March 12, 1963.James M. Windham, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, of Columbia, for Appellant, cites: As to there being no reorganization,consolidation or merger within the intendmentof the statutes: Black's Law Dictionary, (4th Ed.), 50 Ohio App. 299, 198 N.E. 197; 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Sec. 295; 129 S.C. 480, 124 S.E. 760; 164 S.C. 383, 162 S.E. 444, 81 A.L.R. 722; 295 Ill. App. 193, 14 N.E.2d 872; 182 A. 668, 103 A.L.R. 946. As to theFederal definitions being expanded definitions and are notapplicable here: 99 S.E.2d 377, 231 S.C. 587; 235 S.C. 155, 110 S.E.2d 173; 220 S.C. 171, 66 S.E.2d 698; 315 U.S. 179, 86 L.Ed. 775, 62 S.Ct. 540; 65 App. D.C. 205, 82 F.2d 461; 103 F.2d 359; Anno. 173 A.L.R. 911; 105 F.2d 866, cert. den., 308 U.S. 574, 84 L.Ed. 481, 60 S.Ct. 114; 173 A.L.R. 915; 97 A.L.R. 1359. As to the interpretation of statutesby the agency administering them being entitled to greatweight and should not be overturned without cogent reasonsand unless clearly wrong: 189 S.C. 386, 1 S.E.2d 153. At to interest not being recoverable: 233 S.C. 129, 103 S.E.2d 908. Messrs. Willcox, Hardee, Houck, Palmer O'Farrell, of Florence, and Sinkler, Gibbs Simons, of Charleston, forRespondents, cite: As to Courts looking to the substance,not the form, of the transaction involved: 230 S.C. 357, 95 S.E.2d 628. As to the stock transfers being an incidentof reorganization, consolidation or merger and did not resultin any taxable gain: 13 Am. Jur., Corporations, Sec. 1176; 235 S.C. 155, 110 S.E.2d 173; 103 F.2d 359; Webster's Ne
9; 190 S.C. 392, 3 S.E.2d 38; 234 S.C. 177, 107 S.E.2d 43; 234 S.C. 477, 109 S.E.2d 5; Restatement of the Law, Contracts, Sec. 470; 55 Am. Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, Sec. 95. As to no consequential injury being alleged: 218 S.C. 211, 62 S.E.2d 297; 23 Am. Jur., Fraud and Deceit, Sec. 178; 77 Ark. 261, 92 S.W. 783, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 452. As to parol statements being subject to exclusion: 261 S.C. 280, 57 S.E.2d 470. As to the orderoverruling the demurrer herein being appealable, and it isappropriate for the court, in reviewing that order, to considerall matters involved in the appeal: 216 S.C. 500, 59 S.E.2d 132; 231 S.C. 288, 98 S.E.2d 530; 233 S.C. 424, 105 S.E.2d 521. Messrs. James P. Mozingo, III, Benny R. Greer and Archie L. Chandler, of Darlington, and Edward E. Saleeby, of Hartsville, for Respondent, cite: As to trial Judge not erringin holding that the complaint states a cause of action,and in overruling the demurrer and denying the motion tostrike: 236 S.C. 272, 113 S.E.2d 817; 231 S.C. 587, 99 S.E.2d 377; 55 Am. Jur. 560; 55 Am. Jur. 563, par. 88; 23 Am. Jur. 857, par. 80; 23 Am. Jur. 870, par. 93, Sec. C.; 50 S.C. 397, 27 S.E. 873; 141 S.C. 98, 139 S.E. 190; 225 S.C. 303, 82 S.E.2d 123; 223 S.C. 477, 76 S.E.2d 671. August 4, 1960.
Messrs. Wm. H. Smith, Jr., and John L. McGowan, of Florence, for Appellant, cite: As to error on part of TrialJudge in holding the allegations of mutual mistake in thecomplaint constituted nothing more than conclusions of factwhich were not admitted by the demurrer: (S.C.) 99 S.E.2d 377; (S.C.) 98 S.E.2d 263; 82 S.E.2d 454, 225 S.C. 354; 76 C.J.S. 645, 646, 647; 53 C.J. 111, 112; 132 App. Div. 553, 116 N.Y.S. 975; 132 S.E. 616, 134 S.C. 324. As to error on part of Trial Judge in holdingthat the mistake was not a mutual mistake of fact in thesettlement: 76 C.J.S., 645, 646, 647; 132 S.E. 616, 134 S.C. 324. Messrs. Willcox, Hardee, Houck Palmer, of Florence, for Respondents, cite: As to the release being binding: 91 S.C. 332, 74 S.E. 750; 76 C.J.S. 645, Sec. 25; 76 C.J.S. 699, Sec. 52.
remaining after sale of the mortgagedpremises: South Carolina Code, Section 52-25, Section 52-25, Section 52-26 and 52-27; 3 SCLQ 405; 125 S.C. 303, 118 S.E. 613, 29 A.L.R. 43; 2 DeSaussuer's Equity 148; 26 S.C. 136, 1 S.E. 502, 4 Am. St. Rep. 687; Mechem, Partnership, § 308; Crane, Partnership, § 58; 68 C.J.S. 634; Dudley's Equity 85, 113 (S.C. 1837); § 7800, S.C. Code (1942); 6 Stat. 579 (1837); R.S. 840; 2 McCord's Law 312, 13 Am. Dec. S.E. 324; 12 Richardson's Law 600; Riley's Equity 181 (S.C. 1837); 129 S.C. 127, 123 S.E. 776. Messrs. Nexsen, Pruet, Jacobs Pollard, of Columbia, for Respondents-Appellants, cite: As to the Trial Court'snot having erred in finding that the interest charged byPlaintiffs was not usurious: Section 8-3, S.C. Code of Laws, (1969 Amendment); Act No. 234, p. 253, Acts and Joint Resolutions, South Carolina, 1969; 99 S.C. 218, 82 S.E. 1048; 277 S.C. 168, 87 S.E.2d 583; 244 S.C. 152, 135 S.E.2d 841; 244 S.C. 152, 135 S.E.2d 841; 226 S.C. 108, 83 S.E.2d 713; 231 S.C. 587, 99 S.E.2d 377; 240 S.C. 318, 125 S.E.2d 639; 193 Miss. 432, 9 So.2d 638; 31 C.J.S., Evidence, Section 9; 49 S.C. 345, 26 S.E. 990, 29 S.E. 203; 83 S.C. 521, 65 S.E. 739. As to the Circuit Judge's properly finding thatPlaintiffs are not entitled to a joint judgment against all ofthe partners of the Defendant Convention Motor Inns inthe full amount of any deficiency remaining after sale of themortgaged premises: 129 S.C. 127, 123 S.E. 776. February 22, 1977.
Messrs. Daniel R. McLeod, Atty. Gen., Joe I. Allen, Jr. and G. Lewis Argoe, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., of Columbia, for Respondent, cite: As to the action herein being oneagainst the State to which the State has not consented: 253 S.C. 76, 169 S.E.2d 148; 178 S.C. 1, 182 S.E. 93; 149 S.C. 219, 146 S.E. 879; 17 .S C.D., States, Key 191 (2); 231 S.C. 587, 99 S.E.2d 377; 15 S.C.D., Pleadings, Key 214; 155 S.C. 77, 151 S.E. 887; 181 S.C. 453, 187 S.E. 921; 238 S.C. 580, 121 S.E.2d 221; 17 S.C.D., States, Key 191 (1.15); Act No. 624, 48 Statutes At Large 1541; 112 S.C. 67, 98 S.E. 853; 186 S.C. 337, 195 S.E. 840; 17 S.C.D., Statutes, Key 212.4; 17 S.C.D., States, Key 191, et seq.; Section 65-2655, 1962 Code of Laws; Article 1 of Chapter 21 of the 1962 Code; 191 S.C. 19, 3 S.E.2d 686, 701; 207 S.C. 291, 35 S.E.2d 701; 30 S.C. 519, 9 S.E. 686, 3 L.R.A. 841; 15 S.C. 322; 243 S.C. 82, 132 S.E.2d 169; 178 S.C. 1, 182 S.E. 92; 193 S.C. 378, 8 S.E.2d 908; 177 S.C. 240; 181 S.E. 41; 15 S.C.D., Pleadings, Key 72; Act No. 355, Acts of 1963, Sec. 4; Act No. 938, Acts of 1970.
Messrs. Daniel R. McLeod, Atty. Gen., Joe L. Allen, Jr., and G. Lewis Argoe, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., of Columbia, for Appellants, cite: As to Sections 65-681 and 65-690 ofthe South Carolina Code of Laws requiring Respondent topay documentary stamp taxes upon the powers of attorneytaken in connection with the financing of insurance premiums: Act No. 206 of the 1967 Acts of South Carolina; South Carolina Code of Laws for 1962, as amended, Sections 37-1301 through 37-1314; 217 S.C. 407, 60 S.E.2d 851; 44 F.2d 64; 244 S.C. 380, 137 S.E.2d 267; 57 F.2d 811; 17 Wall. 486, 21 L.Ed. 728; 217 S.C. 354, 60 S.E.2d 682; 26 U.S.C. § 3480; 26 U.S.C. § 4384; 110 F. Supp. 945; 231 S.C. 587 cert. denied, 78 S.Ct. 342, 355 U.S. 913, 2 L.Ed. 274; 225 S.C. 341, 82 S.E.2d 465; 283 U.S. 376, 51 S.Ct. 515, 75 L.Ed. 1126; 44 F.2d 64; 217 S.C. 407, 60 S.E.2d 851; 244 S.C. 380, 137 S.E.2d 267; 236 S.C. 2, 112 S.E.2d 716, rev. in 365 U.S. 517, 81 S.Ct. 719, 5 L.Ed.2d 749. Harry M. Lightsey, Jr., Esq., of Columbia, for Respondent, cites: As to a power of attorney documentary stamptax not being properly due on the instrument involved inthis case: Article 2, Chapter 11, Title 65, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962; 44 F.2d 64; 217 S.C. 407, 60 S.E.2d 851, 853; 17 Wall 496, 21 L.Ed. 728; 244 S.C. 380, 137 S.E.2d 267; 84 C.J.S. Taxation, Section 41; 229 N.C. 599, 51 S.E.2d 1; Sec. 37-1312 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962, as amended. As to a power of attorney documentary stamp tax if dueon the instrument not being chargeable to the Respondent: 217 S.C. 407, 60 S.E.2d 851; 44 F.2d 64; 233 S.C. 43, 103 S.E.2d 424; Sec. 65-1407, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962.
42, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962 (Cum. Supp.); Section 3 of Act No. 1574 of 1972; Section 2 of Act 1574 (Section 23-449.1); 256 S.C. 21, 180 S.E.2d 638; 213 S.C. 254, 49 S.E.2d 12; 20 S.C. 190. As to construing Section 23-449.1, the interpretationof that section by the Attorney General should besustained under the rule of executive construction: 215 S.C. 224, 54 S.E.2d 791; 245 S.C. 472, 141 S.E.2d 135; 242 S.C. 98, 130 S.E.2d 72; 242 S.C. 237, 130 S.E.2d 573; 231 S.C. 587, 99 S.E.2d 377; 225 S.C. 341, 82 S.E.2d 465. As to the interpretation of Section23-449.41 urged by the Plaintiff satisfying the requirementsof the United States Constitution: 400 U.S. 112, 91 S. Ct. 260, 27 L.Ed.2d 272; 360 U.S. 45, 79 S.Ct. 985; 3 L.Ed.2d 1072; 321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987, reh. denied, 322 U.S. 769, 64 S.Ct. 1052, 88 L.Ed. 1594; 394 U.S. 802, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 22 L.Ed.2d 739; 225 La. 166, 72 So.2d 465, appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 804, 75 S.Ct. 46, 99 L.Ed. 635. Laughlin McDonald, Esq., of Columbia, for Defendants, cites: As to declaratory judgment being entered, if at all, forDefendants: 1948 Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act; 183 S.C. 337, 191 S.E. 76; 224 S.C. 138, 77 S.E.2d 485; Section 10-2003, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962, as amended; The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, 1 S.C.L.Q. 58 (1948), Judge Lenneau B. Lide; Section 10-2013, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962, as amended; Section 10-2007, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962, as amended; 216 S.C. 1,
Daniel R. McLeod, Atty. Gen., and Glen E.Craig, of Columbia, for Appellant-Respondent, cite: As tothe Bowaters bonds not being eligible investments underitem (b) of Section 37-123 of the Code: 254 S.C. 286, 175 S.E.2d 203; Code Sections 37-123 and 37-125; 248 S.C. 218, 149 S.E.2d 433; 17 F. Supp. 803, 807; 92 S.C. 393, 401, 75 S.E. 866; 141 S.C. 207, 139 S.E. 386, 392; 82 C.J.S., Statutes, Section 347b, page 722; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, Sec. 367, page 371; 83 S.C. 418, 65 S.E. 433; 244 S.C. 308, 136 S.E.2d 778, 782; 86 S.C. 419, 68 S.E. 561, 562; 216 S.C. 334, 58 S.E.2d 83, 88. Walter J. Bristow, Jr., Esq., of Marchant, Bristow Bates, Columbia, for Respondent-Appellant, cites: As to theBowaters bonds being eligible investments under item (b)of Section 37-123 of the Code: Sec. 27-122 of the S.C. Code of 1962; 254 S.C. 286, 175 S.E.2d 203; 242 S.C. 98, 170 S.E.2d 72; 231 S.C. 587, 99 S.E.2d 377; 242 S.C. 9, 129 S.E.2d 736, 738; 107 S.C. 310, 92 S.E. 1036. As to the Nelson loan being an eligible investmentunder item (b) of Section 37-123 of the Code: 102 F.2d 125; 127 Mo. 85, 29 S.W. 990, 27 L.R.A. 653, 658; 225 Or. 439, 358 P.2d 239, 254; 12 Col. Rptr. 235, 236, 190 C.A.2d 554; 37 Ind. 122; 53 F. Supp. 659; 35 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 264 App. Div. 546; 102 F.2d 125; 127 Mo. 85, 29 S.W. 990, 27 L.R.A. 653, 658; 37 Ind. 122; 12 Colo. App. 334, 56 P. 981; 254 S.C. 286, 175 S.E.2d 203. Messrs. Daniel R. McLeod, Atty. Gen., and Glen E.Craig, of Columbia, for Appellant-Respondent, in Reply, cite: As to the Bowaters bonds not being eligible investmentsunder item (b) of Sec. 37-123 of the Code: Senate Bill 119 — Act No. 1129 of 1968. As to the Nelson loan not beingeligible investments under item (b) of Sec. 37-123 of theCode: 251 S.C. 600, 164 S.E.2d 753, 755; 83 C.J.S., Stipulations, Sec. 25b, p. 67.
November 1, 1971.Colden R. Battey, Jr., Esq., of Harvey, Harvey Battey, Beaufort, for Plaintiff-Appellant, cites: As to a release of aclaim for personal injuries being avoided or set aside on thegrounds that the release was given and taken under a mutualmistake of fact as to the nature or extent of the Claimant'sinjuries: 231 S.C. 587, 99 S.E.2d 377; 78 S.Ct. 342, 355 U.S. 913; 2 L.Ed.2d 274; 233 S.C. 75, 103 S.E.2d 521; 245 S.C. 331, 140 S.E.2d 582; 178 S.E.2d 255; 237 S.C. 121, 115 S.E.2d 799; 12 Am. Jur. Contracts, Section 125, S.C. 226, 53 Am. Rep. 669; 233 S.C. 545, 106 S.E.2d 385; 71 A.L.R.2d 82; 199 Va. 243, 99 S.E.2d 721; 91 S.C. 332, 74 S.E. 750; 233 S.C. 545, 106 S.E.2d 385; 2, 153 F.2d 157, 164 A.L.R. 387; App.2d 171, 145 N.E.2d 802, 71 A.L.R.2d 77; 350 Mich., 332, 86 N.W.2d 1957; 24 N.Y.2d 556; 202 Minn. 165, 278 N.W. 355; 299 N.Y. 618, 271 App. Div. 222 Affd.; 25 App. Div.2d (N.Y.) 751; 19 Buffalo L. Rev. 425; 103 F.2d 437; 308 U.S. 560, 84 L.Ed. 471, 60 S.Ct. 106; 113 F.2d 830; 311 U.S. 705, 85 L.Ed. 458, 61 S.Ct. 171; 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537; 151 So.2d 725; 236 Wis. 283, 294 N.W. 828; 107 F.2d 377; 78 F.2d 497; 118 Utah 20, 218 P.2d 685; 118 Utah 41, 233 P.2d 699; 107 So.2d 272; 41 F.2d 617; 121 F.2d 336; 314 U.S. 684, 86 L.Ed. 547, 62 S.Ct. 188; 226 Iowa 137, 284 N.W. 73.
Daniel R. McLeod, Attorney General, and GlenE. Craig, of Columbia, for Appellant, cite: As to whatamount of reserve should be used for a particular year: (Tex.) 401 S.W.2d 369; 249 S.C. 337, 154 S.E.2d 261; 244 S.C. 192, 136 S.E.2d 261; (N.C.) 144 S.E.2d 821; 248 S.C. 334, 149 S.E.2d 777; 252 S.C. 484, 167 S.E.2d 311; 116 F.2d 1008; 231 S.C. 587, 99 S.E.2d 377; 200 S.C. 127, 20 S.E.2d 645; 168 S.C. 84, 167 S.E. 12. As to what value ofreal estate should be used for a particular year: 200 S.C. 363, 20 S.E.2d 813; 186 S.C. 337, 195 S.E. 840; 177 S.C. 240, 181 S.E. 41.