Opinion
6265 Index 101297/15
04-12-2018
In re Geraldine ROSA, Petitioner–Respondent, v. NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, Straus Houses, Respondent–Appellant.
David I. Farber, New York (Laura R. Bellrose of counsel), for appellant. Jeanette Zelhof, Mobilization for Justice, Inc., New York (Sandra Gresl of counsel), for respondent.
David I. Farber, New York (Laura R. Bellrose of counsel), for appellant.
Jeanette Zelhof, Mobilization for Justice, Inc., New York (Sandra Gresl of counsel), for respondent.
Sweeny, J.P., Richter, Andrias, Webber, Moulton, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Alice Schlesinger, J.), entered July 22, 2016, annulling the determination of respondent New York City Housing Authority (N.Y.CHA), dated March 9, 2015, which terminated the tenancy of petitioner for criminal drug activity and chronic rent delinquency, and remanding the matter for a new hearing before a different hearing officer solely on the rent delinquency charge, unanimously reversed, on the law, the determination confirmed, the petition denied, and the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 dismissed, without costs.
The IAS court erred in finding that NYCHA's administrative findings were in violation of petitioner's due process rights. First, the IAS court erred in rejecting the arresting officer's testimony because the underlying criminal proceeding against petitioner had been dismissed and sealed. The sealing of a criminal case will not immunize a defendant against all future consequences of the charges, and an administrative tribunal is permitted to consider evidence of the facts leading to those charges when they are independent of the sealed records ( Matter of Skyline Inn Corp. v. New York State Liq. Auth., 44 N.Y.2d 695, 696, 405 N.Y.S.2d 440, 376 N.E.2d 912 [1978] ; Matter of Dockery v. New York City Hous. Auth., 51 A.D.3d 575, 575, 859 N.Y.S.2d 130 [1st Dept. 2008], lv denied 11 N.Y.3d 704, 864 N.Y.S.2d 808, 894 N.E.2d 1199 [2008] ). The IAS court's finding that the officer's testimony was improperly based on sealed records, rather than his independent recollection, was simply not accurate. Regardless, the "reception of erroneously unsealed evidence at [an administrative] hearing does not, without more, require annulment of respondent's determination" ( Matter of Charles Q. v. Constantine, 85 N.Y.2d 571, 575, 626 N.Y.S.2d 992, 650 N.E.2d 839 [1995] ).
The IAS court also improperly rejected the officer's testimony as impermissible hearsay. It is well-settled that hearsay is admissible in administrative proceedings, that it may be the basis for an administrative determination and—if sufficiently relevant and probative—may constitute substantial evidence alone ( People ex rel. Vega v. Smith, 66 N.Y.2d 130, 139, 495 N.Y.S.2d 332, 485 N.E.2d 997 [1985] ; Matter of Cafe´ la China Corp. v. New York State Liq. Auth. 43 A.D.3d 280, 281, 841 N.Y.S.2d 30 [1st Dept. 2007] ). Petitioner did not suffer any due process violation at the hands of NYCHA.
Further, our independent review of the record confirms that NYCHA's administrative findings are supported by substantial evidence (see generally 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 180–181, 408 N.Y.S.2d 54, 379 N.E.2d 1183 [1978] ). The officer's hearsay and nonhearsay testimony, as well as petitioner's own admissions, were more than sufficient to meet this standard ( Cafe´ la China Corp., 43 A.D.3d at 281, 841 N.Y.S.2d 30 ). Regardless, respondent had the discretion to terminate petitioner's tenancy based on her chronic failure to pay rent alone, which was clearly established at the administrativehearing ( Matter of Hairston v. New York City Hous. Auth., 144 A.D.3d 416, 417, 40 N.Y.S.3d 115 [1st Dept. 2016] ).
We have considered the parties' remaining contentions and find them unavailing.