Opinion
3D24-0507
07-24-2024
Giselle Romero and Wachovia Middlebrooks, Petitioners, v. Sherea Green, Director, Miami-Dade Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and The State of Florida, Respondents.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and John Eddy Morrison, Assistant Public Defender, for petitioners. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Christina L. Dominguez, Assistant Attorney General, and Jeffrey P. DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General (Tallahassee), and Darrick W. Monson, Assistant Solicitor General (Tallahassee), for respondent, the State of Florida.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
A Case of Original Jurisdiction - Habeas Corpus. Lower Tribunal Nos. M24-5869, M24-5873
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and John Eddy Morrison, Assistant Public Defender, for petitioners.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Christina L. Dominguez, Assistant Attorney General, and Jeffrey P. DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General (Tallahassee), and Darrick W. Monson, Assistant Solicitor General (Tallahassee), for respondent, the State of Florida.
Before LOGUE, C.J., and EMAS and LINDSEY, JJ.
EMAS, J.
INTRODUCTION
Section 907.041(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2024) prohibits a judge, at a first appearance hearing, from granting nonmonetary release to a person arrested for certain enumerated crimes, including a charge of misdemeanor domestic violence.
The Florida Supreme Court, in State v. Raymond, 906 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 2005), declared the then-current version of that statute unconstitutional, holding the statutory provision was procedural, conflicted with existing Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.131 and 3.132, and violated separation of powers principles by infringing on the exclusive rulemaking authority of the Florida Supreme Court.
Eighteen years after Raymond, the Florida Legislature amended section 907.041(5)(b), and that amended statute became effective January 1, 2024. In this habeas corpus proceeding, petitioners contend that the 2024 version remains constitutionally infirm under Raymond. We agree, and for the reasons that follow, grant the petition and hold that section 907.041(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2024), infringes upon the exclusive rulemaking authority of the Florida Supreme Court and remains "an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers in Article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution." Id. at 1052.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Petitioners Giselle Romero and Wachovia Middlebrooks were each arrested, in separate incidents, for misdemeanor domestic violence. At their first appearance hearings, the judge, relying upon section 907.041(5)(b), announced that neither Petitioner would be eligible for pretrial release on nonmonetary conditions. Petitioners objected to this, contending the statute was unconstitutional. The trial court imposed a monetary bond amount of $1000 for each Petitioner. The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus followed.
JURISDICTION AND THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE
Before discussing the merits, we address whether this court's jurisdiction is mooted by events occurring after the petition was filed.
When the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed with this court, each Petitioner remained in custody. However, during the pendency of this proceeding, each Petitioner was released from custody. The dissenting opinion contends that, given Petitioners' release from custody, we should dismiss this petition as moot.
We agree with the dissenting opinion's proposition that, as a general rule, once a person is no longer in custody, a pending petition for writ of habeas corpus is rendered moot. See Hernandez v. State, 49 Fla.L.Weekly D324, 2024 WL 463827, at *1 (Fla. 3d DCA February 7, 2024) ("It is well-settled that a petitioner seeking relief in habeas corpus must demonstrate he or she is in custody.") (citing Lambertson v. State, 479 So.2d 773, 774 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) ("A petitioner who is not in custody is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus."))
And if this was the first petition challenging the constitutionality of section 907.041(5)(b) on this ground, we would agree that the change in Petitioners' custodial status should warrant dismissing the petition as moot. But this is not the first such petition. This is the fourth petition filed in this court in 2024 raising the identical issue (constitutionality of section 907.041(5)(b)) based on identical relevant facts. This court has dismissed the three prior petitions as moot following each petitioner's release from custody. See Hernandez, 49 Fla.L.Weekly D324, at *1; Mendez v. Green, No. 3D24-0300 (Fla. 3d DCA Mar. 1,2024); Abreu v. State, No. 3D24-0282 (Fla. 3d DCA Mar. 26, 2024).
There is a well-established exception to the mootness doctrine, fully applicable here: even if the petition is deemed moot, an appellate court nevertheless has jurisdiction to decide the merits where the issue is very likely to recur or, is capable of repetition but evading review. This exception has been relied upon numerous times by this court and the Florida Supreme Court to reach the merits of cases that are procedurally identical to the instant case. For example, in Thourtman v. Junior, 275 So.3d 726 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019), this court reached the merits of a petition for habeas corpus petition, noting that, while the petition was rendered moot following petitioner's release, it was the second petition "presenting virtually identical facts and raising an identical issue." Id. at 731. We held that "because this petition presents a question capable of repetition yet evading review, this court has jurisdiction to hear the merits even if the petition is moot.") (quotation omitted). The Florida Supreme Court, on further discretionary review, reached the merits of the case and approved the decision of this court. Thourtman v. Junior, 338 So.3d 207, 209 (Fla. 2022).
The Florida Supreme Court has adopted, and consistently relied upon, this exception to the mootness doctrine to reach the merits in the same circumstances. For example, in State v. Blair, 39 So.3d 1190, 1191 n.1 (Fla. 2010), the Court reached the merits of the claim even though the defendant had been released from custody, noting:
By the time this case reached this Court, the issue was moot. . . . However, the mootness doctrine does not destroy our jurisdiction in this case. Because this issue is capable of repetition, yet may evade review, we have the authority to retain jurisdiction and decide the issue on the merits under the public exception doctrine.
In Gregory v. Rice, 727 So.2d 251, 252 (Fla. 1999), the Court initially dismissed a petition as moot upon being notified of petitioner's release from custody. Upon a motion for rehearing, the Court granted review and reached the merits "because the issues are of great public importance, are commonly involved in these types of proceedings, and are very likely to recur." See also Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 223 n.1 (Fla. 1984) ("It is well settled that mootness does not destroy an appellate court's jurisdiction, however, when the questions raised are of great public importance or are likely to recur."); Cook v. City of Jacksonville, 823 So.2d 86, 87 n.1 (Fla. 2002) (reaching merits of issue related to elections of state or constitutional officers, noting: "While the 2000 election has passed and no relief may be granted to Cook, we decline to dismiss the Cook case as moot in order to fully explain our decision in these two cases since the issue we address 'is a matter of great importance and of general public interest and will probably recur' in future elections.") (quoting Plante v. Smathers, 372 So.2d 933, 935 (Fla.1979)); Roesch v. State, 633 So.2d 1,2 n.1 (Fla. 1994) (answering certified question of whether a prisoner is required to pay the costs of copies produced pursuant to the Public Records Act, noting that, although "Roesch has recently obtained the $66.83 required to copy the file and has received the copies. . . we have determined to address the certified question because it presents an issue capable of repetition, yet evading review."); Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Jones, 789 So.2d 964, 965 (Fla. 2001) ("Although the issue presented in this appeal may be moot as it relates to these parties, the mootness doctrine does not destroy our jurisdiction when the question before us is of great public importance or is likely to recur.")
Every district court in Florida that has addressed the issue in similar contexts has recognized and applied this exception to reach the merits of claims deemed likely to recur or capable of repetition yet evading review.[
First District Court of Appeal: J.R. v. State, 953 So.2d 690 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (juvenile in delinquency proceeding claimed he was denied his constitutional right to be present at his arraignment; court reached the merits, noting: "We address this otherwise moot issue because it is capable of repetition but evading judicial review." (citation omitted)); Grant v. Credithrift of America, Inc., 402 So.2d 486, 488 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (appellant challenged, as unconstitutional, practice of conducting sheriff's sale of real estate to satisfy debt despite fact that one co-owner claimed homestead interest in undivided one-half interest in real estate; rejecting the suggestion of mootness, the district court observed: "Should we decline on this ground to consider the question presented, no homesteader could ever secure appellate review of the sheriff's practice Because the challenged practice is thus 'capable of repetition, yet evading review,' the issue requires resolution.") (citations omitted). Second District Court of Appeal: Gould v. State, 974 So.2d 441, 444 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (reaching the merits of a habeas corpus petition even though, after the petition was filed, petitioner was released from custody, noting: "However, mootness does not destroy a court's jurisdiction if the question raised is of great public importance or is likely to recur, or if the error is capable of repetition yet evading review.... Because this petition presents a question capable of repetition yet evading review, this court has jurisdiction to hear the merits even if the petition is moot.") (citation omitted). Third District Court of Appeal: Thourtman v. Junior, 275 So.3d 726 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019), see discussion supra at 5; A.M. v. State, 147 So.3d 98, 100 n.4 (Fla. 3d dCa 2014) (in habeas petition challenging whether juvenile met criteria for secure detention, court reached merits even though juvenile had been released from custody, explaining: "[W]e exercise our discretion to do so, since this issue has arisen in the past and is likely to recur. Juvenile detention issues, such as the one raised here, are capable of repetition yet evading review, given their frequent resolution before the appellate court can complete its review and render a merits decision.") (citation omitted). Fourth District Court of Appeal: In Interest of M.C., 567 So.2d 1038, 1039 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on behalf of a child who had been confined in secure detention for longer than the statutory maximum while awaiting placement in a commitment program; the court noted this was "one of many such cases which have been filed in this court" and were mooted by subsequent events. The court noted that although "this case has become factually moot because of placement of the child. . . it is a controversy capable of repetition yet evading review, such that it can be considered on the merits.") Fifth District Court of Appeal: K.P. v. State, 952 So.2d 1229 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (reaching merits of habeas corpus petition challenging continued detention of juvenile, observing: "Though it appears from the face of the order that he will already have been released from the fifteen-day secure detention that the trial court ordered, we consider it an issue capable of repetition and tending to evade review").
The instant case illustrates precisely why the exception to the mootness doctrine exists. Applying the dissenting opinion's analysis, this court would likely never reach the merits of the constitutional validity of this statutory provision, thus depriving certain arrestees of the opportunity to seek release on nonmonetary conditions at first appearance, as currently authorized by an existing rule of criminal procedure but prohibited by a conflicting statute; and depriving the trial courts of needed guidance on a recurring issue. It is worth noting that, given the undeniably recurring nature of this issue, and the circuit court's purported desire for additional guidance, Petitioners and Respondent expressly requested that this court not dismiss the petition as moot, but instead exercise its discretion to reach the merits.
Because the constitutional issue presented is capable of repetition yet evading review, we exercise our discretion under the exception to the mootness doctrine, to address the merits of Petitioners' claim.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
1. The Florida Supreme Court's Exclusive Rule-Making Authority
The Florida Supreme Court's exclusive rulemaking authority is well-established of course, as is the Legislature's exclusive authority to enact substantive laws. While the distinction between "substantive" and "procedural" is often "neither simple nor certain," Markert v. Johnston, 367 So.2d 1003, 1004 (Fla. 1978), the Florida Supreme Court provides guidance on the distinction between the two:
Substantive law has been defined as that part of the law which creates, defines, and regulates rights, or that part of the law which courts are established to administer. State v. Garcia, 229 So.2d 236 (Fla. 1969). It includes those rules and principles which fix and declare the primary rights of individuals with respect towards their persons and property. Adams v. Wright, 403 So.2d 391 (Fla. 1981). On the other hand, practice and procedure "encompass the course, form, manner, means, method, mode, order, process or steps by which a party enforces substantive rights or obtains redress for their invasion. 'Practice
and procedure' may be described as the machinery of the judicial process as opposed to the product thereof." In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So.2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1972) (Adkins, J., concurring). It is the method of conducting litigation involving rights and corresponding defenses. Skinner v. City of Eustis, 147 Fla. 22, 2 So.2d 116 (1941).Haven Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kirian, 579 So.2d 730, 732 (Fla. 1991).
2. Florida Supreme Court Strikes Down Section 907.041(5)(b) in 2005
In Raymond, 906 So.2d at 1048, the Florida Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the then-current version of section 907.041(5)(b),[ contained within the chapter addressing pretrial release of arrestees. The issue presented in Raymond was whether this particular statutory provision was substantive (and thus within the authority of the Legislature to enact) or procedural (and thus within the exclusive rulemaking authority of the Florida Supreme Court). The version of section 907.041(5)(b) addressed in Raymond provided:
In the version of the statute at issue in Raymond, the operative provision was contained in subsection (4)(b). When the statute was amended in 2023, an additional subsection was added and the operative subsection renumbered from subsection (4)(b) to (5)(b). For ease of reference, this opinion refers to both versions as section 907.041(5)(b).
(b) No person charged with a dangerous crime shall be granted nonmonetary pretrial release at a first appearance hearing; however, the court shall retain the discretion to release an accused on electronic monitoring or on recognizance bond if the findings on the record of facts and circumstances warrant such a release.
The Court struck down this provision, holding it was a procedural statute, and thus, an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers principle, noting that the statutory provision did not alter the substantive right to release on nonmonetary conditions, but merely the procedural mechanics of when a court could release an arrestee on nonmonetary conditions:
Under the revised statute, if the defendant is accused of committing one of the specified crimes (in this case, misdemeanor domestic violence) the trial court may only grant nonmonetary release at a hearing held after the first appearance.
...
Because the right to nonmonetary pretrial release is not itself at issue-any person entitled to. . . nonmonetary release before the amendment is still entitled to it after the amendment-this is not a substantive provision. The provision at issue here merely affects the timing of the release on nonmonetary conditions....Raymond, 906 So.2d at 1049-50. See also Knealing v. Puleo, 675 So.2d 593 (Fla. 1996) (declaring unconstitutional a statute allowing a party to make an offer of judgment after mediation ends, concluding the statute was procedural because it altered the time limits for making and accepting an offer of judgment instead of providing for an award of fees.)
3. A Proposed Amendment to Rule 3.131 to Incorporate the Procedural Aspects of Section 907.041(5)(b)
Following the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Raymond, the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee filed a petition proposing an amendment to rules 3.131 and 3.132. See In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.131 and 3.132 , 948 So.2d 731 (Fla. 2007). Relevant to our discussion, one of the proposed amendments would have added a new subdivision (b)(2) to rule 3.131 and would provide as follows:
No person charged with a dangerous crime, as defined in section 907.041(4)(a), Florida Statutes, shall be granted nonmonetary pretrial release at a first appearance hearing. At a subsequent hearing, however, a court has the discretion to release an accused on electronic monitoring, personal recognizance, an unsecured appearance bond, or any condition the court deems appropriate if the findings on the record of facts and circumstances warrant such a release.
This proposed amendment largely mirrored the statutory language contained in the 2005 version of section 907.041 (5)(b) at issue in Raymond.[ Although the Florida Supreme Court adopted other proposed amendments to the rules, see id. at 733, the Court declined to adopt this proposed amendment to rule 3.131.[
"No person charged with a dangerous crime shall be granted nonmonetary pretrial release at a first appearance hearing; however, the court shall retain the discretion to release an accused on electronic monitoring or on recognizance bond if the findings on the record of facts and circumstances warrant such a release."
As is discussed infra at page 19, n.5, the Florida Supreme Court has received, and published for comment, a proposal to amend Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.132, and would incorporate the statutory language contained in the 2024 version of section 907.041(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2024).
4. The 2024 Amendment to Section 907.041(5)(b)
In the 2023 Legislative session, the Florida Legislature enacted Chapter 2023-225, § 1, Laws of Florida, which became effective January 1, 2024. Section 907.041(5)(b), as amended, now provides in relevant part as follows:
A person arrested for a dangerous crime may not be granted nonmonetary pretrial release at a first appearance hearing if the court has determined there is probable cause to believe the person has committed the offense.(emphasis added.)
For our purposes, the only relevant change was the addition of the clause "if the court has determined there is probable cause to believe the person has committed the offense." The State posits that the statute, as amended, contains procedural and substantive aspects, that those aspects are intimately intertwined, and that it therefore passes constitutional muster. However, this same argument was advanced by the State in Raymond, 906 So.2d at 1049, and was rejected by the Court. We find no basis to distinguish the instant provision from the constitutionally infirm provision struck down in Raymond.
a. Are the Procedural Aspects of the Statute "Intimately Intertwined With the Substantive Rights Created by the Statute?"
It is true, of course, that statutes "at times may not appear to fall exclusively into either a procedural or substantive classification." Massey v. David, 979 So.2d 931, 937 (Fla. 2008). And, as the Massey Court reaffirmed, "where a statute contains some procedural aspects, but those provisions are so intimately intertwined with the substantive rights created by the statute, that statute will not impermissibly intrude on the practice and procedure of the courts in a constitutional sense, causing a constitutional challenge to fail." Id. (citing Raymond, 906 So.2d at 1045, 1049 and Caple v. Tuttle's Design-Build, Inc., 753 So.2d 49, 54 (Fla. 2000)).
However, the State's position ignores a critical aspect of the analysis. It is not enough to simply amend the statute to acknowledge a related, but existing, substantive right. As Massey, 979 So.2d at 937, pointed out, a statute may be upheld where the procedural aspects "are so intimately intertwined with the substantive rights created by the statute." (emphasis added). Keeping in mind that the Florida Supreme Court in Raymond found the prior version of this statute unconstitutional because it was procedural- the statute addressed only the timing of when a trial court can release an arrestee on nonmonetary conditions-the relevant inquiry is whether the amended statute creates or conveys any substantive right, because "where a statute does not basically convey substantive rights, the procedural aspects of the statute cannot be deemed 'incidental,' and that statute is unconstitutional." Massey, 979 So.2d at 937 (citing Raymond, 906 So.2d at 1049).
The existing provision ("A person arrested for a dangerous crime may not be granted nonmonetary pretrial release at a first appearance hearing") was amended by adding the clause "if the court has determined there is probable cause to believe the person has committed the offense." While one might hasten to conclude that the addition of a probable cause requirement is substantive, the addition of this language alone does not complete our analysis. We must further examine, as acknowledged by the Florida Supreme Court in Massey and Raymond, whether the amendment "convey[ed] substantive rights." It does not. Rather, it merely references a right that already exists: one that is recognized by both the United States and Florida Constitutions, acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court, and expressly provided for by the rules of criminal procedure promulgated by the Florida Supreme Court. The remainder of the statute contains the identical procedural language which the Court in Raymond, 906 So.2d at 1052, found constitutionally infirm.
Were we to hold that a simple reference to some preexisting substantive right in a statute is sufficient to render an otherwise purely procedural provision a substantive one, we would be paying mere lip service to our well-established jurisprudence that the Legislature may not "create a new procedural rule by statute." Id. at 1051.
b. The Substantive Right to a Probable Cause Determination at First Appearance is Well-Established
Nearly fifty years ago, in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (a case arising in Miami-Dade County) a group of arrestees challenged the constitutional adequacy of Florida's post-arrest process, contending that under the then-existing rules of criminal procedure, "a person arrested without a warrant and charged by information may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending trial without any opportunity for a probable cause determination." Id. at 116. The United States Supreme Court agreed, concluding that Florida's procedure was unconstitutional and holding "that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest." Id. at 115. While the Court recognized the critical importance of this substantive right under the Fourth Amendment, it nevertheless acknowledged the authority of the various states to devise their own procedure to implement this process:
While we limit our holding to the precise requirement of the Fourth Amendment, we recognize the desirability of flexibility and experimentation by the States. It may be found desirable, for example, to make the probable cause determination at the suspect's first appearance before a judicial officer.Id. at 124. See also Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 352 (2001) (reaffirming that "anyone arrested for a crime without formal process, whether for felony or misdemeanor, is entitled to a magistrate's review of probable cause within 48 hours").
Additionally, Article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution contains its own "Search and Seizure" provision. It provides, inter alia, that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. . . shall not be violated." Important for our purposes, it also includes a conformity clause (adopted by general election in 1982), which provides: "This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court." In other words, the protection conferred by this state constitutional right must be guided by and construed in conformity with Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 103. The Florida Supreme Court has adopted just such a procedural rule, consistent with the constitutional mandate announced in Gerstein. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.133, entitled "Pretrial Probable Cause Determinations and Adversary Preliminary Hearings" currently provides in pertinent part:
Nonadversary Probable Cause Determination.
Defendant in Custody. In all cases in which the defendant is in custody, a nonadversary probable cause determination shall be held before a judge within 48 hours from the time of the defendant's arrest; provided, however, that this proceeding shall not be required when a probable cause determination has been previously made by a judge and an arrest warrant issued for the specific offense for which the defendant is charged. The judge after a showing of extraordinary circumstance may continue the proceeding for not more than 24 hours beyond the 48-hour period. The judge, after a showing that an extraordinary circumstance still exists, may continue the proceeding for not more than 24 additional hours following the expiration of the initial 24-hour continuance. This determination shall be made if the necessary proof is available at the time of the first appearance as required under rule 3.130, but the holding of this determination at that time shall not affect the fact that it is a nonadversary proceeding.(emphasis added.)
In sum, an arrestee's substantive right to a probable cause determination is well-entrenched, grounded in the United States and Florida Constitutions, recognized a half-century ago by the United States Supreme Court, and governed by a procedural rule promulgated by the Florida Supreme Court. The additional language annexed to the 2024 version of section 907.041(5)(b) ("if the court has determined there is probable cause to believe the person has committed the offense") adds nothing to the existing substantive right to a probable cause determination following arrest. Accordingly, the 2024 statute remains, as it was in 2005, a procedural statute which "merely affects the timing of the release on nonmonetary conditions." Like the prior version of the statute, "any person entitled to. . . nonmonetary release before the amendment is still entitled to it after the amendment" and therefore- like its 2005 predecessor- "this is not a substantive provision." Raymond, 906 So.2d at 1050.[ And because the 2024 version of section 907.041(5)(b) "does not basically convey substantive rights, the procedural aspects of the statute cannot be deemed 'incidental,' and that statute is unconstitutional." Massey, 979 So.2d 937 (citing Raymond, 906 So.2d at 1049).
We note, parenthetically, that in response to a referral from the Florida Supreme Court, the Criminal Court Steering Committee has recommended amending Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.132 (Pretrial Detention) in light of the legislative amendments to section 907.041, Florida Statutes. See In Re: Amendments to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.132, SC2024-883. As amended, the proposed rule incorporates the statutory language of section 907.041(5)(b) as a rule of criminal procedure, thus curing the constitutional infirmity which led to its invalidation in Raymond (and in the instant case). If the Court adopts the amended rule as recommended by the Steering Committee, rule 3.132(f)(1) would provide as follows:
(f) Custody; Release Conditions.
(1) Dangerous Crime. At first appearance, a judge must not grant nonmonetary pretrial release if there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed a dangerous crime listed in section 907.041, Florida Statutes. After first appearance and after a finding of probable cause, a person arrested for a dangerous crime listed in section 907.041, Florida Statutes, may not be released on nonmonetary conditions under the supervision of a pretrial release service unless the service certifies to the court that it has investigated or otherwise verified the conditions set forth in section 907.041(3)(b), Florida Statutes.
CONCLUSION
We therefore grant the petition and hold that section 907.041(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2024) infringes upon the exclusive rulemaking authority of the Florida Supreme Court and is an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers in Article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution.
Because Petitioners have already been released from custody, we withhold formal issuance of the writ.
LOGUE, C.J., concurs.
LINDSEY, J., dissenting.
Petitioners, Giselle Romero and Wachovia Middlebrooks, were arrested and charged, in separate incidents, with misdemeanor battery designated as domestic violence. Both appeared for their first appearance on March 19, 2024. At that hearing, the trial court advised it would not be granting pretrial services based on section 907.041(5)(b), Florida Statutes, as amended effective January 1, 2024. Later that day, Romero and Middlebrooks, through counsel, filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus arguing the statute is unconstitutional. The next day, both were released from custody.
My esteemed colleagues reach the merits of this petition and agree with Romero and Middlebrooks that section 907.041(5)(b) is unconstitutional. I respectfully dissent and would dismiss the petition as moot because "[w]e lack authority to issue appellate opinions on moot or academic questions that lack practical effect in settling the rights of the litigants." McGraw v. DeSantis, 358 So.3d 1279, 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (dismissing petition for quo warranto as moot where respondent declared petitioner's school board seat vacant because she did not live in the district but, shortly thereafter, the county redrew the district boundary lines, placing petitioner's residence within the district so that "any appellate decision on [petitioner's] underlying petition would grant no effectual relief").
It follows that "an appeal becomes moot if 'by a change of circumstances prior to the appellate decision, an intervening event makes it impossible for the court to grant a party any effectual relief[.]'" Id. (quoting Montgomery v. Dep't of Health and Rehab. Servs., 468 So.2d 1014, 1016 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)); see also Hernandez v. State, 49 Fla.L.Weekly D324 (Fla. 3d DCA Feb. 7, 2024) (denying petition for habeas corpus because the "purpose of habeas corpus is to test legality of restraint on liberty" but petitioner was "unable to demonstrate there is 'a significant restraint imposed on [his] liberty'" where he "was released from custody during the pendency of the petition" (citing Anglin v. Mayo, 88 So.2d 918, 920 (Fla. 1956)) (quoting Lambertson v. State, 479 So.2d 773, 774 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985))); Abreu v. State, No. 3D24-0282 (Fla. 3d DCA Mar. 22, 2024) (dismissing petition for habeas corpus as moot because petitioner was released from custody after filing); Mendez v. Green, No. 3D24-0300 (Fla. 3d DCA Mar. 1, 2024) (same); Conley v. Cannon, 708 So.2d 306, 306-07 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (explaining that "[r]elease of the [petitioner] as soon as application is made to this court to review the proceeding, as happened in [Blalock v. Rice, 707 So.2d 738, 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)] and again in this case, does not rectify the deprivation of a citizen's rights[,]" but still denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus "because the controversy has been rendered moot by the vacation of the order of confinement"); Little v. Gualtieri, 353 So.3d 675, 676 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (denying petition for writ of habeas corpus as moot "because the circuit court ordered [petitioner] released soon after he filed it").