The right of access is rooted in the common law tradition of open trials. See Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. (Rosado II), 970 A.2d 656, 676 (Conn. 2009). As the Supreme Court described: "[T]he historical evidence demonstrates conclusively that at the time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the defendants rely on the proposition that both constitutional and statutory rights are waivable. E.g., Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 292 Conn. 1, 57, 970 A.2d 656, cert. denied sub nom. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. New York Times Co., ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 500, 175 L.Ed.2d 348 (2009); New Haven v. Local 884, Council 4, AFSCME, AFL–CIO, 237 Conn. 378, 385, 677 A.2d 1350 (1996).

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In both his memorandum in opposition to the intervenors' motion to vacate the sealing order and his subsequent motion for reconsideration, the defendant clearly asserted a claim that the witness list was not a judicial document, as defined by this court in Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 292 Conn. 1, 46–47, 970 A.2d 656, cert. denied sub nom. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. New York Times Co., ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 500, 175 L.Ed.2d 348 (2009). Specifically, in support of that claim, he asserted that “[t]he list is ministerial in nature created by a party to the proceeding to help identify those venire persons who might know someone associated with this case.

Boston Herald, supra at 606, 737 N.E.2d 859, quoting Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., supra at 598, 98 S.Ct. 1306. See Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 292 Conn. 1, 34–35, 970 A.2d 656, cert. denied sub nom. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. New York Times Co., 558 U.S. 991, 130 S.Ct. 500, 175 L.Ed.2d 348 (2009)( Rosado ), citing United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir.1995) (“Public monitoring of the judicial process through open court proceedings and records enhances confidence in the judicial system by ensuring that justice is administered equitably and in accordance with established procedures”).

" (Citations omitted.) Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 292 Conn. 1, 53 n. 34, 970 A.2d 656 (2009), citing United States v. Amodeo, supra, 71 F.3d 1044 (2d Cir. 1995). In Connecticut, Practice Book § 11-20A governs "Sealing Files or Limiting Disclosure of Documents in Civil Cases."

In both his memorandum in opposition to the intervenors' motion to vacate the sealing order and his subsequent motion for reconsideration, the defendant clearly asserted a claim that the witness list was not a judicial document, as defined by this court in Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 292 Conn. 1, 46-47, 970 A.2d 656, cert. denied sub nom. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. New York Times Co., U.S.___, 130 S. Ct. 500, 175 L. Ed. 2d 348 (2009). Specifically, in support of that claim, he asserted that "[t]he list is ministerial in nature created by a party to the proceeding to help identify those venire persons who might know someone associated with this case.

The principles underlying public access, therefore, are inapplicable to such material, and consequently, unfettered access to discovered material not filed with the court never has been the norm.Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 292 Conn. 1, 36, 970 A.2d 656, 677 (2009) (emphases added), cert. denied sub nom., Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. New York Times Co., 558 U.S. 991, 130 S. Ct. 500 (Mem), 175 L. Ed. 2d 348 (2009).

Under a narrower view, discovery material would be "subject to public access (and therefore governed by the rules) when . . . filed with the court and . . . used in some manner by the court 'as a basis for adjudication' of a material controversy." (Id. at pp. 89-90, italics added; see also Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. (2009) 292 Conn. 1, 38-40 (Rosado) [postulating three views: a narrow approach that presumes access only to documents relevant to adjudication of a litigant's "substantive right," a middling approach that presumes access to all documents relevant to a court's adjudicatory function, and a broad approach that presumes access to all documents filed in connection with a pending matter].) The Mercury court also noted "a third potential interpretation," under which discovery material would be subject to access if "the filing party intends that it be used 'as a basis for adjudication' of some matter other than a discovery motion."

Under a narrower view, discovery material would be “subject to public access (and therefore governed by the rules) when ... filed with the court and ... used in some manner by the court ‘as a basis for adjudication’ of a material controversy.” (Id. at pp. 89–90, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 88, italics added; see Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. (2009) 292 Conn. 1, 38–40, (Rosado ) [postulating three views: a narrow approach that presumes access only to documents relevant to adjudication of a litigant's “substantive right,” a middle approach that presumes access to all documents relevant to a court's adjudicatory function, and a broad approach that presumes access to all documents filed in connection with a pending matter].) The Mercury court also noted “a third potential interpretation,” under which discovery material would be subject to access if “the filing party intends that it be used ‘as a basis for adjudication’ of some matter other than a discovery motion.”

Although the plaintiff alluded to a constitutional violation in its motion to reargue the summary judgment motion, the court denied that motion without any comment. The plaintiff never filed a motion for articulation of the court's decision denying the motion to reargue, nor sought articulation of the court's decision granting the motion for summary judgment, which would have been the proper means of seeking a ruling on a constitutional claim that the plaintiff believes was overlooked by the court. See, e.g., Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 292 Conn. 1, 59 n. 38, 970 A.2d 656 (noting appellant's responsibility “to move for an articulation to clarify the basis of the trial court's ruling or to ask for a ruling on any overlooked matter”), cert. denied sub nom. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. New York Times Co., ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 500, 175 L.Ed.2d 348 (2009). As this court repeatedly has stated, we will not review an issue on appeal that was never properly raised in or decided by the trial court.