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Rood v. Sec'y of CDCR

United States District Court, Eastern District of California
Nov 5, 2024
1:22-cv-00449-SAB (PC) (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2024)

Opinion

1:22-cv-00449-SAB (PC)

11-05-2024

COLTON JAMES ROOD, Plaintiff, v. SECRETARY OF CDCR, et al., Defendants.


ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL, WITHOUT PREJUDICE (ECF No. 66)

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel, filed November 1, 2024. Plaintiff seeks appointment of counsel because of his incarceration, lack of access to legal resources, complexity of the case, merits of the case, upcoming settlement conference and lack of prejudice to Defendants. (ECF No. 66.)

Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in this action, Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), and the court cannot require any attorney to represent plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). However, in certain exceptional circumstances the court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to section 1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525.

Without a reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the court will seek volunteer counsel only in the most serious and exceptional cases. In determining whether “exceptional circumstances exist, the district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success on the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In the present case, the Court does not find the required exceptional circumstances. Even if it assumed that Plaintiff is not well versed in the law and that he has made serious allegations which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, his case is not exceptional. The Court is faced with similar cases almost daily. While the Court recognizes that Plaintiff is at a disadvantage due to his pro se status and his incarceration, the test is not whether Plaintiff would benefit from the appointment of counsel. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Most actions require development of further facts during litigation and a pro se litigant will seldom be in a position to investigate easily the facts necessary to support the case.”) The test is whether exception circumstances exist and here, they do not. Further, although the Court has found that Plaintiff's complaint states cognizable claims, at this juncture, the Court cannot determine the likelihood of success on the merits of Plaintiff's claims. The likelihood of success on the merits determination is not the same as that required at screening. In addition, the Court does not find Plaintiff's claims of deliberate indifference to safety and retaliation to be complex. Moreover, Plaintiff's incarceration status is an exception circumstance to warrant appointment of counsel. Robinson v. Cryer, No. 1:20-cv-00622-HBK (PC), 2021 WL 9541411, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2021) (“Although Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and is incarcerated, he faces the same obstacles all pro se prisoners face”); Callender v. Ramm, No. 2:16-cv-0694 JAM AC P, 2018 WL 6448536, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018) (“The law is clear: neither plaintiff's indigence, nor his lack of education, nor his lack of legal expertise warrant the appointment of counsel”). Lastly, the fact that Plaintiff wishes to be represented by counsel at the upcoming settlement conference, the fact that an attorney may be better able to perform research, investigate, and represent Plaintiff during discovery and at trial does not amount to an exceptional circumstance. Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (finding no abuse of discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) when district court denied appointment of counsel despite fact that pro se prisoner “may well have fared better-particularly in the realm of discovery and the securing of expert testimony”); Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986) (same); Courtney v. Kandel, No. 2:18-CV-2052-KJM-DMC-P, 2020 WL 1432991, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2020) (challenges conducting discovery and preparing for trial “are ordinary for prisoners pursuing civil rights claim” and cannot form the basis for appointment of counsel); Ricks v. Austria, No. 1:15-cv-01147-BAM (PC), 2016 WL 1734326, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2016) (while a pro se litigant may be better served with the assistance of counsel were the case to proceed to trial, the court need not appoint counsel if plaintiff can articulate his claims and exceptional circumstances do not exist); Thornton v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10CV01583 BTM RBB, 2011 WL 90320, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2011) (explaining that “[f]actual disputes and anticipated cross-examination of witnesses do not indicate the presence of complex legal issues warranting a finding of exceptional circumstances”). Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for the appointment of counsel is denied, without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Rood v. Sec'y of CDCR

United States District Court, Eastern District of California
Nov 5, 2024
1:22-cv-00449-SAB (PC) (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2024)
Case details for

Rood v. Sec'y of CDCR

Case Details

Full title:COLTON JAMES ROOD, Plaintiff, v. SECRETARY OF CDCR, et al., Defendants.

Court:United States District Court, Eastern District of California

Date published: Nov 5, 2024

Citations

1:22-cv-00449-SAB (PC) (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2024)