The court at Trial Term denied alimony to the wife, and the Appellate Division affirmed that determination. Both before and since the enactment of section 236 in 1962 (L. 1962, ch. 313), the courts have held that they possess the power to refuse a wife's application for alimony. (See, e.g., Phillips v. Phillips, 1 A.D.2d 393, 396, affd. 2 N.Y.2d 742, supra; Brownstein v. Brownstein, 25 A.D.2d 205, 209; Rosa v. Rosa, 275 App. Div. 1050; Weis v. Weis, 202 Misc. 101 [per VAN VOORHIS, J.].) In the Phillips case, the court, after noting that times have changed and that women have "`practically unlimited opportunities * * * in the business world of today'", (p. 395), went on to state that, "`in an era where the opportunities for self-support by the wife are so abundant, the fact that the marriage has been brought to an end because of the fault of the husband does not necessarily entitle the wife to be forever supported by a former husband who has little, if any, more economic advantages than she has.' ( Kahn v. Kahn, 78 So.2d 367, 368 [Fla.].) * * * The abiding interest of the State is in the preservation of the family, and in maintaining it as a self-sufficient, independent unit.

After a rather perfunctory, but perhaps adequate, statement to appellant about his right to counsel (cf. Matter of Silvestris v. Silvestris, 24 A.D.2d 247), and his acquiescence to an immediate hearing, the court below proceeded to question the parties. In the course of the short hearing, with all of the questioning done by the court, it became apparent that there might be an issue as to whether the wife had abandoned appellant many years earlier and whether she might thus have forfeited her right to support by him on a means basis (see Levy v. Levy, 22 A.D.2d 794; Rosa v. Rosa, 275 App. Div. 1050). This issue was not explored in depth by the court; and appellant was at no time advised of his right to cross-examine his wife and produce witnesses to rebut her assertions. Under these circumstances, we believe appellant did not get an adequate hearing and "was not accorded his statutory right, granted him by section 433, of an `opportunity to be heard and to present witnesses'" ( Matter of Silvestris v. Silvestris, supra, p. 250).

March 6, 1950. Reargument of an appeal ( Rosa v. Rosa, 275 App. Div. 1050) from an order of the Domestic Relations Court of the City of New York, Family Court Division, County of Kings, directing appellant to pay respondent $7 per week until further order of the court. On reargument, the prior decision of this court is adhered to, and the order of the Family Court is reversed on the law and the facts and the petition dismissed.