Opinion
October 5, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Murphy, J.).
It is well settled that leave to amend a pleading should be freely given ( see, CPLR 3025 [b]), that the decision whether to grant such leave is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court ( see, Edenwald Contr. Co. v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 957, 959; Kramer Sons v. Facilities Dev. Corp., 135 A.D.2d 942; Fulford v. Baker Perkins, Inc., 100 A.D.2d 861), and that the court's determination will not be lightly set aside ( see, Beuschel v. Malm, 114 A.D.2d 569). In exercising its discretion, the court should consider how long the amending party was aware of the facts upon which the motion was predicated, whether the amendment is meritorious, and whether a reasonable excuse for the delay was offered ( see, Caruso v. Anpro, Ltd., 215 A.D.2d 713; Moeller v. Astor Chocolate Corp., 214 A.D.2d 548; Pellegrino v. New York City Tr. Auth., 177 A.D.2d 554, 557).
In the instant case, it was an improvident exercise of discretion to grant the third-party defendants' motion for leave to amend their answer. The third-party defendants failed to proffer any reasonable excuse for their two-year delay in seeking leave to amend their answer despite the fact that they had been aware of all the essential facts during that period. More importantly, the third-party defendants failed to produce even a scintilla of evidence that there was any merit to their proposed amendments.
O'Brien, J. P., Sullivan, Joy and Friedmann, JJ., concur.