that the franchise agreement between the arbitration plaintiffs and SuperShuttle Los Angeles contained an applicable arbitration clause. Defendants conceded that the contracts between defendants and the other plaintiffs did not contain an arbitration clause.
The trial court denied the petition on the ground that if some plaintiffs were to proceed in court and others were to proceed in arbitration, then “there would be a possibility of conflicting rulings.” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2, subd. (c).) Defendants timely appealed from the order denying their petition, which is appealable. (§ 1294, subd. (a).) We review the order for abuse of discretion. (Henry v. Alcove Investment, Inc. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 94, 101.)
All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
DISCUSSION
Subdivision (c) of section 1281.2 provides that a court need not compel arbitration if “[a] party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact . . . .” Under those conditions, “the court (1) may refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement and may order intervention or joinder of all parties in a single action or special proceeding; (2) may order intervention or joinder as to all or only certain issues; (3) may order arbitration among the parties who have agreed to arbitration and stay the pending court action or special proceeding pending the outcome of the arbitration proceeding; or (4) may stay arbitration pending the outcome of the court action or special proceeding.” (§ 1281.2, subd. (c).)
Defendants argue that the trial court’s decision “exceeded the bounds of reason” because there is no possibility of conflicting rulings. Defendants base the latter contention on two separate grounds: (1) Plaintiffs “admitted” that “‘their claims are not identical’” and involve “‘separate facts on issues of liability and damages’”; and (2) the arbitration plaintiffs’ contracts allowed termination only for good cause, whereas the other plaintiffs’ contracts allowed for termination without cause, so the legal and factual issues pertaining to their claims are wholly distinct.
Both grounds lack merit. First, plaintiffs’ alleged “admission” is of no consequence, because plaintiffs’ claims can involve common issues of law or fact even if the claims involve some “separate facts” and are “not identical.” The record contains no admission by plaintiffs that there are no common factual or legal issues.
Second, the record contains no evidence that the arbitration plaintiffs’ contracts allow only termination for cause, or that the other plaintiffs’ contracts allow termination without cause. As for the arbitration plaintiffs, the record contains only the cover page, the signature page, and the page containing the arbitration clause of their contracts. Those pages say nothing about the circumstances under which the contracts can be terminated. As for the other plaintiffs, the record contains not a single page of any of their contracts. Nor does the record contain any declarations or other evidence that fills any of those gaps.
Defendants also argue that the trial court abused its discretion because it could have addressed the problem of potentially inconsistent rulings in another manner, rather than by refusing to compel arbitration (e.g., the court could have compelled arbitration but stayed the arbitration pending judicial resolution of the nonarbitrable claims). Although the option chosen by the trial court—to deny arbitration altogether—is expressly authorized by statute, defendants argue on the basis of three cases that it was an unreasonable choice. None of those cases supports defendants’ position. Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, was decided before the relevant provisions of section 1281.2 were enacted, so it is inapplicable. Independent Assn. of Mailbox Center Owners, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 396, directed the trial court to lift a stay of nonarbitrable claims while the remaining claims proceeded in arbitration; the case does not imply that it is an abuse of discretion to refuse to compel arbitration when the conditions of section 1281.2, subdivision (c), have been satisfied, as they have in this case. In Pioneer Take out Corp. v. Bhavsar (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1353, the trial court refused to compel arbitration on the basis of the possibility of conflicting rulings, because there was a related class action pending in a different court. (Id. at pp. 1355-1356.) But because the court did not combine the two actions—by joinder or consolidation, for example—its order did nothing to address the problem of conflicting rulings. (Id. at pp. 1357-1358.) The Court of Appeal therefore concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion because the trial court’s order did not resolve the court’s own stated concern, while alternative orders would have. (Ibid.) That case is in apposite, because here the trial court’s order did resolve the concern about conflicting rulings: All claims will proceed in litigation in a single action, so the possibility of conflicting rulings will not arise.
Finally, defendants argue that the trial court’s decision conflicts with California’s “strong policies favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements.” We disagree. The trial court concluded that the conditions of section 1281.2, subdivision (c), were met, and defendants have presented no evidence that the court’s conclusion was incorrect. On the basis of that conclusion, the court selected one of the options expressly authorized by statute, namely, refusing to compel arbitration. The option selected by the court resolved the court’s concerns about the possibility of conflicting rulings. We are unaware of any policy favoring arbitration that is so strong as to prohibit trial courts from doing what the Legislature has expressly authorized trial courts to do.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that defendants have not shown that the trial court abused its discretion.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs of appeal.
We concur: MALLANO, Acting P. J., JACKSON, J.
(Judge of the L. A. S.Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)