However, it seems to be claiming that the account in question is a "special purpose" account, which is generally not available for set-off by a bank which is a creditor of the owner of the account. Rosa v. Colonial Bank, 207 Conn. 483, 542 A.2d 1112 (1988). The rights of a creditor bank to set-off are, arguably, more circumscribed than the rights of a third party to execute on a bank account because of agreements the bank may have made with its depositor concerning the use of the funds in an account.

The defendant conceded that the account was neither exempt from execution under our statutes; see General Statutes § 52-367b (citing to relevant exemption statutes); nor served a special or limited purpose that might otherwise have protected it from a judgment creditor. See Rosa v. Colonial Bank, 207 Conn. 483, 494-95, 542 A.2d 1112 (1988). The defendant finds support for this position in United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 105 S.Ct. 2919, 86 L.Ed.2d 565 (1985), in which the Internal Revenue Service sought to execute an administrative levy against a joint account.

A purchaser of an instrument as part of a bulk transaction may become a holder in due course unless the transaction was not in the regular course of business of the transferor. See General Statutes § 42a-3-302(c)(ii); cf. Rosa v. Colonial Bank, 207 Conn. 483, 488-89, 542 A.2d 1112 (1988). In the present case, the court found that there was no evidence before it or in the prior case that the transaction by which Cadle acquired the note at issue was other than in the ordinary course of the business of Great Country Bank.

At least two other jurisdictions have considered the provision in the context of a bank merger or consolidation. See First Alabama Bank of Guntersville v. Hunt, 402 So.2d 992, 994 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981); Rosa v. Colonial Bank, 207 Conn. 483, 489-491 (1988). Earlier holdings deal with the effect of bank consolidations on holder in due course status under the pre-UCC negotiable instruments law.

Statements in superseded pleadings may be admissible as evidentiary admissions. Dreier v. Upjohn Co., 196 Conn. 242, 248-49, 492 A.2d 164 (1985); Chomko v. Patmon, 19 Conn. App. 483, 486-87, 563 A.2d 311, cert. denied, 212 Conn. 819, 565 A.2d 539 (1989); see also Rosa v. Colonial Bank, 207 Conn. 483, 492, 542 A.2d 1112 (1988). The opposing party, however, is entitled to an opportunity to explain the circumstances under which the statements were made and the party's knowledge as to the contents of the pleading so that the trier of fact may properly determine the weight to be given the statements in issue.

If he is, the Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Rosa v. Colonial Bank says that money in any account is subject to garnishment unless that account is a special purpose account over which the debtor has " limited dominion and control." 207 Conn. 483, 494, 542 A.2d 1112. While the account at issue isn't a special purpose account limiting Buzzeo's control, Buzzeo isn't a normal debtor and the state is no ordinary creditor.

Even assuming that the defendant could assert the interests of Reisinger, the assertion was nonetheless untimely. Fourth, even if Reisinger had personally asserted the claim within the twenty-day period allowed by § 52-356c, the court would have been compelled to deny it under Rosa v. Colonial Bank, 207 Conn. 483, 494, 542 A.2d 1112 (1988), because there is no evidence that the property was held in a special purpose account or that the defendant had only limited control over the property. Connecticut's trial courts have consistently rejected claims of third parties to property or funds in accounts over which the judgment debtor retained control.

The deposit is usually made with special restrictions or limitations agreed upon between the bank and depositor. See Rosa v. Colonial Bank, 207 Conn. 483, 494 (1988). Nor did the account meet the formalities required of a trust account.

Thus it has been held that a surviving corporation acquires the same rights as the terminating corporation in a merger, including Article 3 rights regarding a promissory note. See Rosa v. Colonial Bank, 207 Conn. 483, 490-91, 452 A.2d 1112 (1988). Under this general rule, Webster Bank acquired the right to enforce the lost $680,000 Note after the merger, and there is nothing in the facts suggesting that any exceptions to this rule are applicable in this case.

An instrument acquired by legal process is not one, ordinarily, subject to the holder in due course insulation from prior claims, presumably because it is not obtained in the ordinary course of business. See Rosa v. Colonial Bank, 207 Conn. 483, 488-89 (1988) (quoting Comment 3 to the Uniform Commercial Code). More particularly, various statutory provisions require delay in the post-judgment procedures, at least partly in order to provide those with a colorable interest in the property the opportunity to protect their interests. For example, the UEFJA prohibits the transfer of the proceeds of an execution until thirty days after notice to the judgment debtor; § 52-605 (c); and, of course, § 52-356c requires a stay of twenty days in which a party with a superior interest may assert its claim. Sonic further argues that it is a transferee pursuant to § 42a-9-332 (b) of the General Statutes and therefore takes without regard to any prior secured interest.