In its answer, Fayette County did not allege that the State was wholly or partly responsible for Claimants' injuries. Rather, the County denied the allegations in the complaint and asserted that it could not be liable for any injuries resulting from the allegedly negligent maintenance or placement of the stop sign, intersection, or highway because that property was in control of the State. Asserting that another party controls the instrumentality of a plaintiff's injuries is not the same as claiming that another party caused a plaintiff's injuries. Claimants further contend that their case is analogous to Romine v. Fernandez, 124 S.W.3d 599 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2003). In Romine, plaintiff patient alleged that defendant physician, Dr. Morris and the associated hospital were guilty of negligence in the care of plaintiff and in the administration of the drug Toradol. 124 S.W.3d at 601.

(emphasis added)); Moreno, 479 S.W.3d at 806 (citing Becker, 431 S.W.3d at 592 ); Townes, 50 S.W.3d at 451, 453-54 ("In light of the statute's purpose ... we have determined that it is remedial and should be construed liberally ... [and] to enable plaintiffs to have their claims adjudicated on the merits." (emphasis added)); Romine v. Fernandez, 124 S.W.3d 599, 604 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) ("[T]his statute is not to be construed narrowly, but should be construed liberally. " (emphasis added)), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2003); Swearengen v. DMC-Memphis, Inc., 488 S.W.3d 774, 780 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) ("[T]he statute is to be construed to afford an injured party a ‘fair opportunity to bring before the court all persons who caused or contributed to the party's injuries.’ "

However, a plaintiff should not be denied an opportunity to recover against that potential tortfeasor simply because a defendant's answer did not follow a precise legal formula. See Romine v. Fernandez, 124 S.W.3d 599, 604-05 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a defendant who gave plaintiff sufficient notice of a nonparty tortfeasor had raised the defense of comparative fault even though he did not explicitly allege the fault of the nonparties). Moreover, under Rule 8.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may successfully raise the defense of comparative fault by "set[ting] forth affirmatively facts in short and plain terms relied upon to constitute ... comparative fault (including the identity or description of any other alleged tortfeasors)."

At this hearing, SMS argued first that, because the Airport Authority had denied in its answer that it controlled and maintained the part of the airport in which Shaffer fell and had also asserted comparative fault as an affirmative defense in its answer, the answer triggered the 90-day statutory period under Section 20-1-119 for Shaffer to amend her complaint to assert claims against an additional tortfeasor. Questioned about whether the Section 20-1-119 grace period was triggered by an answer that did not identify a specific person or entity in its assertion of comparative fault, SMS cited Romine v. Fernandez, 124 S.W.3d 599 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), for the proposition that, in light of available discovery tools, a defendant does not have to specifically name an additional alleged tortfeasor if its answer provides reasonable notice. In response, Shaffer argued that, under Rule 8.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, the Airport Authority did not perfect the affirmative defense of comparative fault until it disclosed the identity of SMS in its interrogatory response.

Wagner cites a case in which the Tennessee Court of Appeals sanctioned the application of Section 20–1–119 in adding two new defendants to an action, despite the fact that the original defendant “did not specifically state their names.” See Romine v. Fernandez, 124 S.W.3d 599, 604–05 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003). In Romine, a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff initially named only one physician as a defendant, alleging, among other things, negligent administration of a drug.

In Romine v. Fernandez, 124 S.W.3d 599, 600-601 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2003), the Romines sued Dr. John Morris alleging that following knee surgery on Mr. Romine, Dr. Morris negligently prescribed a drug known as Toradol, which resulted in Mr. Romine needing additional surgery for the peritonitis and perforated duodenal ulcer caused by the Toradol. On November 24, 1999, Dr. Morris filed a timely answer to the Romines' complaint stating that Mr. Romine was "administered Toradol . . . but not at Dr. Morris' order" and that "Dr. Morris has no knowledge of any act of medical negligence committed by any other defendant or third party in the care and treatment of the plaintiff . . .

In this Court, Dr. Flora argues that his answer satisfied his obligations under Rule 8.03, citing Bidwell ex rel. Bidwell v. Strait , 618 S.W.3d 309 (Tenn. 2021) and Romine v. Fernandez , 124 S.W.3d 599 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). He points to passages in his answer that include generic references to comparative fault and an independent intervening cause, and a later response to an interrogatory in which he associated Mr. Crotty's alleged injury with his subsequent treatment.

We have previously described this statute as providing a “grace period” in which a plaintiff may add a defendant to a lawsuit when the applicable statute of limitations has expired. Romine v. Fernandez, 124 S.W.3d 599, 603 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003).In this case, we begin our analysis by considering whether DMC's original answer triggered the running of the ninety (90) day grace period.

The Court further noted that the determination of whether comparative fault is an issue "cannot turn on the presence or absence of such precise language" and Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 applies "whenever a defendant's answer gives a plaintiff notice of the identity of a potential nonparty tortfeasor and alleges facts that reasonably support a conclusion that the nonparty caused or contributed to the plaintiff's injury." Id. at 357-58 (citing Romine v. Fernandez, 124 S.W.3d 599, 604-05 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2003) (holding that a defendant who gave plaintiff sufficient notice of a nonparty tortfeasor had raised the defense of comparative fault even though he did not explicitly allege the fault of the nonparties)). Based upon the foregoing principles, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court and this court, concluding that the statute was triggered when Fayette County alleged in its answer that the stop sign "is in the right of way of the State of Tennessee [and] under the control of the State of Tennessee" and that the State is responsible for the "maintenance of the roadway at or near the intersection of Mt. Pleasant Road and Highway 57."

Based on this rule, commentators have stated that our rules “do not permit ... a party to recover money damages in excess of the amount sought in the ad damnum of the complaint.” Romine v. Fernandez, 124 S.W.3d 599, 605 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Robert Banks, Jr. & June F. Entman, Tennessee Civil Procedure § 5-4(c) (1999)); see also Cross v. City of Morristown, No. O3A01-9606-CV-00211, 1996 WL 605248, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 1996) (“A judgment that exceeds the ad damnum clause is invalid.” (citing Gaylor v. Miller, 166 Tenn. 45, 59 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Tenn. 1933))).