Opinion
366327
12-14-2023
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 22-003331-CZ
Before: LETICA, P.J., and O'BRIEN and CAMERON, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, Francis Romeo, appeals as of right the order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants, William Pritula Excavating and William Pritula, under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (statute of limitations). We affirm.
Although summary disposition was granted in favor of both defendants, only defendant William Pritula Excavating is a named appellee in this case. For clarity we refer to defendants collectively as "defendants." Defendant-appellee, William Pritula Excavating, is called "Pritula Excavating."
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case involves alleged "[c]lean up and debris removal" by Pritula Excavating at plaintiff's former home in Romulus, Michigan. In 2015, the City of Romulus ("the City") contracted with Pritula Excavating to clean up and remove debris from the home. On November 12, 2015, Pritula sent the City an invoice for the work at plaintiff's home. The City, in turn, added these costs to plaintiff's property tax bill, which he received in September 2016. Plaintiff apparently never paid these assessed costs and, in February 2022, the City seized and later razed plaintiff's home.
Plaintiff argued below that this work was never completed. Whether the work was actually completed is not directly relevant to resolution of this appeal. Rather, the issue on appeal is the date the claim arose and whether the statute of limitations expired on the basis of this date.
Plaintiff filed the complaint related to this appeal on March 21, 2022, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation by defendants. Defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing that the limitations period of plaintiff's claim was expired. The trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.
II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Plaintiff contends the trial court incorrectly dismissed his complaint on the basis of the statute of limitations. We disagree.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo motions for summary disposition. Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich. 557, 561; 664 N.W.2d 151 (2003). Questions regarding the timeliness of a party's claim are also reviewed de novo. Farley v Advanced Cardiovascular Health Specialists PC, 266 Mich.App. 566, 570; 703 N.W.2d 115 (2005). Summary disposition is proper under MCR 2.116(C)(7) when the statute of limitations bars a claim.
This case further involves issues of statutory interpretation and of administrative orders from our Supreme Court, which are reviewed de novo. Farley, 266 Mich.App. at 570-571; Carter v DTN Mgt Co, ___ Mich. App___, ___n 1;___ N.W.2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 360772); slip op at 3. "Principles of statutory construction apply to determine the Supreme Court's intent in promulgating rules of practice and procedure." Linstrom v Trinity Health-Mich, ___Mich App___, ___; ___N.W.2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 358487); slip op at 6. "When courts interpret statutes, they must first look to the specific statutory language to determine the intent of the Legislature, and if the language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute reflects the legislative intent and judicial construction is not permitted." City of Grand Rapids v Brookstone Capital, LLC, 334 Mich.App. 452, 459; 965 N.W.2d 232 (2020).
B. LAW AND ANALYSIS
The proceedings below included multiple hearings involving oral arguments by the parties. One such hearing was defendants' motion for summary disposition on March 2, 2023. This hearing is directly relevant to plaintiff's disagreement with the trial court's resolution of defendants' motion for summary disposition. MCR 7.210(B)(1)(a) states, in relevant part: "The appellant is responsible for securing the filing of the transcript as provided in this rule .... [T]he appellant must order from the court reporter or recorder the full transcript of testimony and other proceedings in the trial court or tribunal." Plaintiff plainly violated this rule by failing to secure the relevant lower court transcript for the appellate court record. Given the authoritative nature of the rule that the party "must" order a copy of the transcript, this issue is waived for lack of a complete record. See, e.g., Leelanau Co Sheriff v Kiessel, 297 Mich.App. 285, 288-289; 824 N.W.2d 576 (2012) (declining to consider an issue for an appellant's failure to order the relevant transcripts). Further weighing in favor of waiver is the fact that plaintiff's argument on appeal rests almost completely on the assumption that the trial court considered the wrong statute of limitations when it dismissed plaintiff's complaint. The trial court's order dismissing plaintiff's complaint did not explicitly state the relevant statute of limitations. Without the transcript of the proceedings, it is impossible to determine which statute of limitations the trial court relied on in granting defendants' motion for summary disposition.
But, even briefly considering plaintiff's argument, we conclude the trial court correctly granted summary disposition. We agree with plaintiff that the statute of limitations for his claim of common-law fraud is 6 years. MCL 600.5813. Plaintiff's claim accrued on November 12, 2015, when Pritula Excavating sent the invoice to the City. MCL 600.5827 (A claim for commonlaw fraud "accrues at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results."). Even accounting for tolling under our Supreme Court's administrative orders related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the limitations period of plaintiff's claim expired before plaintiff filed the complaint on March 21, 2022. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed the case on the basis of the statute of limitations.
Plaintiff did not explicitly state his claim was for common-law fraud. But, looking to the gravamen of the allegations, Kuznar v Raksha Corp, 272 Mich.App. 130, 134; 724 N.W.2d 493 (2006), we determine the basis of his complaint was common-law fraud.
See Administrative Order No. 2020-3, 505 Mich. cxxvii (2020); Administrative Order No. 202018, 505 Mich. clviii (2020).
III. SANCTIONS
Plaintiff's arguments that sanctions are warranted is limited only to plaintiff's questions presented. There is no substantive argument anywhere in plaintiff's amended brief on appeal explaining why sanctions are warranted. Thus, plaintiff's belief that counsel for defendants committed sanctionable offenses is plainly abandoned as it is impossible to determine plaintiff's argument. MOSES Inc v SEMCOG, 270 Mich.App. 401, 417; 716 N.W.2d 278 (2006) ("If a party fails to adequately brief a position, or support a claim with authority, it is abandoned.").
Affirmed.