Opinion
H023833.
7-2-2003
DEBORAH ROMO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RICHARD A. ROMO, Defendant and Respondent.
The Santa Clara County appeals from the trial courts order requiring it to adjust the amount due on a renewed child support judgment so as to eliminate interest on the portion of the renewed judgment that constituted accrued interest on child support arrears. We conclude that interest properly accrues on the full amount of a renewed judgment, so we reverse the trial courts order.
I. Background
In November 1975, a judgment was entered ordering defendant to pay $ 75 per month to plaintiff for the support of his son, who was then three years old, plus $ 47.50 to reimburse the cost of filing fees. Because his son was receiving "welfare aid" from the County, plaintiffs right to these child support payments was assigned to the County. In November 1982, the County renewed the child support judgment. At that time, the accrued arrears and interest totalled $ 15,627.36. The portion of this amount attributable to principal was $ 5508.50; the remainder was accrued interest. No further support payments were due after the renewal of the judgment, so no arrears accrued thereafter. However, interest continued to accrue.
Defendant resided in state prison from September 1989 to February 1999. When he was released from prison, he was unable to obtain a drivers license due to his failure to pay the judgment. The court permitted him to obtain his drivers license if he paid $ 175 per month toward the renewed judgment.
In August 2001, defendant sought a determination that the County had incorrectly added to the amount he owed accrued interest on the entire amount of the 1982 judgment rather than limiting interest to the principal portion of the renewed judgment. The County maintained that the applicable statutes permitted the accrual of interest on the entire amount of the 1982 renewed judgment, including both principal and interest. The trial court agreed with defendant and ordered the County to adjust the amount due on the renewed judgment to eliminate any interest on the interest portion of the renewed judgment. The County filed a timely notice of appeal.
Defendant attempts to challenge other aspects of the renewed judgment in his respondents brief on appeal. Since he has not appealed, we do not address these contentions.
The County cites to a reporters transcript that is not part of the appellate record. As the County bore the burden of providing us with the appellate record, we refuse to consider any portion of the Countys brief that relies on a transcript that we do not have.
II. Analysis
"In the case of a money judgment payable in installments not previously renewed, the amount of the judgment as renewed is the total of the past due installments, the costs added to the judgment pursuant to Section 685.090, and the accrued interest, which remains unsatisfied and is enforceable on the date of the filing of the application for renewal and includes the fee for the filing of the application for renewal." (Code Civ. Proc., § 683.150, subd. (c), emphasis added.) "Interest accrues at the rate of 10 percent per annum on the principal amount of a money judgment remaining unsatisfied." (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.010, subd. (a).) "Principal amount of the judgment means the total amount of the judgment as entered or as last renewed . . . ." (Code Civ. Proc., § 680.300, emphasis added.) "The amount required to satisfy a money judgment is the total amount of the judgment as entered or renewed with . . . the addition of interest added to the judgment as it accrues pursuant to Sections 685.010 to 685.030, inclusive." (Code Civ. Proc., § 695.210, subd. (b).)
As these statutes indicate, the renewal of a judgment converts the accrued interest into an indivisible part of the principal amount of the renewed judgment, and that entire amount bears interest from the date of the renewal. Consequently, the County was correct in accruing interest on the entire amount of the 1982 renewed judgment rather than excluding interest on the portion of the renewed judgment that was attributable to accrued interest.
The only cases that address the issue agree with the Countys interpretation of the relevant statutes. "The general rule is that there is no compounding of interest in the absence of specific statutory authority." (Westbrook v. Fairchild (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 889, 894.) "The only exception to the rule that interest on interest (i.e. compound interest) may not be recovered is in situations in which interest is included in a judgment which then bears interest at the legal rate. One common situation occurs when a judgment is renewed. At that time, accrued interest is included in the new judgment, and the new judgment bears interest at the legal rate." (Id. at pp. 894-895, citation omitted.)
"Accrued child support arrearages are treated like a money judgment. Generally, a money judgment is enforceable for 10 years after entry, but the enforcement period may be extended by renewal of the judgment. A judgment for child support is exempt from the renewal requirement. It is enforceable until paid in full, even after the child reaches 18 years. [P] Though unnecessary, renewal of a child support judgment is of economic benefit to the judgment creditor. When an installment money judgment is renewed, the amount of the lump-sum renewed judgment includes past due installments, costs, and accrued interest. Thus, renewal allows for compounding of interest." (In re Marriage of Thompson (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1057, citations omitted, emphasis added.)
Since the Countys position is supported by the applicable statutes, the trial court erred in requiring the County to recalculate the amount due on the 1982 renewed judgment.
III. Disposition
The order is reversed.
WE CONCUR: Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J., and Wunderlich, J.